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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Contribution
Economic inequality has increased considerably in many Western countries over
the past decades.1 The growing gap between rich and poor is now one of the main
issues on the policy agendas around the world. The recent period of economic
crisis in the aftermath of the 2008 financial market collapse in the United States
has rendered issues concerning the distribution of economic resources, in general,
and questions of the appropriateness of extremely high earnings, in particular,
even more urgent (OECD, 2011, p. 17). Austerity measures in the context of
the euro crisis have recently triggered social unrest in countries like Greece and
Spain where these measures are perceived to affect the poor disproportionally.
The “Occupy Wallstreet” movement, which presses policy makers for steps against
growing social and economic inequality, has popularized the catchphrase “We are
the 99% ”. Interestingly, this slogan directly refers to academic research on the
increasing income share of the richest 1% of the US population, which is nowadays
back to historically high levels.2 The latter example especially shows that the
distribution of economic resources across the population is not just a matter for
1For extensive overviews, see Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997); Atkinson and Piketty (2007);
OECD (2008, 2011); Atkinson (2008b); Salverda et al. (2009).
2Figures of this trend over the last century (e.g., Piketty and Saez, 2007b, pp. 147 ff.) have become
widespread not only in academic journals but also in leading newspapers (New York Times,
Oct. 26, 2011: “It’s Official: The Rich Get Richer”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung,
Oct. 14, 2012: “Amerika entdeckt den Klassenkampf ”).
1
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public debate and policy making. On the contrary, the analysis of distribution is
long since “back in from the cold” (Atkinson, 1997) and has turned from “watching
the grass grow” (Aaron, 1978) to an active and relevant area of research in public
economics. This dissertation contributes to the literature on economic inequality
with a special focus on Germany. In the remainder of this section, I will outline
why the study of economic inequality, in general, is a relevant area of research with
important implications for policy making and public debate. In the next section,
I will give an overview of the specific research questions that are addressed in the
single chapters and briefly present the main results.
Why should economists care? In addition to public and policy makers’ in-
terest in issues concerning economic inequality, there is also scientific interest in
this topic. Salverda et al. (2009) argue that there are mainly three reasons for
being interested in economic inequality. First, the distribution of economic re-
sources and factors that influence this distribution “were central concerns at the
outset of market economics” (p. 6). In addition, according to Musgrave (1959),
income redistribution is one of three functions of government activity alongside the
efficient allocation of resources and macroeconomic stabilization. Hence, the dis-
tribution of resources is a key component of economic research whereby the focus
of the literature has shifted from functional to personal distributions over the last
decades (Goldfarb and Leonard, 2005). Second, both citizens and policy makers
have strong normative feelings about inequality. Economists should, therefore, be
able to provide answers to economic phenomena that are of such vital concern
for agents in the political process (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000, p. 4). In-
deed, scientific interest in income distribution has increased alongside increases
in inequality (Jenkins and Micklewright, 2007a). Finally, even if inequality itself
were not of great interest, there are a number of important implications that come
with it. For example, many economists argue that inequality is not a bad thing
per se. On the contrary, inequalities in relative factor prices are fundamental
to the functioning of market economies. With a special focus on labor markets,
Welch (1999) emphasizes that inequalities in wages are “good” since they signal
scarcities, provide incentives for investments in human capital and compensate for
different job attributes. However, Welch himself states that inequality becomes
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“destructive” when society does not view effort as worthwhile and upward mobil-
ity is perceived unlikely or even impossible. In general, public opinion in market
economies shares economists’ view that absolute equality in economic outcomes
is not desirable and that inequalities are, to a certain degree, not only inevitable
but even necessary (Salverda et al., 2009, p. 7). However, if income differences are
viewed as insurmountable, social cohesion as well as acceptance of market economy
and even democracy are challenged (Stiglitz, 2012).
So, is inequality “good” or “bad” at the end of the day? Atkinson (1997) argues
that the normative assessment of equity is rather concerned with mobility over
the lifecycle or across generations and not with cross-sectional income differences.
However, there is evidence that economies with greater levels of inequality also
show lower levels of mobility (Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti, 1997; OECD, 2008) which can
hamper equality of opportunity (Roemer, 1998) and, hence, justice. In addition,
a recent strand in the literature shows that relative income positions matter for
subjective well-being of individuals (Luttmer, 2005; Senik, 2005; Clark et al., 2008).
Moreover, Bartels (2008) and Gilens (2012) show for the US that increasing levels
of economic polarization can lead to political polarization. Governments seem to
become more responsive to preferences of the aﬄuent population while preferences
of low and middle income earners – the majority of the electorate – are less or even
not at all represented when a small fraction of the population commands a large
share of economic resources (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007).3
To sum up, in light of these direct and indirect effects of economic inequality
on various dimensions, there are good reasons why economists should carry out
sound analyses of the distribution of resources across households and individuals.
This should serve as a basis for explaining causes and consequences to policy
makers and the wider public. Given that there is no consensus on an “optimal
level of inequality”, it is very difficult for decision makers to judge whether a
society experiences levels of inequality that actually harm public welfare or not.
An objective basis for decision making should, therefore, consider the specific
causes and implications of inequality, since it is usually the result of a complex
3Murray (2012) cites the former US Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis (1856–1941): “We
can have democracy in this country, or we can have great wealth concentrated in the hands of a
few, but we cannot have both” (p. 1).
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interaction of various contributions and determinants that are discussed in the
following. Speaking with Jenkins (1995), one should know “whodunnit” (p. 29).
Inequality of what among whom? When dealing with economic inequality as
a research subject the question “inequality of what among whom” arises (Goldfarb
and Leonard, 2005). The answer to the part “among whom” is straightforward for
economists. The term economics dates back to the ancient Greek word oikos which
means household. Hence, the essence of the economics discipline is the study of
the smallest unit of individuals within an economy jointly carrying out production
and consumption activities. The question of “what” is related to the underlying
concept of economic resources and is much more complex. Analyses of inequal-
ity are typically concerned with the distribution of wages, earnings or income.4
However, there are “several steps between relative factor prices and [...] disposable
income among households” (Atkinson, 2003a, p. 23). The most important steps
in this process are the creation of gross market income from various sources and
all household members, the design of the government’s tax and transfer system as
well as patterns of household formation and composition.
Firstly, gross labor earnings make up the largest share of total household in-
comes and are an important driver of income inequality (Atkinson, 2008b). A
vast literature in labor economics deals with rising wage and earnings dispersion.
Common explanations are changes in the supply and demand for skills and tasks
as well as changing labor market institutions and policies.5 In addition, differ-
ences in wages and earnings are affected by pay differentials across gender, race,
occupations or sectors.6 Other market incomes, from self-employment and private
pensions as well as from capital and property, have also gained importance as
4In addition, there are some studies on consumption inequality (see, e.g., Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln et al.,
2010; Heathcote et al., 2010; Meyer and Sullivan, 2010, 2011).
5See Autor et al. (1998); Katz and Autor (1999); Card and Lemieux (2001); Goldin and Katz
(2008); Autor et al. (2008); Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for studies on the effects of skill-biased
technological change and increasing international trade with low-wage countries. The role of
the minimum wage and trends of de-unionization have, among others, been investigated by
DiNardo et al. (1996); Fortin and Lemieux (1997); Card and DiNardo (2002); Lemieux (2006).
6See Altonji and Blanc (1999); Blau and Kahn (2000, 2006); Kunze (2005); Arulampalam et al.
(2007) for an overview of the literature on gender and racial wage gaps and Ehrenberg and
Schwarz (1987); Pederson et al. (1990); Hundley (1991) for pay differentials across the private
and public sector. Chapter 2 deals with a related issue.
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sources of both income and inequality (Frick and Grabka, 2003, 2010; OECD,
2011). A recent strand in the literature deals with the contribution of top in-
comes to overall inequality and shows that large shares of total pre-tax income are
increasingly concentrated among the rich (Piketty and Saez, 2003; Atkinson and
Piketty, 2007; Atkinson et al., 2011).
Secondly, another important determinant of household income is the tax and
transfer system.7 Governments redistribute market incomes via income and payroll
taxes as well as cash and in-kind benefits. The level of redistribution, i.e., the dif-
ference between inequality of market and disposable income, is determined by the
institutional setting of the economy as well as voters’ and policy makers’ per-
ceptions and preferences for redistribution from rich to poor (see McCarty and
Pontusson, 2009, for an overview of the political economy of redistribution).8
Finally, total disposable household income depends on the household context,
i.e., the number, composition and characteristics of individuals actually forming
households. For given wages and labor market conditions, gross earnings depend
on the number of hours worked, while taxes paid and cash benefits received are de-
termined by the characteristics of and the family relationships within households.
Hence, the household context, which has changed tremendously over the past dec-
ades, determines the distribution of resources both within and across households
in the economy.9 The observed distribution of disposable income is not simply a
matter of mechanically applying the tax and transfer schedule to gross incomes for
a given household composition, but the result of complex interactions between the
market production of gross income (joint decisions on labor supply and savings)
and the formation of households (marriage, cohabitation and fertility decisions,
7See, among others, Slemrod (1992); Poterba (2007); Piketty and Saez (2007a); Bargain and
Callan (2010); Peichl and Doerrenberg (2012) for analyses of the (re)distributional effect of tax
and transfer policies.
8For example, Bargain et al. (2011) decompose the change in after-tax income inequality in
the US over a period of 30 years and isolate the direct policy effect on inequality. They find
that tax reforms implemented under Democrat (Republican) administrations had an equalizing
(disequalizing) effect. As a consequence of partisan politics, the overall policy effect almost
cancels out over the whole time period.
9See Jenkins (1995); Cancian and Reed (1998, 1999); Burtless (1999, 2009); Hyslop and Mare
(2005); Daly and Valletta (2006); Martin (2006); Bover (2010); Schwartz (2010) for studies
addressing the role of changing household and family structures for inequality. Chapters 3 and
4 contribute to this literature.
CHAPTER 1. 6
ageing and retirement), which might, in turn, be affected by incentives from the
tax and transfer system. Therefore, it is an enormous challenge to formulate “mod-
els of the household income distribution, incorporating not only models of labour
market earnings [...] and the demographic factors affecting who lives with whom”
(Jenkins and Micklewright, 2007a, p. 19). This issue is beyond the scope of this
thesis and, instead, the analysis is restricted to particular aspects and “building
blocks” (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000, p. 5).
The discussion of different concepts of economic resources has so far been re-
stricted to either gross or disposable income and, hence, to the flow dimension
of economic resources. However, recently interest in the stock dimension, the ac-
cumulation of assets commanded by households and individuals, has increased.
Stiglitz et al. (2009) recommend including the analysis of wealth when assessing
the well-being of the population, which is important for the analysis of economic
inequality for several reasons. First, wealth is typically much more unequally dis-
tributed than income (Davies et al., 2011) and should therefore complement the
analysis of inequality. Second, wealth fulfils several important economic functions.
It serves as a source of income, utility and power as well as social status and helps
to stabilize consumption over time (Wolff and Zacharias, 2009; Michelangeli et al.,
2011). Finally, especially with regard to the analysis of inequality at the top of
the distribution, the composition of the rich subpopulation is very heterogenous
in terms of income and wealth (Atkinson, 2008a; Waldenstro¨m, 2009). In fact,
inequality in wealth can differ substantially from inequality in income (OECD,
2008; Ja¨ntti et al., 2008; Roine and Waldenstro¨m, 2009).10
The case of Germany. Germany has long been a country with comparatively
low levels of income inequality among the OECD world. Although still exhibiting
average levels of inequality, the growth in the income gap has been considerably
fast since the turn of the millennium (OECD, 2008, 2011). Therefore, empirical
results in the academic literature relating to inequality in Germany differ sub-
stantially, depending on the specific period under consideration. After World War
II, the distribution of income was quite stable until the 1980s, inequality started
growing slowly in the 1990s and growth accelerated around 2000 (Dell, 2005, 2007;
10Chapter 5 analyzes the joint distribution of income and wealth at the top.
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Atkinson, 2007b). Drivers of this trend have mainly been gross incomes, especially
at the top of the distribution (Bach et al., 2009; Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln et al., 2010).
Special attention has been paid to the development of wage inequality and the
effects of globalization, technological change and changes in wage bargaining on
the labor market (Dustmann et al., 2009; Antonczyk et al., 2010). In addition
and in line with similar experiences in other countries, capital and property have
become more important income sources, which are very unequally distributed and
increasingly contribute to overall inequality (Frick and Grabka, 2003; Fra¨ssdorf
et al., 2011). This is also reflected in the growth of wealth inequality in Germany
(Hauser, 2003; Frick et al., 2010). The reunification of East and West Germany in
1990 and the transition process of the former East afterwards has also rendered the
overall distribution more unequal (Schwarze, 1996; Grabka et al., 1999; Biewen,
2005; Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln et al., 2010).
Moreover, household composition has changed considerably. For example, Ger-
man household size is now the second lowest among OECD countries (OECD,
2008), which has important implications for the distribution of income. While
market income inequality is relatively high in Germany, inequality in disposable
income after taxes and transfers is average in international comparisons (OECD,
2008, 2011). This is mainly due to the progressive system of income taxation.
Although there is some evidence that a series of reforms after 2000 have reduced
the redistributive effect of the income tax, it is still characterized by a high level
of progression (Corneo, 2005; Bach et al., 2011).
In a series of reports on poverty and richness in Germany (Bundesregierung,
2001–2012) the German federal government regularly monitors the development
of inequality across various dimensions and gives an overview of the population’s
attitude to distributional issues. Moreover, the government states its general as-
sessment of the current level and future development of inequality and how it
intends to address this. According to these reports, policy makers and the pub-
lic in Germany are, generally, very concerned with inequality and preferences for
redistribution are quite high (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).
Hence, Germany is an interesting case for the study of inequality, since every
component determining the overall distribution of economic resources described
above plays an important role in this country: Market income inequality has in-
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creased substantially over the past decades, the tax and transfer system is strongly
redistributive and reduces market inequality. Moreover, the population structure
has distinctly changed and inequality is an important issue on the policy agenda.
1.2 Agenda and Summary of Results
The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the empirical literature on economic
inequality in Germany. The studies presented in the following chapters differ with
respect to both “inequality of what” as well as “among whom”. More precisely,
the underlying concept of economic resources varies between earnings, gross and
net household income as well as household wealth. At the same time, the extent to
which the household context is involved in the analysis ranges from individuals to
couples to the entire household. In the remainder of this section, I will first briefly
outline the overall agenda of the thesis and then summarize the proceedings as
well as the main results of each chapter separately.
Agenda. The agenda is as follows. Chapter 2 addresses the literature on the
dispersion of individual earnings and deals with a very specific case of a wage gap
by testing for an earnings premium for German members of parliament. Chapter
3 extends the analysis of earnings inequality beyond the individual level and con-
siders the household context and studies the role of marital sorting on inequality
of couple earnings while taking into account labor supply behavior of spouses.
Whereas chapters 2 and 3 are confined to the analysis of the distribution of gross
labor earnings, chapter 4 is concerned with the distribution of total household
income (gross and net) and examines the role of changing household structure.
Finally, while the previous chapters analyze the flow of earnings and incomes,
chapter 5 extends the analysis to the stock dimension of economic resources and
looks at the joint distribution of household income and wealth at the top. Chapter
6 concludes.
Chapter 2. Individual Earnings: The Politicians’ Wage Gap. A vast
literature in (labor) economics deals with the dispersion of individual gross wages
and earnings. As discussed before, labor earnings make up a large share of total
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household income and, therefore, earnings inequality is a “subject of real signific-
ance for everyone” (Atkinson, 2008b, p. 3). While a large portion of differences
in remuneration of workers can be explained by differences in human capital as
well as labor market conditions and policies, there is still a significant share that
remains unexplained. A number of analyses have shown that compensating wage
differentials, rent-seeking behavior and discrimination also play an important role
in explaining pay differences. Moreover, the current economic crisis has rendered
issues concerning the appropriateness of high earnings an important topic in public
debate. Hence, for the assessment of whether earnings inequalities are equitable,
it is crucial to determine whether they can be justified or not.
Chapter 2 deals with a very specific case of a wage gap and tests whether
there is an earnings premium for German members of parliament (MPs). Of
course, the pay of a tiny number of MPs (in comparison to the total population)
cannot noticeably affect the entire distribution of earnings in Germany. However,
politicians’ earnings attract wide media attention and, therefore, have a strong
impact on the public’s attitudes towards equitable pay, particularly since members
of parliament command legislative power that can be used for regulative and/or
redistributive purposes. Hence, with respect to the assessment of pay adequacy,
German MPs are of special interest.
There are, however, arguments in favor of a positive wage gap for politicians.
The citizen candidate framework suggests an income premium in the form of a
compensating wage differential for the uncertainty of (re)election as well as for
campaigning costs. Moreover, a wage premium for MPs could be beneficial for
society if it attracted more able individuals to run for office and, as a consequence,
yielded a more efficient provision of public goods.
Using a unique dataset of German MPs, this chapter analyzes the politicians’
wage gap (PWG). After controlling for observable characteristics as well as ac-
counting for election probabilities and campaigning costs, we find a positive earn-
ings premium for MPs which is statistically and economically significant. The
results are consistent with the citizen candidate model when comparing MPs to
citizens occupying executive positions. However, it shrinks to zero when restricting
the control group to top level executives.
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Chapter 3. Couple Earnings: Marital Sorting and Labor Supply. Stud-
ies on pay differentials like chapter 2 are mainly concerned with the adequacy of
and inequalities in individual earnings. However, earned income is not only de-
termined by a worker’s productivity (the wage rate) but also by the number of
hours worked, which results from labor supply coordination within households.
Chapter 3 extends the analysis beyond the distribution of pay across individuals
to the investigation of joint couple earnings. Increases in the correlation of spouses’
earnings in couple households has been interpreted as an increasing similarity of
spouses in terms of earnings-related characteristics (assortative mating), which has
an amplifying effect on inequality since it reduces the level of redistribution within
households. Previous studies on this issue can largely be classified as accounting
approaches since observed earnings distributions are compared to counterfactuals
by manipulating the correlation between male and female earnings. However, the
role of labor supply behavior has so far not been taken into account.
In this chapter, I measure the effect of non-random sorting of spouses on in-
equality across couple households in West Germany from 1986 to 2010 by matching
couples randomly to each other and predicting counterfactual labor supply choices.
This allows me to quantify the pure effect of sorting in earnings potential rather
than observed earnings. Using German microdata as well as a behavioral microsim-
ulation model, I find that the impact of observed sorting on earnings inequality
among couples turned from slightly equalizing to slightly disequalizing in recent
years, but is generally rather neutral. However, after adjusting for the effect of
labor supply choices, I find that sorting in productivity has a much stronger impact
on earnings inequality.
Chapter 4. Income Inequality, Household Size and the Welfare State.
Increasing correlation of spouses’ earnings is only one aspect of changing living
arrangements and household contexts in many Western countries. More generally,
structural shifts in household composition are linked to rising inequality, since the
number and characteristics of individuals living together affect the distribution of
economic resources due to income sharing within households.
Chapter 4, therefore, addresses the effect of changing household compositions
on inequality in pre and post government income (after subtracting income and
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payroll taxes and adding benefit payments to market incomes) and, hence, pays
special attention to the role of the tax and transfer system in Germany. Moreover,
while the previous chapters deal with the important role of gross income inequality,
economic well-being depends on resources that are available for current and future
consumption, i.e., disposable income. The aim of this chapter is to quantify the
effect of changes in household composition that are accompanied by changes in
employment patterns on the income distribution. The case of Germany is of special
interest in this respect since the demographic development is not only characterized
by an ageing population, but also by a sharp fall in average household size.
Using German microdata, we find that the growth of the income gap between
1991 and 2007 is indeed strongly related to changes in household composition.
The result for income inequality before taxes and transfers is much larger than the
result for inequality in disposable incomes. This means, that the welfare state has
largely compensated for inequality induced by changes in household structure.
Chapter 5. Multidimensional Aﬄuence: Income and Wealth. In line
with many other analyses of economic inequality, chapters 2–4 apply concepts of
economic resources that exclusively deal with the flow dimension. However, well-
being is usually not perceived as an one-dimensional phenomenon and, recently,
there is also an increasing interest in the stock dimension. In addition, top income
and wealth shares of very rich households have been identified as important drivers
of overall economic inequality.
Chapter 5 contributes to both strands of the literature and extends the analysis
beyond income, introducing a family of multidimensional measures of aﬄuence.
The analysis is concerned with the role of both income and wealth for the top of the
distribution and compares Germany to the US. Since “the rich” are an important
source of both economic growth and economic inequality, it is important to know
who the rich in society are, how much they have and what kind of resources they
command. When determining who belongs to the top, the literature has so far
only been concerned with a single dimension and has mainly focused on the shares
of top fractiles.
However, neither a headcount ratio nor top shares are satisfying measures for
(inequality of) economic well-being at the top because they do not account for
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changes in the composition or in the distribution among the top. Moreover, ana-
lyzing top income and wealth shares separately does not reveal insights about their
joint distribution. In contrast to commonly used top income shares, the proposed
multidimensional aﬄuence measures allow for the analysis of the extent, intensity
and breadth of aﬄuence within a common framework.
We illustrate this by analyzing the role of income and wealth as dimensions of
multidimensional well-being in Germany and the US in 2007, as well as for the US
over the period 1989–2007. We find distinct country differences with the country
ranking depending on the measure. While in Germany wealth predominantly
contributes to the intensity of aﬄuence, income is more important in the US.
Chapter 2
Individual Earnings:
The Politicians’ Wage Gap∗
2.1 Introduction
The remuneration of politicians is widely debated in many countries. In partic-
ular, the fact that politicians can set their own salary frequently triggers public
criticism whenever their wages increase. This might be one of the reasons why
ever-larger fractions of the populations of Western democracies perceive that the
political class has separated itself from the electorate, forming an elitist circle
of substantive political power and little accountability (Hay, 2007). In addition,
rising economic inequalities have amplified the general discontent with politicians,
since the political elite belongs to the top of the income distribution, removed from
the average citizen (Gilens, 2005; Solt, 2008).1 There are, however, also arguments
for a positive wage gap. From a positive point of view, the citizen candidate frame-
work suggests an income premium for politicians as a form of compensation for the
uncertainty of (re)election as well as for campaigning costs (Osborne and Slivinski,
1996; Besley and Coate, 1997). Moreover, a larger salary could raise the cost of
∗This chapter is based on the paper The Politicians’ Wage Gap: Insights from German Members
of Parliament (joint with Andreas Peichl and Sebastian Siegloch, see Peichl et al., 2012).
1The German case is of special interest as the reputation of politicians in Germany seems to be
lower than the reputation of most other occupations and has been decreasing for many years
(Allensbacher Archiv, 2008). In addition, trust in German politicians is rather low compared
to several other European countries (European Social Survey, 2007).
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abusing political office (Becker and Stigler, 1974). From a normative perspective,
a wage premium for politicians could be beneficial for society if it attracted more
able individuals to run for office and as a consequence yielded a more efficient
provision of public goods (Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Messner and Polborn, 2004).
In this chapter we empirically test whether there is a politicians’ wage gap
(PWG) for German members of parliament (MPs) conditional on qualification as
well as election probabilities and campaigning costs.2 To the best of our knowledge,
this has not been investigated before. We make use of a unique microdata set of
personal and professional information on German MPs, providing detailed insight
into their earnings (including remuneration from public office and outside earnings)
as well as their occupation before entering parliament (Becker et al., 2009). We
combine these data with the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), a
microdata set which is representative for the German population and thus for
the electorate. We estimate election probabilities as well as campaigning costs for
candidates running for the German parliament in order to calculate MPs’ expected
income. The empirical analysis then proceeds in two steps in order to estimate
the PWG. First, we employ a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to
account for observable characteristics that affect earnings. Second, we make use
of semi-parametric matching techniques in order to further increase comparability
between MPs and voters.
Our results show that both the sign and the size of the wage gap depend on the
definition of the control group and the MPs’ income. On average, politicians earn
more than citizens in executive positions after controlling for observed character-
istics, most importantly qualification. Using a broad definition of executives, the
PWG varies between 35% and 65% depending on the specification (corresponding
to 20,000–36,000 euros per year). Robustness checks suggest that these results are
unlikely to be biased by positive selection into politics. When defining the control
group more narrowly, the wage gap shrinks and is statistically indistinguishable
from zero for “top level” executives, suggesting that German politicians’ pay is
2Previous research has only examined income differentials between public and private sector
employees. See Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1987); Bender (1998) and Gregory and Borland (1999)
for overviews. Although most studies concentrate on US data, similar results are obtained
for other countries (e.g., Pederson et al., 1990; Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1993; Melly, 2005;
Gorodnichenko and Peter, 2007).
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not excessive in this case. These findings are consistent with the citizen candidate
framework, which stipulates a non-negative wage gap. The wage gap mechanically
decreases when excluding politicians’ outside earnings, while it increases consider-
ably when neglecting election probabilities and campaigning costs.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we discuss the theoretical
concept underlying our empirical analysis. Section 2.3 describes the institutional
background and the data. In section 2.4 we lay out our empirical strategy and
present the results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Background
In this section we use the citizen candidate framework (Osborne and Slivinski,
1996; Besley and Coate, 1997) to provide a theoretical explanation for a non-
negative income differential for members of parliament when compared to the
electorate. All citizens initially find themselves in a situation of political competi-
tion and have to decide whether to run for office (Cadigan, 2005). Citizens weigh
the costs of running for office against the uncertain individual benefits of winning
the election.3 Typically, the necessary condition for a rational citizen to decide to
run for political office takes the form (Caselli and Morelli, 2004):
p · (W office −W private) ≥ CC. (2.2.1)
Hence, the difference between income from public office (W office) and market
income in the private sector (W private) weighted by the election probability (p) has
to compensate for the direct campaigning costs (CC) associated with candidacy.
From expression (2.2.1) it follows directly that the pay of politicians should exceed
in the long run the incomes of comparable citizen in order to compensate for the
uncertainty of (re)election and for the sunk costs of candidacy.
The model has implications for the selection of candidates with regard to qual-
ification. The effect of ability on participation is mixed. On the one hand, high-
3See Besley (2004); Mattozzi and Merlo (2008); Gersbach (2009); Braendle and Stutzer (2010)
and De Paola and Scoppa (2011). For empirical applications, see Ferraz and Finan (2009);
Gagliarducci et al. (2010) and Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2012).
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ability citizens have a larger expected income in the private sector and therefore
face a smaller (perhaps negative) wage premium when running for office. On the
other hand, if voters prefer competent citizens in political office, better qualified
candidates are more likely to win the election and might face lower costs due to
more efficient campaigning.
The politicians’ wage gap. The main purpose of this study is to empirically
test whether there is a wage premium for German MPs which can neither be ex-
plained by advantageous characteristics of politicians, such as qualification, nor by
a compensation for uncertainties and campaigning costs stemming from electoral
competition. In order to specify what we refer to as the politicians’ wage gap
(PWG), we define a binary indicator Ri, which equals 1 if individual i decides to
run for office and 0 otherwise. Individual income Yi is defined as:
Yi(Xi, pi) =
pi ·WMPi (Xi) + (1− pi) ·W citi (Xi)− CCi if Ri = 1W citi (Xi) if Ri = 0, (2.2.2)
where Xi denotes individual characteristics and pi ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of
being elected. When running for office, income is the probability weighted sum of
remuneration from public office WMPi and potential income in the private labor
market W citi net of campaigning costs CCi. When not running for office, income
simply equals the market income of a citizen given characteristics Y citi . Comparing
the incomes of two individuals i (a candidate) and j (a citizen) with identical
characteristics Xi = Xj = X˜ yields a definition of the relative wage gap:
PWG unc
(
X˜, pi
)
= pi ·
(
WMP (X˜)
W cit(X˜)
− 1
)
− CCi
W cit(X˜)
. (2.2.3)
Expression (2.2.3) defines the unconditional PWG, taking into account the uncer-
tainty of candidate i being (re)elected as well as the requirement of investing in
the election campaign.4 From the perspective of the citizen candidate framework,
4We also estimate the conditional wage gap, defined as PWG cond(X˜) = W
MP (X˜)
W cit(X˜)
−1. It neglects
election probabilities and campaigning costs and is nested in (2.2.3). This wage gap is observed
by the electorate and thus relevant for the perception of the political elite’s pay.
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the unconditional PWG of an elected MP should in general be weakly greater than
zero, assuming that candidates form realistic expectations regarding election prob-
abilities and campaigning costs, otherwise they would not have decided to run for
office. Alternatively, a positive wage premium for politicians could be interpreted
as a prize for winning the political tournament.
2.3 Institutional Background and Data
The Bundestag is the lower house of the German parliament and its members are
elected to four-year terms. Each eligible voter has two votes. The first one is
directly attributed to a candidate representing the electoral district. This part of
the election has the features of a majority-rule voting system. The second vote is
for a party which may then, according to its share of party votes, send candidates
from predefined electoral lists to the Bundestag. This part of the election has
the feature of proportional representation. While each directly elected candidate
represents one of the 299 electoral districts, candidates on the party lists capture
the remaining 299 seats in accordance with their party’s overall share of second
votes. Due to 16 additional surplus mandates, the Bundestag comprised a total
number of 614 seats in its 16th legislative period (Oct. 2005–Sept. 2009).
Data. The empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset comprising personal
and professional information on German MPs, which is an extended and updated
version of the data used by Becker et al. (2009). We include only MPs who
have been members of the Bundestag for the entire period under consideration.
Hence, 599 MPs remain in the sample for the year 2006. We extract all available
data, including biographical and socio-demographic information as well as data
on previous occupations and political offices, from the MPs’ individual Bundestag
websites (see table 2.6.1 in the appendix).
We calculate the annual gross earnings as the sum of basic remuneration from
public office, payments for cabinet members, pensions, interim allowances and
outside earnings. Each MP receives a remuneration which is determined by the
Bundestag itself (7,009 euros per month in 2006, see Bundestag, 2009). Further-
more, MPs who are both members of the Bundestag and the Federal Government
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are paid extra. When a member of the government resigns, she receives interim
payments for the number of months served as a member of the cabinet – a total of
at least six months but not more than three years (Bundesministergesetz, 2008).
After resigning from office the former minister is entitled to a public pension if the
position was held for at least two years.
In order to improve accountability, German MPs have been obliged by law
to disclose information on outside employment since 2005 (Bundestag, 2010). All
MPs have to report professional activities and sources of income which they pursue
outside their political mandates. The level of transparency is fairly high compared
to many other countries (Djankov et al., 2010). For each payment, it is indicated
whether it is received on a regular (annual or monthly) basis or one-off (Bundestag,
2011b). Outside earnings are published according to four categories: (1) below
1,000 euros, (2) 1,000–3,500 euros, (3) 3,500–7,000 euros and (4) more than 7,000
euros. The highest category has no upper bound. In order to obtain a measure
of outside earnings in this category, we follow Becker et al. (2009) and assume a
maximum of 12, 000 euros, which yields a linearly increasing difference between
the category means.5 Finally, we calculate the amount of outside earnings for each
MP by using average values for each category.
All earnings are before taxes and are likely to underestimate an MP’s total
income. First, we do not include capital income due to a lack of data. Second,
we do not consider the (partly tax-free) allowances for office-related expenses, as
they are not necessarily part of the individual’s earnings. Third, we do not include
additional incomes paid to (vice-)chairmen of the parties’ parliamentary groups,
as this information is not publicly available for all parties and MPs.6
We combine the politicians’ data with representative survey data for the elect-
orate taken from the SOEP (Wagner et al., 2007) and construct the same socio-
5As this choice may induce distortions, we experiment with several alternatives – including the
categories’ lower bounds. The results do not change qualitatively. In terms of quantitative
effects, note that the chosen upper bound level is a conservative assumption (Becker et al.,
2009). Hence, if the estimated effects are biased, they will be underestimated. We check the
information on outside earnings with other data sources, such as newspaper reports and MPs’
personal statements.
6Office-related allowances mainly cover expenses at the constituency level (about 3,700 euros
per month), staff costs (more than 14,000 euros) and travel costs. Party salaries can be quite
substantial. For example, a vice-chairman of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) receives 3,451
euros per month.
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demographic variables for the electorate in 2006. Total gross earnings are cal-
culated at the individual level by accumulating labor earnings, fringe benefits,
pensions and bonus payments. Education is based on the CASMIN classification
(Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations), the sector of em-
ployment on the ISCO-88 classification (International Standard Classification of
Occupations). Non-German individuals younger than 18 years are excluded since
they are not eligible to vote. Note that in many datasets, larger incomes are not
very well covered. To tackle this issue, the SOEP includes a special high-income
sample to increase the representativeness of the upper tail of the income distri-
bution, which has been validated against administrative data (Frick et al., 2007;
Bach et al., 2009). Therefore, the SOEP is the main data source for the German
government’s reports on poverty and aﬄuence. We use the SOEP’s population
weights to make the data representative.
Samples. MPs in the German Bundestag are the top politicians in Germany.
They face a relatively heavy workload and have personnel responsibility, which
certainly distinguishes them both from an average employee and from an average
(local) politician. For these reasons we consider MPs as holding executive positions
in terms of occupation and only compare them to citizens working in similar jobs.
As a baseline, we start with a rather broad comparison group which follows the
SOEP definition and includes individuals in leadership positions across various
occupational sectors working full-time. The sample, which we refer to as “all
executives”, comprises master craftsmen, self-employed people, members of the
liberal professions (e.g., medical doctors, lawyers or architects), managers (of both
for-profit and not-for-profit organizations) as well as public sector executives and
high-level civil servants. To check the sensitivity with respect to the control group,
we narrow down the definition in two steps by excluding certain professions from
the “all executives” sample. Firstly, we drop master craftsmen as well as self-
employed persons and liberal professionals without employees from the baseline
and refer to this sample as “white collar executives”. Secondly, we define the
“top level executive” sample as managers as well as liberal professionals and the
self-employed with ten or more employees.
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Descriptive statistics. Table 2.3.1 summarizes the distribution of characterist-
ics among the German population eligible to vote, our three executive samples and
the MPs. Despite efforts to increase the number of women in professional leader-
ship positions, female politicians are clearly under-represented in the Bundestag.
The share of females is even smaller among executives (17%–22%). Both execut-
ives and MPs turn out to be older and much better educated than the electorate
as a whole. More than 40% of the executives are classified as high-skilled and the
proportion among MPs can be as much as twice this. Furthermore, MPs often
exhibit occupational backgrounds in the public sector, while many executives are
self-employed. Regarding our research question, we are especially interested in the
comparability of MPs and executives in terms of annual gross earnings. With a
median of 24,000 euros (in 2006), the center of the electorate’s distribution is far
below the center of the distributions of “all executives” and of MPs’, which exhibit
median values of 42,000 and 86,100 euros. MP earnings average at 106,000 euros,
while the mean among the electorate is 28,100 euros and 56,100 euros in the “all
executive” sample. Comparing the three executive samples, the narrowing of the
definition becomes apparent in the rising mean and median earnings.
Election probabilities. Due to its mixed-member electoral system (see above),
there are two ways to enter the Bundestag: either by winning the majority of
votes in an electoral district or by being ranked sufficiently high on a party list.
We quantify the probabilities of being elected for both channels separately. We
first turn to the probability of being elected directly in one of the 299 electoral
districts.
For decades districts have been won only by candidates from the two major
parties with Christian (Social) Democrats being more successful in the South and
West (North and East) as well as in rural and Catholic (urban and protestant)
areas.7 Hence, the party’s share of first votes in the previous election (2002) can
be regarded as a meaningful predictor of the 2005 vote share and implicitly the
probability of winning a majority in the district. In fact, the data show that an
7Exceptions are the three districts in the East of Berlin where the Left Party’s candidates received
the majority of first votes several times. In 2005 a candidate running for the Green Party was
successful in another Berlin district for the first time.
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Table 2.3.1: Characteristics of the German electorate and MPs (2006, in %)
Electorate All executives White collar Top level MPs
Gender Female 52.2 22.1 19.9 16.9 32.2
Age 18 – 29 16.7 4.9 4.3 4.8 1.2
30 – 39 15.0 21.0 21.8 20.7 12.5
40 – 49 20.1 35.9 35.3 39.6 24.2
50 – 59 16.2 27.1 26.1 23.8 41.4
60 – 69 15.3 9.9 10.8 7.3 19.9
≥ 70 16.8 1.2 1.7 3.7 0.8
Education Low-skilled 15.4 2.3 1.2 0.0 0.2
Medium-skilled 68.0 56.5 47.1 48.0 17.0
High-skilled 16.6 41.2 51.6 52.0 82.8
Region West Germany 77.4 77.5 83.4 87.3 78.0
Occupational status Not working 47.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Part-time 14.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Full-time 38.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sector Private sector 36.2 18.2 20.0 68.3 40.1
Public sector 8.3 15.1 24.7 3.7 53.4
Self-employed 5.6 66.7 55.3 28.0 6.5
Annual earnings Mean 28,135 56,110 70,036 88,536 105,698
(in euros) Median 24,000 42,000 55,059 72,000 86,108
Observations 20,836 1,505 985 299 599
Source: SOEP and Bundestag, own calculations.
individual candidate can influence the electoral outcome only marginally (e.g., by
popularity or campaigning effort). To quantify the probability, we retrieve the
2002 first vote shares for each party in each of the 299 districts. We then run a
logistic regression of the binary outcome variable elected (= 1 if the candidate is
elected, 0 otherwise) on party and state dummy variables and on the 2002 first
vote share.8 We use the predicted values for the MPs in our dataset.
The election of party list candidates works as follows. In each of the 16 German
states every party sets up a separate list (Landesliste). The total share of second
votes determines a party’s total number of seats in parliament. After subtracting
each party’s number of directly elected MPs, the remaining total is then allocated
to the state party lists (net of the direct candidates) according to the share of
8The predicted probabilities for the major parties’ candidates are displayed in figure 2.6.1 in the
appendix. Note that there are two distinct curves with similar shapes for both major parties.
The one more to the left (with fewer observations) represents Eastern German districts where
the Left Party receives a much larger share of votes than in the West and the probability of
winning the relative majority is greater for a given vote share.
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second votes in the respective state. This number finally determines how many
party list candidates enter parliament. Consequentially, a candidate’s election
probability on a party list is a function of the rank and the number of seats
allocated to the party. To estimate these probabilities, we construct a dataset of
all party list candidates running for the 2005 election of the Bundestag, based on
information from the federal agency administrating elections (Bundeswahlleiter,
2011). We run a logistic regression of the binary outcome elected on a set of
explanatory variables. These comprise state and party dummies, the rank on the
respective party list, a binary indicator for the traditional, major parties (the
Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and the Left Party in the Eastern
states) as well as several interaction terms. Moreover, we include a binary variable
indicating whether the party list rank is “promising”, i.e., if it had allowed the
candidate to enter parliament in the previous election. Based on the estimated
coefficients, we use the predicted values for the elected MPs in our dataset.9 The
overall probability of being elected is the maximum of the probabilities of being
elected either through a party list or directly in an electoral district. In table 2.3.2
we present the estimated probabilities for all candidates and elected MPs.
Campaigning costs. Campaigning costs can be regarded as a necessary invest-
ment to be made before being (re)elected and hence reduce an MP’s income. The
amount of campaigning costs can be expected to vary across MPs, depending on
various individual characteristics. Unfortunately, detailed information regarding
campaigning expenses from the politicians under consideration is not available.10
The only reliable source of information on campaigning expenses are the parties’
annual statements of accounts (Bundestag, 2011a). In Germany political parties
are legally obligated to report their financial situations to the President of the
9See figure 2.6.2 in the appendix. In some cases (especially for Christian and Social Democrats)
predicted probabilities are rather low even for highly ranked candidates. This is due to the fact
that in some federal states one of the major parties regularly wins almost every district (first
vote) and hence the respective party does not send any list candidate to parliament.
10There are only very few MPs who provide information on individual campaigning costs
(see, e.g., Martin Do¨rmann reporting personal expenses of 10,000 euros, http://www.
martin-doermann.de/live/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/glaeserne-taschen.pdf, 10–
19–2011). Moreover, neither party headquarters nor parliamentary groups were willing or able
to provide detailed information upon request.
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Table 2.3.2: Estimated election probabilities
Obs. Mean Sd Min Max
Party list
All candidates 1,843 0.208 0.360 0.000 1.000
Elected MPs 384 0.828 0.242 0.001 1.000
Elected MPs (major parties) 249 0.781 0.260 0.001 1.000
Electoral district
All candidates 1,196 0.250 0.397 0.000 1.000
Elected MPs 299 0.880 0.226 0.021 1.000
Elected MPs (major parties) 295 0.881 0.225 0.021 1.000
Overall
Christian Democrat 216 0.861 0.216 0.032 1.000
Social Democrat 221 0.863 0.217 0.107 1.000
Green Party 46 0.939 0.128 0.340 1.000
Liberal Party 61 0.918 0.173 0.380 1.000
Left Party 53 0.850 0.287 0.001 1.000
None 2 0.964 0.001 0.963 0.965
Elected MPs 599 0.873 0.215 0.001 1.000
Source: Bundeswahlleiter (2011), own calculations.
Bundestag on an annual basis and separately for each federal state. We collect data
on the parties’ expenses from the statements of accounts during the period 2004–
2009. We subtract revenues (i.e., party donations and government subsidies) to
calculate yearly net expenses by party and state. As in some states the Bundestag
elections coincide with other elections, we need to subtract the effect of those other
elections on expenses. We, therefore, run a state-party fixed effect regression of
net expenses on federal, state, district and European election year dummies and
predict the expenses for the year 2005 as if there had not been any other election.11
Thus, we obtain the net expenses per electoral seat for the 2005 Bundestag elec-
tion by state and party. We define these as campaigning costs that the individual
candidates have to bear.
The results are displayed in table 2.3.3. On average, campaigning costs amount
to 23,500 euros per seat and there is considerable variation not only across parties
11Regression outputs are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 2.3.3: Estimated campaigning (in euros)
Party
State Christ. Dem. Social Dem. Green Liberal Left Total
BB 22,333 61,295 9,804 19,578 24,888 27,580
BE 21,892 35,157 12,333 22,542 25,420 23,469
BW 18,215 36,351 11,080 19,239 22,983 21,573
BY -13,153 30,121 10,424 19,564 22,411 13,873
HB 52,756 21,886 692 18,950 23,898 23,636
HE 20,329 38,659 11,682 16,131 24,161 22,192
HH -13,632 49,603 6,561 16,172 21,189 15,978
MV 15,811 36,783 10,364 18,368 23,014 20,868
NS 23,474 36,094 11,042 18,819 22,695 22,425
NW 36,787 49,789 14,411 23,443 22,848 29,455
RP 30,589 41,588 11,326 21,176 23,122 25,560
SA 21,487 35,899 12,881 17,898 21,674 21,968
SH 24,878 39,474 14,203 19,181 28,754 25,298
SL 14,302 40,092 9,647 19,144 23,170 21,271
SN 73,567 58,198 13,005 11,399 34,079 38,050
TH 19,764 40,900 12,787 17,925 25,850 23,445
Average 23,087 40,743 10,765 18,721 24,385 23,540
Source: Bundestag (2011a), own calculations. Estimated campaigning costs per seat by state
and party.
but also across states. Interestingly, when comparing the two major parties, the
campaigning costs for Social Democrats are on average much higher than for Chris-
tian Democrats (41,000 versus 23,000 euros), which is due to considerably larger
donations for the latter. Note that the negative values in table 2.3.3 indicate that
revenues, especially from donations, exceeded expenses. In those cases we set the
individual campaigning costs of the candidate to zero. The estimated campaigning
costs can be regarded as an upper bound from the individual candidate’s perspect-
ive, since it is highly unlikely that the candidate has to bear personally all of the
additional costs. Usually, candidates receive (financial) support from their local
party as well.
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2.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
2.4.1 Ordinary Least Squares
The model. In order to estimate the politicians’ wage gap as defined in section
2, we enter an indicator variable Pi, which takes on the value 1 if individual i is
an MP and 0 otherwise. Annual earnings Yi for MPs and citizens are defined as
follows:
Yi =
p̂i ·WMPi + (1− p̂i) · Ŵi − ĈCi if Pi = 1W citi if Pi = 0. (2.4.1)
For citizens we use the information on gross earnings W citi from the SOEP. For MPs
we use the information collected on earnings WMPi multiplied by the estimated
election probabilities p̂i. Potential earnings of an MP in the private sector Ŵi are
predicted values based on estimated coefficients from an OLS regression on the
sample of citizens. Campaigning costs ĈCi are calculated as described above.
In order to operationalize equation (2.4.1), we employ a dummy variable ap-
proach which is standard for detecting wage differentials between subgroups in
empirical labor economics (see, e.g., Pederson et al., 1990; Kunze, 2005). As is
common, instead of estimating the model in levels, we use the log of Yi, which
yields the following Mincerian earnings equation (Mincer, 1974) to be estimated
using ordinary least squares (OLS):
ln(Yi) = β0 + β1Pi + βXi + µi. (2.4.2)
A positive and significant estimate of β1 would provide empirical evidence in fa-
vor of a wage premium for politicians. Put another way, the coefficient on the
politicians’ dummy variable corresponds exactly to PWG unc(X˜, pi) from equa-
tion (2.2.3). In terms of the citizen candidate model β̂1 measures by how much
p · (W office − W private) exceeds CC (cf. (2.2.1)). We control for a vector Xi of
demographic characteristics which have been shown to be standard determinants
of earnings, such as gender, qualification, age, tenure or number of children. The
error term is denoted by µi. Depending on the specification of the model, we also
include interaction terms between certain characteristics and the politician dummy
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in order to test for heterogeneous effects.
OLS results. Table 2.4.1 presents estimation results of equation (2.4.2) for the
three different executive samples defined above.12 Specification (1) shows a posit-
ive and significant (at the 0.01 level) coefficient on the dummy variable politician
of 0.501. This suggests that MPs ceteris paribus earn 65% more than non-MP
citizens.13 The coefficients on the covariates have the expected signs: tenure and
age, measuring specific and general human capital respectively, have a positive but
decreasing effect on earnings. Education has a positive effect on annual earnings.
Compared to the low-skilled, high-skilled (medium-skilled) individuals have a pos-
itive income differential of 149% (57%). The female dummy reveals the well-known
gender wage gap (Oaxaca, 1973) – in our case of around 30%, which is compar-
able to previous estimates for Germany (Kunze, 2005; Arulampalam et al., 2007).
The variables concerning party affiliation confirm that supporters of those parties
which are said to promote more business friendly policies – Christian Democrats
and Liberals – earn about 20–30% more than supporters of leftist parties (Social
Democrats, Green Party, Left Party).14 Living in East Germany reduces annual
gross individual earnings considerably. Finally, private sector employees earn more
than individuals in the public sector or self-employed.
In specification (2) we restrict the income of MPs to their remuneration from
public office. The PWG decreases mechanically to 0.324 (38%), but remains stat-
istically and economically significantly. In models (3)–(6) we compare the MPs to
more narrowly defined executive samples. As expected, the estimated wage gap
shrinks. When applying the “white collar” sample, the wage gap for total income
is 0.428 (53%), while the coefficients on the covariates hardly change. Using the
“top level executives”, the coefficients for both income definitions are not signi-
ficantly different from zero. This results is still in line with the citizen candidate
12In this section we focus on the results when applying the unconditional income concepts for
MPs following definition (2.2.3). We also estimate the conditional wage gap. As expected
PWG estimates shift upwards (see table 2.6.2 in the appendix).
13Note that β̂1 can be interpreted only in percentage terms for small values. From (2.4.2) it
follows that ln(Y |P = 1)− ln(Y |P = 0) = β1 and thus Y |P=1−Y |P=0Y |P=0 = exp(β1)− 1.
14Note that survey respondents in the SOEP report their party preferences. Hence, we are able
to use information on party affiliation not only for MPs but also for the citizens in our sample.
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Table 2.4.1: OLS – Unconditional wage gap: Baseline results
Executive sample All White collar Top level
MP income Total Remun. only Total Remun. only Total Remun. only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Politician 0.501∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.049 -0.127
(0.086) (0.085) (0.084) (0.083) (0.158) (0.158)
Tenure 0.006 0.006 -0.005 -0.005 0.007 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Tenure2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.050∗ 0.050∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.005 0.005
(0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.034) (0.034)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Medium-skilled 0.453 0.453 0.255∗ 0.255∗ 0.145 0.144
(0.314) (0.314) (0.144) (0.144) (0.153) (0.153)
High-skilled 0.914∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗
(0.308) (0.308) (0.151) (0.151) (0.164) (0.164)
Female -0.284∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.056) (0.056) (0.082) (0.082)
Married 0.012 0.012 0.067 0.067 0.089 0.090
(0.058) (0.058) (0.063) (0.063) (0.086) (0.086)
Children 0.087 0.087 -0.014 -0.014 0.203∗∗ 0.203∗∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.067) (0.067) (0.091) (0.091)
Christ. Dem. 0.191∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.077) (0.077)
Liberal 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.124 0.124 0.332∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.097) (0.105) (0.105) (0.113) (0.113)
East -0.397∗∗∗ -0.397∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.063) (0.063) (0.100) (0.100)
Self-employed -0.234∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ 0.097 0.097
(0.050) (0.050) (0.058) (0.058) (0.093) (0.093)
Public sector -0.241∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -0.444∗∗∗ -0.444∗∗∗ -0.054 -0.055
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.111) (0.111)
Constant 8.763∗∗∗ 8.763∗∗∗ 8.794∗∗∗ 8.793∗∗∗ 10.089∗∗∗ 10.088∗∗∗
(0.893) (0.893) (0.508) (0.508) (0.769) (0.769)
Adjusted R2 0.331 0.331 0.376 0.376 0.436 0.436
Observations 2104 2104 1584 1584 898 898
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and
0.01 (***).
CHAPTER 2. 28
framework, which stipulates a non-negative wage gap.
Group-specific results. The results for the PWG in table 2.4.1 represent an
average effect for all of the MPs under consideration. To provide further evidence
of whether the wage gap differs for politicians from different socio-demographic
backgrounds, we interact the politicians’ dummy with other characteristics. We
estimate the specifications on the “all executive” sample and include all covariates
shown in table 2.4.1 (for total MP income).
The results displayed in table 2.4.2 suggest that we do not find additional
returns to tenure. Specification (2) shows that the wage gap for high-skilled politi-
cians is much lower (0.815− 0.381 = 0.434) than for medium-skilled MPs (0.815),
representing the omitted category. As far as gender is concerned, table 2.4.2 shows
a positive and significant coefficient on the Politician x Female interaction term.
This positive coefficient neutralizes the negative gender pay gap found in the full
sample (cf. table 2.4.1), so that women in politics do not earn significantly less
than male politicians. This is not surprising since male and female MPs receive
the same basic pay from holding public office.15 A similar logic applies to the
PWG of East German politicians. While the baseline results in table 2.4.1 show
that earnings in the East are much lower for the combined MP-citizen sample, the
Politician x East interaction term yields a positive sign. This indicates that the
East-West pay gap is significantly smaller among politicians.
Interestingly, as far as party affiliation is concerned, the results of specification
(5) suggest that members of more leftist parties exhibit a substantially larger wage
gap conditional on observable characteristics than members of right-wing parties.
More precisely, the wage premium for Liberal and Christian Democrat MPs de-
creases to 0.289 and 0.354 respectively compared to 0.641 for leftist MPs. This is
due to the fact that left-wing voters earn less on average (see table 2.4.1).16 Hence,
15This might help to explain why Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2011) find that generous remu-
neration for public office has stronger effects for female than for male candidates in Finland.
Similarly, running the earnings regression on the MP sample yields an insignificant gender
dummy estimate.
16Especially the Social Democrats as well as the Left Party traditionally are supported by blue-
collar workers, with close ties to trade unions. The right-wing parties in Germany are histor-
ically more business-friendly, which might explain why they receive around 70% of total party
donations (Bundestag, 2011a). These patterns can be expected to have an effect on MPs’
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the wage gap is wider when comparing the incomes of an average left-wing MP and
of a comparable left-wing voter. Finally, the PWG is not different for MPs who
were self-employed before becoming politicians but larger for MPs who previously
worked in the public sector. In specification (7) we control for all interaction terms
simultaneously and the results do not change considerably. As a result, the group-
specific results suggest that existing income differentials between socio-economic
groups (male-female, West-East, left-right) in the overall population are mitigated
or even neutralized in the politicians’ sample. The earnings distribution among
MPs seems to be much more homogenous than in the private labor market.
Table 2.4.2: OLS – Unconditional wage gap: Interaction effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Politician 0.514∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.107) (0.090) (0.087) (0.093) (0.082) (0.099)
Pol. x Tenure -0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Pol. x H-skill -0.381∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.070)
Pol. x L-skill 0.470 0.482
(0.326) (0.316)
Pol. x Female 0.336∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.063)
Pol. x East 0.238∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.067)
Pol. x Liberal -0.352∗∗∗ -0.160
(0.101) (0.108)
Pol. x Christ. Dem. -0.287∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗
(0.065) (0.064)
Pol. x Self-empl. 0.091 0.047
(0.085) (0.072)
Pol. x Public sector 0.282∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗
(0.079) (0.079)
Adjusted R2 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.328
Observations 2104 2104 2104 2104 2104 2104 2104
Notes: Regressions estimated on sample of all executives. MP income is defined as total
earnings. In addition to the interaction terms, all covariates from table 2.4.1 are included
in each specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are 0.1 (*),
0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
earnings after retiring from politics (Eggers and Hainmueller, 2009; Querubin and Snyder,
2009).
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Selection on unobservables. Like all empirical studies our analysis is subject
to the well-known danger of omitted variable bias. If there is an unobserved con-
founder that affects both selection into politics and earnings, the estimates of our
wage gap are biased. In the context of our study, such an unobserved confounder
could be related to the politicians’ personality. For instance, it might be that
politicians have certain qualities, such as higher motivations, more competitive-
ness or better networking skills, that make them more likely to enter politics and
at the same time have a positive effect on their earnings.
In order to assess the potential impact of such a positive selection, we make
use of the 2005 wave of the SOEP, which contains information on the Big Five
personality traits of respondents.17 The Big Five is a theoretical measurement sys-
tem stemming from psychology which has been shown to describe an individual’s
personality comprehensively along five dimensions: openness, conscientiousness,
extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. Previous research has shown that
neuroticism and (to some extent) agreeableness have a negative effect on earnings
and job performance (see, e.g., Nyhus and Pons, 2005; Borghans et al., 2008, for
surveys). We are able to replicate this relationship with our “all executive” sample.
As we do not have any information about the personality traits of MPs, we
need to impute their Big Five values. In order to provide an upper bound for a pos-
itive selection into politics based on personal characteristics, we assume that MPs
have average scores (compared to executives) on the dimensions that do not affect
earnings (i.e., openness, conscientiousness and extraversion). For agreeableness
and neuroticism we, however, assign them values that are one standard deviation
lower than the average, which will have a positive effect on their earnings (due to
the negative coefficient in the earning equation). The overestimation becomes ap-
parent when looking at the mean values for agreeableness and neuroticism across
samples. While the averages in the electorate are 5.40 and 3.88 respectively, the
mean values in the “all” (“top level”) executive sample are 5.26 and 3.70 (5.25
and 3.53). In contrast, the imputation method assigns politicians values of 4.38
and 2.43, which are considerably lower. Another reason for us to believe that this
17Previous research has shown that the Big Five are stable over time (Cobb-Clark and Schurer,
2012); hence we can use the panel structure of the data and link the personality information
from 2005 to our 2006 data.
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procedure leads to an upper bound is the fact that the scarce research on the Big
Five in the political arena indicates that politicians are more extraverted and more
agreeable than the average citizen (Caprara et al., 2003; Gerber et al., 2011). Note
that the latter relationship would even suggest a negative selection into politics
based on personal characteristics, i.e., lower wage premia for politicians.
Table 2.4.3: OLS – Unconditional wage gap including Big Five
Executive sample All White collar Top level
MP income Total Remun. only Total Remun. only Total Remun. only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Politician 0.380∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.142 -0.154 -0.330
(0.100) (0.100) (0.116) (0.115) (0.202) (0.202)
Openness -0.028 -0.028 0.010 0.010 -0.006 -0.006
(0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.020) (0.043) (0.043)
Conscientiousness 0.011 0.011 -0.004 -0.004 0.021 0.021
(0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.041)
Extraversion 0.037 0.037 0.014 0.014 0.054 0.054
(0.036) (0.036) (0.030) (0.030) (0.039) (0.039)
Agreeableness -0.046 -0.046 -0.013 -0.013 -0.004 -0.004
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.037)
Neuroticism -0.034∗ -0.034∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.048 -0.048
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031)
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.354 0.404 0.404 0.469 0.469
Observations 1894 1894 1451 1451 860 860
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. In addition to Big Five, all covariates from
table 2.4.1 are included in each specification. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and
0.01 (***).
Table 2.4.3 shows that even if the selection into political careers based on
personal traits is wholly positive (with respect to earnings) our estimates are quite
robust. As expected, all coefficients decline, but the PWG remains positive for
specification (1)–(3) and statistically indistinguishable from zero otherwise.18
18Based on the findings by Caprara et al. (2003), we also assign politicians an above average
level of extraversion as a robustness check. The results do not change as extraversion does not
significantly affect earnings.
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2.4.2 Matching
The model. As table 2.3.1 shows, the MPs differ from the executives in sev-
eral characteristics. Matching, an econometric technique popular in the field of
labor economics (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008), is a method to further increase
the comparability of politicians and executives. In general, matching is applicable
if the population under consideration can be divided into one sub-population re-
ceiving a treatment (in our case being a politician) and another sub-population
of untreated individuals (citizens). Matching is a way to tackle the problem that
we cannot observe what politicians would have earned if they had not been elec-
ted, by finding the most appropriate match in terms of observable characteristics
within the control group to calculate the counterfactual outcome. Hence, match-
ing ensures that only the nearest neighbors in terms of characteristics are used to
estimate the PWG (Imbens, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).19 Furthermore,
the matching framework allows us to assess the relevance of potential unobserved
factors influencing the PWG. As discussed in section 2.4.1, this might be especially
important as unobserved motivation or assertiveness could explain at least some
of the PWG.
We define a binary “treatment” indicator Pi ∈ {0, 1} that takes the value 1
if an individual is an MP and 0 otherwise. Again, the outcome variable Yi(Pi) is
annual gross earnings. We are interested in estimating the average treatment effect
on the treated (ATT), which is defined as:
τATT = E[Y (1)|P = 1]− E[Y (0)|P = 1], (2.4.3)
with E[.] standing for expectation. The ATT is equal to the potential income
differential if it were possible to draw an individual i randomly from the sample
of MPs and allow the simultaneous pursuit of a career as a non-MP citizen in
the regular labor market. In order to construct the counterfactual E[Y (0)|P =
1], we identify a “statistical twin” among the non-treated in terms of observable
characteristics. As matching on numerous characteristics X causes dimensionality
19In that sense, matching is comparable to non-parametric regression methods such as kernel
estimation, since it allows identification without explicit assumptions regarding the (potentially
non-linear) functional form of the association between dependent and independent variables.
CHAPTER 2. 33
problems, we follow standard practice and condition on the propensity score of
being treated. That is, we estimate the probability of being a politician given X,
Pr(P = 1|X), with a standard probit model.20 The covariates X control for self-
selection into the treatment, which in the case of becoming a politician is certainly
a very specific and individual decision (Belman and Heywood, 1989; Gregory and
Borland, 1999).
Matching results. We estimate the propensity score of being a politician using
a simple probit model, controlling for all the socio-demographic variables available
in our data, such as age, tenure, qualification, gender, presence of children, marital
status, occupational position (for politicians before becoming MPs) and region.21
As done in section 2.4.1, we estimate the PWG using three different defini-
tions of the control group. Table 2.4.4 presents the results of the propensity score
matching with the logarithmized annual earnings as the outcome variable. We em-
ploy a one-to-one nearest neighbor matching specification with replacement and a
caliper of one-quarter of the standard deviation of the estimated propensity score
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). The ÂTT for full earnings and the “all executive”
sample is significant (at the 0.01 level) and estimated at 0.312, which indicates
that being a politician increases earnings by more than 35% on average. The t-
statistics at the lower part of table 2.4.4 show that matching on the propensity
score balances treatment and control groups well. The only exception is the East
covariate, for which we, nevertheless, do not find large difference between the two.
In addition, the mean standardized bias after matching (2.20) is very small and
suggests that matching was successful (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The ÂTT
remains positive and significant, when using MPs’ basic pay as the outcome vari-
able for politicians – excluding outside earnings, payments for cabinet members,
pensions and interim allowances.
Specifications (2) and (3) of table 2.4.4 show that narrowing the control group
20Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that propensity score matching ensures independence of
treatment from the potential outcome, which is one of the two identifying assumptions of the
matching estimator – the other one being the common support assumption.
21Note that the interpretation of the coefficients of the propensity score estimation is not eco-
nomically relevant. Neither is the purpose of the propensity score estimation to predict the
selection into treatment, but to balance the covariates. For completeness, estimation results of
the probit estimations are presented in table 2.6.3 in the appendix.
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Table 2.4.4: Matching – Baseline results
(1) (2) (3)
Executive Sample All White collar Top level
Treated observations 599 599 599
Control observations 1,505 985 299
Full earnings
ATT 0.312 (0.061)*** 0.221 (0.090)*** -0.270 (0.534)
Rosenbaum Γ 2.4 1.8 −
Basic remuneration from public office
ATT 0.135 (0.060)** 0.045 (0.089) -0.447 (0.534)
Rosenbaum Γ 1.6 − −
t-statistics / % bias reduction:
Age -0.03 / 99.5 0.20 / 96.3 6.93 / 12.5
High-skilled -0.39 / 97.5 -4.03 / 67.2 -1.68 / 85.4
Medium-skilled 0.31 / 97.9 3.95 / 66.9 1.60 / 86.0
Children -0.37 / 96.8 -0.49 / 95.5 1.44 / 84.7
Gender 0.12 / 96.5 0.37 / 91.5 0.06 / 99.1
East 1.96 / -103.4 0.00 / 100.0 -0.35 / 86.8
Married 0.06 / 91.1 0.56 / 75.3 -0.51 / 54.9
Public sector -0.06 / 99.5 0.81 / 91.6 -0.12/ 99.3
Self-employed 1.12 / 97.3 2.09 / 94.3 -0.00 / 100.0
Standardized Bias 2.20 5.70 6.58
Note: Estimates are based on “psmatch2” by Leuven and Sianesi (2010) and “rbounds”
by Gangl (2004). One-to-one nearest neighbor matching is conducted with replacement
and a caliper of 0.25 · σprop.score. ATT refers to average treatment effect on the treated.
Standard errors of ATT (shown in parentheses) are corrected following Abadie and Im-
bens (2006). Asterisks indicate the conventional significance levels. Rosenbaum Γ denotes
the minimum influence (in terms of explanatory power of all observables) a potential un-
observed confounder must have to render the PWG estimate insignificant (based on a 1%
significance level). T-statistics under H0: “no significant differences in mean characteristic
between treated and control group”. % bias reduction corresponds to reduced differences in
observables between control and treatment group due to matching.
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leads to a decline in the estimated PWG. While it remains positive and significant
for full earnings and the “white collar” sample, it is statistically indistinguishable
from zero in all other earning-sample combinations – similar to that of section 2.4.1.
As the sample size decreases, it becomes more difficult to balance the covariates
and the mean standard biased rises as a consequence.22
Furthermore, we conduct several robustness checks to make sure that our res-
ults are not driven by functional forms, the matching algorithm or choices made
when estimating the propensity score. We find almost identical estimates when
using Epanechnikov kernel matching. The results are also robust to using a simpler
model to estimate the propensity score excluding all interaction terms. Yet in that
case, the balancing property is not fulfilled for all covariates, which is precisely the
reason why interaction terms should be used. Moreover, our results do not change
when using a logit instead of a probit model to estimate the propensity score.
Selection on unobservables. Just as in the OLS analysis, we are faced with
potential bias caused by omitted variables. So far we have assumed that the observ-
able covariates X fully account for the self-selection of individuals into treatment
and control groups. However, if there are unobserved factors that simultaneously
affect selection into treatment and the outcome, the identifying assumption of un-
confoundedness is violated and matching estimators are susceptible to a hidden
bias (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). In the case of politicians, unobserved charac-
teristics such as motivation, competitiveness or networking skills, might determine
self-selection into the treatment group, while simultaneously having a positive ef-
fect on earnings. To account for this potential bias, we conduct a Rosenbaum
bounds sensitivity analysis (see Rosenbaum, 2002, for a technical presentation).23
In a nutshell, the Rosenbaum bound analysis provides a value Γ, which indic-
22As was done for OLS, we also provide matching estimators for PWG based on the conditional
income of the politicians. Ignoring campaigning costs and the probability of not being elected
to office raises the politicians’ earning and, thus, the PWG. Table 2.6.2 in the appendix shows
that the ÂTT varies between zero and 0.5 depending on the income definition and the sample
used.
23Another estimation technique to account for unobserved heterogeneity is the application of a
fixed-effects regression (see Diermeier et al., 2005, for an application to US Congress members).
However, this would require a panel dataset of MPs, and we have data only for one legislative
period. Moreover, there is no variation in the dummy variable identifying MPs.
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ates how sensitive the results are with respect to an unobserved confounder. A
value of Γ = 1.6 would imply that an unobserved confounder with an explanatory
power of at least 1.6 times the explanatory power of all observables X is needed to
render the estimated effect statistically insignificant (at the 1% significance level).
Thus, a low value of Γ indicates that results are quite sensitive to unobserved
confounders; high values of Γ (greater than 2) suggest that it is extremely unlikely
that confounding factors alter statistical inferences. The values of Γ in table 2.4.4
show that it is quite unlikely that personality traits of politicians could render the
positive PWG found in specifications (1) and (2) for full earnings insignificant.
Thus, the positive wage gap based on the basic pay of German MPs for the “all
executive” sample is quite robust to omitted variable bias.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we test whether there is a wage gap for German MPs. Building
on a unique dataset and relying on the citizen candidate framework, we calculate
the expected earnings of MPs taking into account election probabilities and cam-
paigning expenses. We estimate the politicians’ wage gap by comparing the MPs
to a representative sample of German executives using both OLS and matching
techniques.
We find that both the sign and the size of wage gap depend on the definition of
the control group and the MPs’ income. Using the broadest sample of executives,
the PWG varies between 35% and 65% depending on the estimation method (cor-
responding to 20,000–36,000 euros per year). Robustness checks suggest that these
baseline results are unlikely to suffer from omitted variable bias due to positive
selection into politics. When defining the control group more narrowly, the wage
gap shrinks and is statistically indistinguishable from zero for “top level” exec-
utives. In this case the data suggest that the pay of politicians is not excessive.
However, while MPs may compare themselves with top-managers, this association
might not be shared by the public, which in turn might have consequences for the
perception of the adequacy of politicians’ pay. The wage gap also mechanically
decreases when we exclude politicians’ outside earnings and restrict their income
to the basic remuneration from holding public office. On the contrary, the income
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premium increases considerably when estimating the conditional wage gap, i.e.,
neglecting election probabilities and campaigning costs.
Thus, our empirical results are well in line with the theoretical predictions
of the citizen candidate framework, which predicts a non-negative wage gap for
politicians. From a normative perspective, a positive PWG could be beneficial
for society if it attracted more able individuals to run for office or raised the
costs of abusing political office. Yet recent theoretical and empirical studies show
that higher earnings need not necessarily lead to better politicians (Poutvaara and
Takalo, 2007; Kotakorpi and Poutvaara, 2011). We contribute to this literature
by showing that becoming a politician is financially attractive for the average
executive (and even more so for the average citizen) but not for top level managers
and business owners. In addition, our analysis shows that the outside earnings
constitute a substantial share of the income premium. Therefore, it is important to
hold politicians accountable for their (outside) activities, which calls for a greater
level of transparency (Besley and Case, 1995; Ferraz and Finan, 2008). While this
seems to be the case in Germany (Djankov et al., 2010), the amount of outside
earnings of MPs is not limited by law. This could be problematic, as moonlighting
politicians might not only face a conflict of time regarding their legislative effort
but also a conflict of interests (Gagliarducci et al., 2010).
Several qualifications have to be made with respect to the magnitude of our em-
pirical results. First, in general, higher pay can be justified by a heavier workload.
Unfortunately, we do not observe politicians’ working hours.24 Second, we prob-
ably underestimate the PWG, as we assume a conservative upper bound of outside
earnings and overestimate individual campaigning costs. Third, it is likely that
there is a positive selection bias for jobs in the political sector. Although we show
that the baseline estimates are robust with respect to an unobserved confounder,
their exact magnitudes might change. Finally, we are able to compare politicians
and citizens only at one particular point in time. However, politicians who follow
political careers (as opposed to career politicians ; see Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008)
might leave public office in order to work in the private sector and benefit from
building their political networks. It would therefore be worthwhile to estimate the
24There is evidence collected from the MPs’ websites that their working times vary between 50
and 70 hours a week. We find similar values for the executive samples.
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PWG using lifetime income (see, e.g., Eggers and Hainmueller, 2009; Querubin
and Snyder, 2009). Moreover, our findings for Germany should be complemented
with (comparative) studies on other countries with different institutional details
and regulations to flesh out the picture.
2.6 Appendix
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Figure 2.6.1: Election probabilities: Electoral districts
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Figure 2.6.2: Election probabilities: Party lists
Note: The “relative position on party list” is the rank on the respective list (with rank 1 being
the most promising) divided by the total number of candidates on that list. Hence, the first
candidate on the list is assigned a value close to zero, while the last candidate receives a one.
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Table 2.6.2: OLS and Matching – Conditional wage gap
Executive sample All White collar Top level
MP income Total Remun. only Total Remun. only Total Remun. only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 0.667∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.216 0.042
Matching 0.498∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ -0.101 -0.275
Observations 2104 2104 1584 1584 898 898
Note: Estimates derived from same specifications as in baseline models (see tables 2.4.1
and 2.4.4). Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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Table 2.6.3: Propensity score estimation
Executive sample All White collar Top level
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Age -0.004 35.804 0.072 36.050 0.019 0.006
High-skilled -4.983 0.000 5.975 . 0.825 1.309
Medium-skilled -7.671 0.540 4.011 0.600 -0.065 1.307
Children -5.721 0.568 -6.251 0.626 0.268 0.254
Female 0.575 0.537 0.292 0.573 0.677 0.153
East 0.674 0.583 1.079 0.662 0.184 0.155
Married 2.040 0.559 0.251 . -0.686 0.158
Public sector 0.070 0.559 10.870 0.198 2.553 0.407
Self-employed -12.700 0.000 -2.378 0.727 -0.598 0.208
Age x H-skill -0.004 35.804 -0.069 36.050
Age x M-skill 0.029 35.804 -0.046 36.050
Age x Children 0.138 0.011 0.144 0.012
Age x Female 0.001 0.011 0.005 0.011
Age x East -0.011 0.012 -0.017 0.013
Age x Married -0.059 0.011 -0.060 0.012
Age x Public sector 0.023 0.011
Age x Self-empl. 0.018 0.013 0.007 0.013
H-skill x Children -0.404 0.246 -0.390 0.269
H-skill x Female -0.273 0.248 -0.169 0.265
H-skill x East 0.074 0.252 -0.072 0.291
H-skill x Married 0.306 0.262 2.118 0.589
H-skill x Public sector -1.355 0.248 -11.073 0.000 -0.718 0.420
H-skill x Self-empl. 10.059 0.620 0.558 0.332
M-skill x Self-empl. 9.873 0.670
Children x Female 0.493 0.211 0.416 0.223
Children x Public sector 0.168 0.213 0.152 0.218
Children x Self-empl. -0.061 0.265 -0.083 0.281 0.128 0.296
Female x East -0.141 0.216 -0.093 0.239
Female x Married -0.096 0.220 -0.268 0.231
Female x Public sector -0.144 0.199 -0.759 0.367
East x Married 0.163 0.221 -0.001 0.258
East x Public sector -0.133 0.207 -0.157 0.249
Married x Public sector -0.164 0.245 -0.119 0.243
Married x Self-empl. 0.193 0.283 0.179 0.302
M-skill x Married 1.947 0.610
M-skill x Public sector -9.735 0.274
Children x East 0.320 0.231
Children x Married 0.193 0.265 0.541 0.284
Female x Self-empl.. 0.258 0.242
East x Self-empl. -0.032 0.294
M-skill x East 0.202 0.329
Constant 5.594 0.481 -5.844 0.442 -1.495 1.332
Pseudo R2 0.490 0.437 0.375
χ2 1231 918 428
Observations 2104 1584 898
Chapter 3
Couple Earnings:
Marital Sorting and Labor Supply
3.1 Introduction
Increasing correlation of spouses’ earnings is typically interpreted as increasing
similarity of spouses in terms of earnings-related characteristics (assortative mat-
ing, see Mare and Schwartz, 2005). Moreover, marital sorting has an amplifying
effect on inequality across households since it reduces the level of redistribution
within families (Burtless, 1999, 2009; Schwartz, 2010). When the share of couples
where both partners are either high or low wage earners grows, inequality across
couple households will be higher compared to a situation where couples with one
high and one low wage earner dominate. Since the population living in couple
households makes up a large part of the total population, this affects the over-
all distribution of economic resources. The trend towards more positive sorting
is also related to increasing female labor force participation, since the number
of single-earner families has been decreasing in many countries (Blau and Kahn,
2007; Heim, 2007; Blundell et al., 2011a,b). More generally, changes in household
demographics affecting “who lives with whom” (Jenkins and Micklewright, 2007b,
p. 19) have been found to contribute to income inequality (see, e.g., Jenkins, 1995;
Daly and Valletta, 2006; Martin, 2006; Peichl et al., 2012). Hence, with regard
to economic inequality, trends of widening earnings gaps cannot be assessed inde-
43
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pendently of changes in the socio-demographic composition of the population of
interest.1
Previous studies on the effect of an increasing association of female and male
earnings on inequality can largely be classified as accounting approaches. The
observed distribution of income or earnings is typically compared to a number
of counterfactual distributions by manipulating female earnings or the correlation
between spouses’ earnings (e.g., Karoly and Burtless, 1995; Burtless, 1999; Aslak-
sen et al., 2005). Cancian and Reed (1998, 1999) emphasize that the question of
whether female earnings contribute to income inequality can only be meaningfully
assessed when the observed distribution of household income is compared to an
appropriate reference distribution. However, when constructing such a counter-
factual, the role of behavioral effects (labor supply) has so far not been taken
into account. This is important, since earnings do not only reflect a worker’s
productivity (the wage rate) but also depend on the number of hours worked,
which is determined by the allocation of partners’ time on paid work, household
production and leisure (Juhn and Murphy, 1997; Devereux, 2004; Gottschalk and
Danziger, 2005). This depends on the household context and, therefore, changes
in household characteristics are reflected in changing labor supply behavior. That
is why the assessment of the effect of marital sorting on earnings inequality should
explicitly adjust for labor supply behavior in order to disentangle the pure effect
of sorting compared to the observed (non-random) sorting of spouses’ earnings.
In this chapter, I measure the effect of the association of female and male earn-
ings on total earnings inequality across couple households in West Germany over
a 25-year period from 1986 to 2010 and adjust for labor supply choices. Using
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) and a behavioral mi-
crosimulation model for Germany (IZAΨMOD, see Peichl et al., 2010), I estimate
a discrete choice model of labor supply for couples for each year separately. This
provides estimates on preferences for income, leisure as well as various interactions
with household characteristics. Then, I create a sample of hypothetical couples by
1Labor earnings have become much more dispersed (see Katz and Autor, 1999, for an overview).
Numerous studies analyze issues related to increases in inequality of hourly wages: skill-biased
technological change and globalization (Juhn et al., 1993; Autor et al., 1998, 2008), changes in
labor market institutions (DiNardo et al., 1996; Card and DiNardo, 2002; Lemieux, 2006) and
the gender wage gap (Blau and Kahn, 2006; Arulampalam et al., 2007).
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randomly matching individual earnings and characteristics of females and males
from couple households. This serves as a counterfactual benchmark to assess the
effect of non-random sorting on inequality. Spousal characteristics, which consti-
tute a key part of the household context, affect individual labor supply decisions
and, therefore, individuals would respond to a counterfactual environment. In
order to capture labor supply adjustments, I use the estimated coefficients, pre-
dict labor supply behavior of the hypothetical couples and calculate the respective
earnings of randomly matched individuals and, hence, total household earnings.
Differences in earnings inequality between the distributions of observed and hy-
pothetical couples after labor supply adjustment allow me to quantify the pure
effect of marital sorting on inequality by applying an index measuring the effect
of the association between spouses’ earnings on inequality (the “flocking index”,
see Aslaksen et al., 2005).
I find that the observed pattern of sorting in earnings has a fairly weak impact
on earnings inequality among couple households. The trend over time suggests
that the effect of sorting has turned from slightly equalizing to slightly disequaliz-
ing in recent years. However, after adjusting for labor supply choices based on the
hypothetical household context, I find that sorting in productivity has a large im-
pact on earnings inequality. This result is driven by two factors: First, women with
high (low) earnings potential tend to couple with high (low) earning men. Second,
participation and working hours of women living in couples with high earning
men were low in the 1980s, but increased disproportionally over the period under
consideration. Taken together, this indicates that increasing earnings correlation
between females and males results to a large extent from increasing labor force
attachment of women rather than from changes in couple formation.
From a policy maker’s perspective, this result implies a trade-off between policy
measures promoting female labor force participation and redistributive policies.
Achieving the objective of higher female employment apparently comes at the price
of higher inequality. The policy implications are ambiguous. On the one hand,
one could argue that government intervention is not justified, since the observed
trend of increasing female labor force participation is the result of couples’ choices.
On the other hand, the growing share of dual earner couples implies a declining
importance of intra family redistribution, which could potentially be substituted
CHAPTER 3. 46
by government redistribution.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the methodology
before the empirical application and the data are described in section 3.3. Results
are presented in section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Methodology
In order to quantify the extent of marital sorting on couple earnings inequality,
I use an index introduced by Aslaksen et al. (2005), which is derived from a
decomposition of the Gini coefficient. The “flocking index” quantifies both the
extent and the sign of the effect of the association of female and male labor earnings
(“flocking together”2) on inequality across couples. It is calculated based on the
observed as well as a hypothetical distribution of couple earnings. The hypothetical
distribution is constructed by matching spouses’ individual earnings randomly to
each other. However, it has to be noted that a shortcoming of previous applications
of this index is that the difference between the observed and the counterfactual
distribution does not reflect changes due to labor supply behavior. Hence, taking
into account labor supply coordination requires a simulation of counterfactual
choices given the randomly matched household context. In the following, I will
first introduce the unadjusted “flocking index” and then suggest an extension that
adjusts for labor supply choices.
The flocking index. Consider a population of n couple households indexed
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a distribution of household earnings Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn), where
household i’s total earnings are simply the sum of both the female and the male
spouse’s individual earnings: Yi = Y
f
i + Y
m
i . The cumulative distribution of total
earnings, FY , is a function of the gender-specific marginal earnings distributions
FY = FY (F
m
Y , F
f
Y ).
3 Each distribution is associated with mean earnings (µY , µ
f
Y
and µmY ) and a level of earnings inequality, represented by the Gini coefficient G(·).
2The earliest citation of this proverb dates back to Minsheu (1599): “Birdes of a feather will
flocke togither”. This means that those with similar taste tend to congregate in groups. A
modern version refers to “doctors marrying doctors rather than nurses” (OECD, 2011).
3See Decancq et al. (2012) for a copula-based decomposition of couple earnings inequality.
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The Gini coefficient of the distribution of total couple earnings Y reads
G(Y ) =
2
µY
· Cov[Y, FY ] = µ
f
Y
µY
· γf + µ
m
Y
µY
· γm, (3.2.1)
where γs = 2/µsY ·Cov[Y s, FY ] for s ∈ {m, f}, which is a measure of the association
between female or male earnings respectively and total earnings (see Aslaksen
et al., 2005, p. 503). It depends on the covariance of gender-specific earnings
Y s and the couple’s position in the total earnings distribution FY , which does
not necessarily coincide with spouses’ individual positions in the gender-specific
distributions F sY .
Taken the distributions of Y f , Y m and, hence, Y as given, the level of inequality
in total household earnings G(Y ) is bounded between an upper and a lower level,
i.e., G(Y ) ∈ [Gmin(Y ), Gmax(Y )]. These bounds depend on the spouses’ positions
in the gender-specific earnings distributions relative to the household’s position in
the total distribution. With s,−s ∈ {m, f} and s 6= −s these are defined as
G(Y) =
{
Gmax(Y ) if F sY (Y
s
i ) = F
−s
Y (Y
−s
i )
Gmin(Y ) if F sY (Y
s
i ) = 1− F−sY (Y −si )
(3.2.2)
This means that the level of total couple earnings inequality is highest (lowest)
if the highest earning woman is married to the man with the highest (lowest)
earnings within the male distribution, the second highest earning woman with the
second highest (lowest) man and so on. Hence, the pattern of marital sorting has
the most (dis)equalizing effect on earnings inequality across couple households in
a situation where sorting of spouses is perfectly negative (positive) with respect
to individual earnings.
A way to assess to what extent the observed inequality in the distribution
of couple earnings is affected by non-random sorting of spouses is to compare
the observed distribution with a hypothetical one where partners’ earnings are
randomly matched to each other. Consider as a counterfactual a distribution
of randomly matched couples indexed i˜ ∈ {1, . . . , n} with total earnings Yi˜ =
Y f
i˜
+Y m
i˜
. Note that without any adjustments the levels of inequality in the gender-
specific marginal distributions do not change, i.e., G(Y˜ s) = G(Y s) for s ∈ {m, f}.
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However, inequality of total earnings is affected, i.e., in general G(Y˜ ) 6= G(Y ).
Normalizing the difference between observed and hypothetical inequality by the
distance between random inequality and the upper or lower bound yields an index
of the extent of “flocking together” (Aslaksen et al., 2005):
V (Y, Y˜ , Y f , Y m) =

G(Y )−G(Y˜ )
Gmax(Y )−G(Y˜ ) if G(Y ) > G(Y˜ ),
G(Y )−G(Y˜ )
G(Y˜ )−Gmin(Y ) if G(Y ) < G(Y˜ ),
(3.2.3)
where V ∈ [−1, 1]. Positive values of V imply that G(Y ) > G(Y˜ ), i.e., observed in-
equality of couple earnings is greater than inequality of the distribution of random
matches. This reflects a disequalizing pattern of sorting, while negative values of
V indicate a sorting pattern that is equalizing compared to random sorting. Note
that the extreme cases of either perfect positive, i.e., G(Y ) = Gmax(Y ) (negative
sorting, i.e., G(Y ) = Gmin(Y )) imply the maximum (minimum) values of V = 1
(V = −1). Finally, the case of V = 0 represents a situation where observed and
random sorting pattern coincide.4
Household context and the adjusted flocking index. Previous studies as-
sessing the effect of female earnings or the correlation of spouses’ earnings on total
inequality have constructed various counterfactuals from observed income or earn-
ings distributions. The fact that observed household earnings and incomes and
their distribution across the population do not only reflect couple formation but
are also determined by income-producing choices, in particular spouses’ (joint)
decisions on labor supply, has so far been neglected.5 Hence, the observation of
increasing correlation of spouses’ earnings does not necessarily only reflect changes
in the assortativeness in couple formation but is also affected by changes in the
coordination of labor market behavior of existing couples.
Consider, for example, a perfectly negative sorting pattern where the best
earning woman and the least earning man form a couple and vice versa. This would
indicate that sorting with respect to earnings is most equalizing, since resources
4Note that the interpretation of the flocking index is similar to a measure of correlation between
two stochastic variables. Aslaksen et al. (2005) show that the flocking index is equal to the
correlation coefficient when the Gini coefficient is replaced by the squared coefficient of variation.
5See Bargain et al. (2012) for a comprehensive documentation of significant cross-wage elasticities.
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are redistributed within the household. However, since earnings are a function of
earnings potential (the wage rate) and supply of working time on the labor market
(hours), it is not clear whether this sorting pattern reflects assortative mating
in traits like ability or education (doctors marry nurses) rather than patterns of
labor market behavior of couples (female doctors work less when married to a male
doctor).
The latter example reflects a situation where the number of hours supplied on
the labor market is negatively associated with partner income, e.g., the higher the
male earnings the lower the number of hours worked by the female spouse (and
vice versa). This implies that the extent of “flocking together” with respect to
earnings is influenced by labor supply choices of couples. That is why one has
to take into account the dependency of individual earnings, in particular both
the extensive and the intensive margin of labor supply, on the household context
which comprises the earnings potential and other characteristics of the partner
when constructing a counterfactual distribution of couple earnings.
Randomly matching individual earnings instead of using the observed earnings
Y si , which is a function of observed couple characteristics Xi, requires an imputa-
tion of hypothetical earnings Y s
i˜
based on the hypothetical setting Xi˜. I define
the adjusted flocking index V̂ based on predicted counterfactual distributions for
both female and male earnings. In order to do so, I make explicit that hypothet-
ical individual earnings would adjust their behavior given the counterfactual couple
characteristics, i.e., Ŷ s
i˜
= Ŷ s
i˜
(Xi˜), where a hat indicates a random match and labor
supply adjustment. The nature of this relationship can be predicted based on the
relationship of observed earnings and household characteristics Y si = Y
s
i (Xi) (see
below). The adjusted flocking index is constructed using the adjusted distributions
of female and male as well as total earnings:
V̂ = V̂ (Y, Ŷ , Ŷ f , Ŷ m). (3.2.4)
The interpretation of the adjusted flocking index is the same as for the unadjusted:
Positive values indicate a disequalizing and negative values an equalizing sorting
pattern. The main difference is that labor supply coordination given the household
context is explicitly taken into account and, hence, the adjusted index gives an
CHAPTER 3. 50
indication of the pure effect of partner sorting on earnings inequality across couple
households.
Modeling household labor supply. In order to predict the relationship between
household and partner characteristics and individual labor supply decisions, I make
use of microsimulation techniques and apply a structural model of household labor
supply (Aaberge et al., 1995; Van Soest, 1995; Blundell et al., 2000). I assume that
couple households have a utility function Ui = Ui(Di, h
f
i , h
m
i ;Xi), where the argu-
ments are household disposable income Di and leisure time of the female and male
partner respectively (hfi and h
m
i ) given household characteristics Xi. Moreover, I
assume that utility is maximized by jointly deciding on (hfi , h
m
i ) and disposable
income is given by Di = d(w
f
i h
f
i , w
m
i h
m
i , Ii;Xi), where w
f
i and w
m
i are the fixed
individual wage rates and Ii is non-labor income. The tax-benefit function d(·)
transforms labor earnings and other gross income into disposable income given
household characteristics. Furthermore, it is assumed that couple households can
choose among a fixed choice set of combinations of net income and leisure time.
This is reflected by a finite set of m working time categories for each individual,
which gives a total of m2 = J choices of (hfij, h
m
ij ) per couple.
Utility Uij of household i in choice j comprises the systematic influence of the
arguments as well as observable heterogeneity captured by characteristics Xi and
its interactions with the arguments. Unobserved heterogeneity in preferences is
captured by adding a stochastic term (random utility maximization, see McFad-
den, 1974). Hence, total household utility is Vij = Uij + ij. Assuming that the
error terms follow a Gumbel (extreme value) distribution and are independently
and identically distributed across choices j ∈ {1, ..., J} as well as the assumption
of utility maximizing behavior imply that the probability of household i choosing
category k over all other available categories l ∈ {1, ..., J}\k is
Pik = P (Vik > Vil) = P (Uik − Uil > il − ik) = exp(Uik)∑J
l=1 exp(Uil)
. (3.2.5)
The set of coefficients β of the systematic part of the utility function Ui(Di, h
f
i , h
m
i ;Xi)
can be estimated empirically on the sample of observed couple households (see
Creedy and Kalb, 2006, for a detailed overview of microsimulation models of labor
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supply). The estimates βˆ can be interpreted as population averages of preferences
for income and leisure given observed heterogeneity in household characteristics.
Hence, after having estimated the labor supply model, I can use βˆ to predict the
probability distribution across choices P̂i˜j for each hypothetical couple household.
This is the basis for calculating labor supply choices hˆs
i˜
, which gives hypothetical
individual earnings Ŷ s
i˜
for s ∈ {m, f} and total earnings Ŷi˜ as well as the resulting
levels of inequality which are required for calculating the adjusted flocking index
according to equations (3.2.3) and (3.2.4).
3.3 Empirical Application
3.3.1 Microsimulation model
The analysis presented in this chapter is based on the microsimulation model
IZAΨMOD of the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), which comprises a static
tax-benefit calculator for Germany as well as a random utility model of labor sup-
ply as described in the previous section (see Peichl et al., 2010, for a documentation
of the model). In order to predict labor supply choices, I have to impute income
levels for counterfactual choices of working time.6 It is straightforward to calcu-
late gross labor earnings for categories that are not actually chosen by multiplying
the individual hourly wage rates with the number of working hours.7 However,
since labor supply decisions are based on the trade-off between leisure time and
disposable income it is necessary to subtract counterfactual income and payroll
taxes and add benefit payments. Since the model’s tax-benefit calculator is cur-
rently only available for recent years (since 2005) and not yet fully extended to the
period from the mid-1980s onwards, I do not make use of IZAΨMOD’s standard
tax-benefit calculator. Instead, I apply a reduced-form regression methodology
to calculate disposable income from gross incomes and run the following ordinary
6The model comprises seven working time categories for each individual with 10, 20,...,60 hours
of work per week as well as the non-work category of zero hours. Therefore, couple households
have a choice set of 7x7=49 categories.
7Wage rates are not observed for individuals currently not in employment and are estimated on
observed wages using a Heckman correction for sample selection (Heckman, 1976, 1979). I use
predicted wages for the entire sample.
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least squares (OLS) regression model for each year t = 1986, ..., 2010 separately:8
Dit = α
0
t +Xitα
x
t + Zitα
z
t + (X
′Z)itαxzt + uit, (3.3.1)
where Dit is observed disposable income, Zit is a vector of gross incomes (from
labor, assets, private pensions and other gross income) including the squared values
and Xit is a set of household characteristics that are relevant for various tax-
benefit policies (marital status, age, age squared and hours worked of both spouses,
number of children and number of working-age adults as well as dummies for civil
servants and self-employed). The vector (X ′Z)it comprises interactions of gross
incomes and household characteristics. The regression results yield values for R2
very close to one (0.97–0.99), which means that this fairly simple regression model
captures almost the entire observed variation in disposable household incomes and,
therefore, has sufficient predictive power to calculate tax liabilities and benefit
payments in both observed and counterfactual choice categories.9
Using predicted disposable incomes as an input, I estimate the conditional logit
model with the observed choice of working hours category as dependent variable
as described in equation (3.2.5).10 For the systematic part of the household utility
function Uij, I use a translog specification, i.e., the main arguments income and
leisure as well as the interactions of income with female and male leisure enter
the utility function in natural logarithms (see Peichl et al., 2010). In the condi-
tional logit estimation, I use the squared arguments as well as several interactions
with household characteristics as additional explanatory variables of labor supply
decisions. The interaction variables are age and age squared of both partners as
well as dummy variables for skill levels (high and low education), the presence of
children in various age groups and for working part-time (10–30 hours per week)
following Van Soest (1995).11
8See Frenette et al. (2007); Biewen and Juhasz (2012); Peichl (2012); Bargain et al. (2012) for
similar approaches.
9Regression results are presented in tables 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 in the appendix.
10See Bargain et al. (2012) for an extensive overview of this methodology.
11Results of the conditional logit estimations are presented in tables 3.6.3–3.6.8 in the appendix.
The labor supply model is estimated separately for flexible couples and for flexible females and
males in semi-flexible couples (see below).
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Data and sample selection. The simulation model is based on microdata
from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), which is a panel survey
of households and individuals that has been conducted annually since 1984 and
currently comprises 27 waves (Socio-Economic Panel, 2011). Population weights
make the respondents’ information representative for the German population. Is-
sues concerning sampling and weighting methods or the imputation of information
in case of item or unit non-response are well documented by the SOEP Service
Group (see Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005; Wagner et al., 2007).
The sample is restricted to West Germany, since especially shortly after the
reunification of Germany in 1990, labor supply behavior of East Germans differs
substantially from that of West Germans. Moreover, income levels are still sub-
stantially different between East and West. The sample is further restricted to
couples (both married and cohabiting) where both spouses are of prime working
age (25–55) and at least one spouse can adjust labor supply flexibly. This means
that I exclude couples where both spouses are in education, in military or com-
munity service, pensioners, on parental leave, civil servants, self-employed or have
gross household income from capital that exceeds half of income from labor. In-
dividual earnings comprise gross earnings from dependent work as well as from
self-employment in the month prior to the survey interview. Household labor
earnings are the sum of both partners’ earnings.
3.3.2 Descriptives
Earnings inequality and correlation. The development of observed earnings
inequality across couple households in West Germany over the period 1986–2010
is displayed in figures 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 in the appendix. The Gini coefficient of
total couple earnings (figure 3.6.1) has increased quite strongly from 0.23 in the
mid-1980s to around 0.3 at the end of the period under consideration. At the
same time, the correlation coefficient of female and male earnings in the sample
of couples has increased from around −0.13 in 1986/87 to 0.03 in 2009/10 and
turned from a negative to a positive correlation in the mid-2000s. Correlation and
inequality of wages follows a similar trend.
The trends of observed female and male earnings inequality are displayed in
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figure 3.6.2 in the appendix. While the Gini coefficient of male earnings displays
both a similar level and upward trend as couple earnings inequality, female earnings
inequality has substantially decreased over the past 25 years. Starting from a very
high level (around 0.64 in 1986) it has decreased to around 0.5 in 2010, which is
still quite high compared to male earnings inequality.
Employment and hours worked. The observation of decreasing earnings in-
equality among women is for a large part driven by advances in female labor force
participation. In the mid-1980s less than 50% of women in couples were em-
ployed, while the employment rate has increased to more than 70% at the end of
the last decade (figure 3.6.3 in the appendix). This development has particularly
dampened female earnings inequality since the share of women with zero earnings
has been constantly decreasing. At the same time, the employment rate of prime-
aged men has remained fairly constant at a high level of 90–95%. In addition, men
work on average full-time with at least 40 hours per week over the entire period,
while the average number of hours worked by women is much lower due to lower
participation rates and part-time work (see figure 3.6.4 in the appendix).
Previous research (e.g., Juhn and Murphy, 1997) has documented that changes
in both labor force participation and hours worked of females are not uniformly
distributed across the distribution of male earnings. Figures 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 show
the changes in employment rates and hours of women by male earnings quintile
and within 5-year subperiods.12 Female labor force participation was below average
especially for women living with men in the upper tail of the earnings distribution
in the 1980s. For example, only 40% of women with men in the top quintile of the
male earnings distribution were employed and worked on average about 13 hours
per week, while 50–60% of women with non-working or low earning men (bottom
quintile) were employed and worked 20–23 hours. This pattern has changed over
time. Employment growth among women has been largest at the upper tail of the
male distribution. In the recent period 2006–2010, there are almost no differences
in employment rates and hours worked by women across the male distribution.
12Individuals are assigned to one of six groups. Individuals with zero earnings are assigned to the
group “not in work”, individuals with positive earnings are assigned to their earnings quintile
(based on positive earnings).
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Figure 3.3.1: Female employment rates by male earnings quintile (1986–2010)
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Figure 3.3.2: Female working hours by male earnings quintile (1986–2010)
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Unadjusted flocking index
The descriptive results suggest that earnings inequality has increased among couples
and among men, while earnings inequality among women has decreased. At the
same time, earnings correlation between females and males in couples has turned
from negative to slightly positive over the period 1986 to 2010. In order to ana-
lyze whether increasing association of female and male earnings has contributed
to overall inequality, I calculate the unadjusted flocking index following Aslaksen
et al. (2005) as defined in equation (3.2.3) for each year separately. This means
that spouses’ earnings from observed couples are matched randomly to each other
and earnings levels are not adjusted, but taken as given.
The resulting trend of the unadjusted flocking index over time is displayed
in figure 3.4.1. The extent of “flocking together” remains fairly constant from
the mid-1980s until the early 1990s. The resulting negative values, ranging from
around −0.08 to −0.11, suggest that the pattern of sorting during this period has
slightly dampened earnings inequality across couple households. However, the ef-
fect was not particularly strong.13 From the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s, the
unadjusted index remains mostly negative but values are closer to zero, which im-
plies that the pattern of earnings sorting is rather neutral with respect to couple
earnings inequality. I find positive values of the unadjusted flocking index only for
the period 2006–2010. Ranging from 0.01 to 0.07, this result indicates a disequal-
izing pattern of sorting, which is however not very strong. Nevertheless, I find an
upward trend of the extent of association between spouses’ earnings on inequality
over the period 1986–2010. In particular, this effect has switched signs in the
2000s turning from an equalizing to a disequalizing pattern of marital sorting in
earnings.
3.4.2 Adjusted flocking index
As discussed in section 3.2, when measuring the effect of the association of spouses’
earnings on inequality across couples using observed earnings, results might be
13Recall that the minimum and maximum values of the flocking index −1 and 1 respectively.
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biased when earnings reflect both assortativeness of earnings potential in couple
formation as well as labor supply behavior of households. Therefore, the adjusted
flocking index explicitly takes into account labor supply. I use the estimated coeffi-
cients on preferences for income and leisure and several interactions with household
and partner characteristics (see section 3.3) and predict labor supply behavior of
the randomly matched hypothetical couples. This allows me to predict earnings
levels after labor supply adjustment, which are used as an input to calculate the
adjusted flocking index as defined in equation (3.2.4).
The results are presented in figure 3.4.1. I find that the level of the adjusted
flocking index is positive throughout the entire period under consideration and
considerably larger than the unadjusted flocking index. Note that the upper and
lower bounds are the same as in equation (3.2.3) since the counterfactual distri-
bution taking into account labor supply is compared to the observed distribution
of couple earnings. The elements of both the unadjusted and the adjusted flock-
ing index are displayed in figure 3.4.2. From the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s
the level ranges between 0.3 and 0.4 and decreases somewhat afterwards, ranging
from around 0.25 to 0.3 during the past 15 years. This means that the level of
couple earnings inequality based on random sorting and adjusting for labor supply
behavior is much lower compared to inequality of the observed pattern of sorting
(figure 3.4.2).
The interpretation of this result is that, while the pattern of observed earnings
sorting does not have a large impact on earnings inequality, the pattern of sorting
in earnings potential does have a strong disequalizing impact. However, it is veiled
by a particular pattern of labor market behavior of (potentially high earning)
women in couples with high earning men who tend not to participate in the labor
force in early years. This view is supported by a similar trend of the flocking
index calculated for hourly wages only (figure 3.4.1), which only takes into account
sorting in productivity. This corresponds to calculating earnings based on wage
rates and assigning both females and males the same number of working hours.
The difference between unadjusted and adjusted flocking index is particularly large
at the beginning of the period under consideration in the 1980s but has decreased
considerably since then due to increasing labor market attachment of women.
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Figure 3.4.1: Unadjusted and adjusted flocking index flocking index (1986–2010)
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Figure 3.4.2: Elements of the unadjusted and adjusted flocking index (1986–2010)
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Labor supply adjustments. In the following, I take a closer look at which
parts of the female and male earnings distributions labor supply adjustments are
most important when earnings are matched randomly to each other. The resulting
labor market outcomes of adjusted employment and hours worked are presented
in figures 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 in the appendix. Overall, employment rates and average
hours slightly decrease compared to the observed outcomes, but the trends are very
similar. I find that changes in male labor force participation are on average very
small (see figures 3.4.3 and 3.4.4). Adjustments in participation are concentrated
among men from lower quintiles of the observed earnings distribution, while hours
would be slightly reduced in upper quintiles. Both participation and hours would
increase for men not in work. However, note that this group makes up only about
5–10% of males due to the very high observed employment rates (see above).
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Figure 3.4.3: Male employment: adjustment by own earnings quintile
The small difference in overall employment rates between observed and random
sorting masks considerable differences across the earnings distribution of women,
which is shown in figures 3.4.5 and 3.4.6. Women who are observed to be not in
employment would increase their participation considerably in the case of random
matching by up to 40 percentage points and more than ten hours in the 1980s.
Recall that women not in employment tend to couple with high earning men in
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Figure 3.4.4: Male working hours: adjustment by own earnings quintile
earlier years. Hence, being matched to a man with lower earnings (potential) would
apparently create incentives to participate in the labor force and/or work more
hours, which is in line with negative cross-wage and income elasticities documented
in the literature.14 At the same time, women in employment would on average
reduce their labor supply both at the extensive and the intensive margin. This
pattern remains fairly similar over time, however the extent of the adjustments
decreases between the 1980s and the 2000s. The responsiveness of women to other
income has decreased over time (see Blau and Kahn, 2007; Heim, 2007) and is
generally lower for women in upper deciles of the female earnings distribution.
Finally, figures 3.4.7 and 3.4.8 show the predicted labor supply adjustments of
women across the earnings distribution of the men they are randomly matched to.
I find that women who are matched to a non-working or low earning man would
respond with an increase in labor supply, while women matched to men in upper
quintiles would reduce participation and hours worked. This result is in line with
the interpretation of male earnings having an “income effect” on labor supply of
women (Reed and Cancian, 2009).
14See Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999); Devereux (2004); Blau and Kahn (2007); Bargain et al. (2012).
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Figure 3.4.5: Female employment: adjustment by own earnings quintile
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Figure 3.4.6: Female working hours: adjustment by own earnings quintile
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Figure 3.4.7: Female employment: adjustment by male earnings quintile
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Figure 3.4.8: Female working hours: adjustment by male earnings quintile
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3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I measure the effect of the association of female and earnings
on total earnings inequality across couple households in West Germany over a
25-year period from 1986 to 2010. I match spouses randomly to each other and
predict labor supply choices of hypothetical couples, which yields a counterfactual
distribution of earnings and allows me to quantify the extent of marital sorting
in earnings potential. Constructing counterfactuals based on observed earnings is
misleading since labor supply choices are affected by both earnings potential as
well as labor supply coordination in couple households
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) and a be-
havioral microsimulation model for Germany, I find that the observed pattern of
sorting in earnings has a fairly weak impact on earnings inequality among couple
households. However, the trend suggests that the pattern of sorting has turned
from slightly equalizing to slightly disequalizing in recent years. After adjusting
for labor supply choices based on the household context, I find that sorting in
productivity has a much stronger positive impact on earnings inequality.
This result is mainly driven by two factors: First, women with high (low)
earnings potential generally tend to couple with high (low) earning men. Second,
women in couples with high earning men are more often not employed and work
less in the 1980s, but increased labor supply above average over the period under
consideration. Taken together, this suggests that increasing earnings correlation
between females and males in couples results to a large extent from increasing
labor force attachment of women, especially with high earnings potential, rather
than from changes in couple formation.
Moreover, these results suggest that advances in the attachment of women to
the labor market affect the distribution of earnings across couple households. For
policy makers, this implies a trade-off, since measures supporting further increases
in female labor force participation potentially amplify economic inequality across
couple households, which make up a large, though diminishing, share of the total
population. Higher female employment apparently comes at the price of higher
inequality.
However, based on this study, there are no unambiguous policy implications.
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On the one hand, one could argue that government intervention is not justified,
since the observed trend of increasing female labor force participation is the result
of couples’ choices. On the other hand, the growing share of dual earner couples
implies a declining importance of intra family redistribution, which could poten-
tially be substituted by government redistribution. Future research should address
the normative implications based on a theoretical framework of optimal taxation
of couples.
3.6 Appendix
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Figure 3.6.1: Couple earnings: correlation and inequality (1986–2010)
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Figure 3.6.2: Individual and couple earnings: inequality (1986–2010)
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Figure 3.6.3: Employment rates: females and males (1986–2010)
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Figure 3.6.4: Working hours: females and males (1986–2010)
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Table 3.6.1: OLS – Estimation of tax-benefit system (1986–1998)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
married 25.797 8.292 -33.461 -122.350∗∗∗ -88.548∗∗∗ -144.553∗∗∗ -66.463 52.429 61.470 -162.750∗∗∗ -113.206∗∗ 57.533 -80.593
hours (male) -5.027∗∗∗ -5.213∗∗∗ -3.479∗∗∗ -4.710∗∗∗ -3.990∗∗∗ -3.709∗∗∗ -8.366∗∗∗ -7.256∗∗∗ -8.608∗∗∗ -5.942∗∗∗ -6.151∗∗∗ -4.744∗∗∗ -4.442∗∗∗
hours (female) 3.200∗∗∗ 1.110∗ 1.983∗∗∗ 1.497∗∗ 3.053∗∗∗ 0.553 2.723∗∗∗ 3.381∗∗∗ 3.517∗∗∗ 1.558∗ 2.110∗∗ 0.929 1.080
couple -233.843∗∗∗ -160.718∗∗∗ -155.676∗∗∗ -143.471∗∗ -97.746∗ -209.854∗∗∗ -1.390 -205.542∗∗∗ -64.509 67.085 -26.629 -71.962 -330.297∗∗∗
age (male) 14.970∗∗∗ 12.411∗∗∗ 14.474∗∗∗ 22.128∗∗∗ 15.498∗∗∗ 14.569∗∗∗ 15.111∗∗∗ 13.821∗∗∗ 8.243∗∗ 10.053∗∗∗ 17.068∗∗∗ 7.185∗ 23.411∗∗∗
age (female) 7.615∗∗∗ 6.051∗∗ 8.849∗∗∗ 13.633∗∗∗ 10.408∗∗∗ 10.014∗∗∗ 5.891∗∗ 8.541∗∗∗ 7.301∗∗ 3.664 9.604∗∗∗ 5.923∗ 16.726∗∗∗
age sq. (male) -16.589∗∗∗ -15.233∗∗∗ -17.729∗∗∗ -27.125∗∗∗ -17.724∗∗∗ -14.633∗∗∗ -20.022∗∗∗ -16.188∗∗∗ -11.109∗∗∗ -10.748∗∗∗ -18.674∗∗∗ -7.261 -21.741∗∗∗
age sq. (female) -9.328∗∗∗ -6.882∗∗ -9.614∗∗∗ -15.581∗∗∗ -10.702∗∗∗ -10.786∗∗∗ -7.831∗∗ -9.644∗∗∗ -12.570∗∗∗ -3.844 -10.751∗∗∗ -7.005∗ -14.891∗∗∗
civil serv. (male) 96.192∗∗ -43.547 -66.820 -54.054 -10.406 25.289 104.194 125.422 67.097 33.349 -51.481 -20.693 57.222
civil serv. (female) -196.726∗ 28.376 -24.404 -7.601 -65.017 -63.425 -214.752∗∗ 0.261 -247.797∗ -262.609∗ -208.983∗∗ -282.958∗∗ -84.626
self-empl. (male) 95.349∗∗∗ 82.070∗∗ -5.447 64.999 18.348 -14.928 13.164 90.941∗ 136.633∗∗ -79.665 -103.666∗ -88.310 -14.364
self-empl. (female) -85.367∗∗ -169.962∗∗∗ -124.665∗∗∗ -136.299∗∗ 106.774∗∗ -112.357∗ -138.551∗∗ -132.798∗∗ -37.626 -41.708 -64.853 -82.101 -139.419∗
kids 0-2 120.752∗∗∗ 35.321 165.965∗∗∗ 153.498∗∗∗ 88.619∗∗∗ 181.102∗∗∗ 200.557∗∗∗ 405.496∗∗∗ 242.502∗∗∗ 317.665∗∗∗ 149.896∗∗∗ 129.479∗∗ 342.178∗∗∗
kids 3-6 115.715∗∗∗ 166.031∗∗∗ 80.828∗∗∗ 67.945∗∗ 87.248∗∗∗ 140.659∗∗∗ 150.015∗∗∗ 250.597∗∗∗ 113.469∗∗∗ 87.696∗∗∗ 68.691∗∗ 254.082∗∗∗ 204.415∗∗∗
kids 7-16 84.131∗∗∗ 103.957∗∗∗ 107.526∗∗∗ 108.820∗∗∗ 143.996∗∗∗ 166.384∗∗∗ 109.286∗∗∗ 116.827∗∗∗ 53.165∗∗ 80.097∗∗∗ 81.607∗∗∗ 55.449∗∗ 127.892∗∗∗
kids 17-25 62.626∗ 33.487 -9.812 67.450∗ 85.637∗∗ 48.874 10.021 120.393∗∗ 187.741∗∗ 209.227∗∗∗ -26.617 -47.151 -122.618∗
adults 63.089∗∗∗ 91.199∗∗∗ 52.427∗∗ 24.849 70.122∗∗∗ 101.195∗∗∗ 119.646∗∗∗ 76.051∗∗ 101.728∗∗∗ 97.476∗∗∗ 124.294∗∗∗ 186.408∗∗∗ 209.504∗∗∗
gross inc. 1.208∗ 2.380∗∗∗ 1.525∗∗∗ 2.276∗∗∗ 1.111∗∗ 1.097∗ 0.359 1.020∗ -0.995∗ 0.165 1.366∗∗ 1.027∗∗ 0.943∗
gross inc. sq./100 0.001 0.012∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.013∗∗∗ 0.002 0.003 -0.003
gross inc. x married 0.340 0.532∗∗ 0.203 0.419 0.015 0.135 0.213 0.251 0.121 0.097 0.137 -0.004 0.337∗
gross inc. x hours (male) -0.004 0.012∗∗ 0.002 0.006 0.007∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.000 0.005 -0.005 0.012∗∗ 0.002 -0.006
gross inc. x hours (female) -0.000 -0.009∗ -0.006∗ -0.008∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001 0.008∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.004 -0.008 0.005
gross inc. x couple 0.877 1.749∗ 1.509∗∗ 2.109∗∗ 0.928∗ 0.916 0.348 0.365 -1.220∗ -0.076 0.894∗ 0.905∗ 0.009
gross inc. x age (male) -0.035 -0.079∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.026 -0.041∗ -0.012 -0.017 0.044∗∗ -0.007 -0.013 -0.043∗∗∗ -0.024
gross inc. x age (female) -0.051∗∗ -0.039 -0.031∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.029∗ -0.021 -0.010 -0.012 0.028∗ 0.017 -0.050∗∗∗ -0.028∗ -0.027∗
gross inc. x age sq. (male) 0.028 0.065∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.020 0.039∗∗ 0.006 0.013 -0.038∗∗ 0.012 -0.005 0.044∗∗∗ 0.025∗
gross inc. x age sq. (female) 0.048∗∗ 0.011 0.013 0.030 0.016 0.009 0.009 -0.002 -0.017 -0.029∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.023∗
gross inc. x civil serv. (male) -1.532 -1.185 -1.824∗∗ -2.207 0.024 -1.721∗ 1.394 1.370 8.925 -0.503 -1.709 1.077 0.529
gross inc. x civil serv. (female) 0.592 1.567 -0.385 -0.117 -0.481 1.439 1.540 -0.907 -1.105 -15.835 -6.689 90.097 0.196
gross inc. x self-empl. (male) 0.247 0.012 -0.116 -0.334 0.048 0.170 0.286∗∗ -0.055 -0.367∗∗∗ 0.090 -0.126 0.049 0.042
gross inc. x self-empl. (female) 0.131 0.325∗ 0.312∗ 0.393∗∗ 0.007 0.131 -0.109 -0.264∗ 0.288∗ -0.430∗∗∗ -0.074 0.257 0.008
gross inc. x kids 0-2 -0.103 -1.747 1.956∗ 1.153 -1.202 1.082 -0.853 1.409∗∗∗ 2.014 0.634 1.007 3.450 0.322
gross inc. x kids 3-6 1.551∗ 0.308 -0.423 -0.275 0.858 -0.634 -0.052 -0.189 -0.136 0.360 -2.672∗ -0.167 -0.458
gross inc. x kids 7-16 -0.031 -0.403∗∗ -0.077 0.431∗ -0.097 0.458 0.278 0.475 0.728∗∗ 0.612 0.614∗∗∗ 0.393 -0.282
gross inc. x kids 17-25 0.095 -0.116 0.209∗ 0.051 0.176 -0.081 0.889∗∗∗ 0.310∗ 0.268 0.373 0.440 0.287 0.205
gross inc. x adults -0.050 -0.225∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗ -0.191∗∗ -0.043 -0.185∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ -0.155∗ -0.198∗∗ -0.120 -0.022 0.075
gross inc. sq./100 x married -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.002
gross inc. sq./100 x hours (male) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000∗ -0.000 0.000
gross inc. sq./100 x hours (female) 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
gross inc. sq./100 x couple 0.003 0.015∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.012∗ -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.006 0.006 0.009∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.006∗ -0.001
gross inc. sq./100 x age (male) -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
gross inc. sq./100 x age (female) 0.000 -0.000∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000
gross inc. sq./100 x age sq. (male) 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000
gross inc. sq./100 x age sq. (female) -0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ -0.000
gross inc. sq./100 x civil serv. (male) -0.006 -0.001 0.007∗ -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000
gross inc. sq./100 x civil serv. (female) 0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.011 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.008 -0.000 0.001
gross inc. sq./100 x self-empl. (male) -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.002∗ -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
gross inc. sq./100 x self-empl. (female) -0.003 -0.004∗ -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
gross inc. sq./100 x kids 0-2 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.007 0.001 0.007∗∗ -0.008 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.003
gross inc. sq./100 x kids 3-6 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.003∗ -0.002 -0.004∗∗ 0.002 0.006∗∗∗ 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
gross inc. sq./100 x kids 7-16 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.002∗∗ -0.001 -0.001∗ -0.002∗ 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.002∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.000
gross inc. sq./100 x kids 17-25 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004∗∗ -0.002 -0.001 -0.002∗ 0.001
gross inc. sq./100 x adults 0.000 0.001 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ -0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ -0.001 0.003∗∗ 0.001
labor inc. -0.560 -1.708∗ -0.883∗ -1.602∗ -0.430 -0.360 0.216 -0.314 1.606∗∗∗ 0.583 -0.643 -0.238 -0.091
labor inc. sq./100 -0.004 -0.014∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.003 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.015∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.005 0.000
labor inc. x married -0.368 -0.530∗∗ -0.182 -0.342 0.034 -0.060 -0.194 -0.275∗ -0.180 -0.014 -0.099 -0.044 -0.270
labor inc. x hours (male) 0.007 -0.009∗ -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.014∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.007∗ -0.010∗ -0.001 0.006
labor inc. x hours (female) -0.002 0.008∗ 0.006 0.008∗ 0.006∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.001 -0.010∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.004 0.007 -0.005
labor inc. x couple -0.596 -1.546∗ -1.358∗∗ -1.892∗∗ -0.775 -0.702 -0.321 -0.160 1.414∗∗ 0.244 -0.722 -0.575 0.282
labor inc. x age (male) 0.023 0.069∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.017 0.033∗ 0.007 0.007 -0.050∗∗ -0.005 -0.001 0.030∗ 0.009
labor inc. x age (female) 0.045∗ 0.035 0.027∗ 0.043∗ 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.006 -0.035∗ -0.024 0.043∗∗ 0.016 0.019
labor inc. x age sq. (male) -0.014 -0.052∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.032∗ 0.002 -0.000 0.046∗∗∗ 0.003 0.023 -0.028∗ -0.008
labor inc. x age sq. (female) -0.041∗ -0.007 -0.008 -0.019 -0.013 0.001 -0.007 0.008 0.027∗ 0.037∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.017
labor inc. x civil serv. (male) 1.555 1.316 1.982∗∗ 2.345 0.082 1.804∗ -1.321 -1.316 -8.855 0.596 1.856 -0.961 -0.424
labor inc. x civil serv. (female) -0.384 -1.522 0.468 0.206 0.606 -1.331 -1.357 0.977 1.247 15.997 6.797 -89.908 -0.115
labor inc. x self-empl. (male) -0.160 0.083 0.288 0.469∗ 0.106 -0.003 -0.121 0.182∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.118 0.341∗∗ 0.199 0.180
labor inc. x self-empl. (female) -0.057 -0.168 -0.191 -0.268 -0.011 0.000 0.236 0.378∗∗ -0.229 0.511∗∗∗ 0.166 -0.146 0.140
labor inc. x kids 0-2 0.083 1.791 -1.974∗ -1.168 1.239 -1.096 0.880 -1.567∗∗∗ -2.056 -0.681 -0.977 -3.397 -0.385
labor inc. x kids 3-6 -1.592∗∗ -0.358 0.425 0.289 -0.855 0.607 0.014 0.086 0.153 -0.338 2.715∗ 0.119 0.449
labor inc. x kids 7-16 0.025 0.391∗∗ 0.072 -0.440∗ 0.071 -0.509 -0.289∗ -0.475 -0.704∗∗ -0.597 -0.589∗∗∗ -0.343 0.283
labor inc. x kids 17-25 -0.094 0.159 -0.138 -0.036 -0.140 0.119 -0.826∗∗∗ -0.313∗ -0.279 -0.428 -0.377 -0.176 -0.048
labor inc. x adults 0.018 0.170∗∗∗ 0.085 0.175∗∗ 0.001 0.133∗ 0.095 0.196∗∗ 0.108 0.151∗ 0.068 -0.074 -0.184∗
labor inc. sq./100 x married 0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001
labor inc. sq./100 x hours (male) -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
labor inc. sq./100 x hours (female) -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000
labor inc. sq./100 x couple -0.006 -0.017∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.007 -0.007∗ -0.008 -0.010∗∗ -0.009∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.001
labor inc. sq./100 x age (male) 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
labor inc. sq./100 x age (female) -0.000 0.000∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
labor inc. sq./100 x age sq. (male) -0.001∗ -0.001∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
labor inc. sq./100 x age sq. (female) 0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000
labor inc. sq./100 x civil serv. (male) 0.006 -0.001 -0.009∗ -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000
labor inc. sq./100 x civil serv. (female) -0.004 0.005 0.001 -0.003 -0.013 -0.002 0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.008 -0.001 -0.001
labor inc. sq./100 x self-empl. (male) 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.000 -0.001 -0.002∗ 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
labor inc. sq./100 x self-empl. (female) 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
labor inc. sq./100 x kids 0-2 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.008 -0.002 -0.007∗∗ 0.008 0.021∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.004 0.003 -0.005 0.003
labor inc. sq./100 x kids 3-6 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.003∗ 0.002 0.004∗∗ -0.001 -0.005∗∗ -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
labor inc. sq./100 x kids 7-16 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003∗∗ 0.001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗ -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.000
labor inc. sq./100 x kids 17-25 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004∗ 0.003 0.000 0.002 -0.003∗
labor inc. sq./100 x adults -0.000 -0.000 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗ 0.002∗ -0.000 0.001 -0.002∗ -0.002∗ -0.002 0.001 -0.002∗ -0.000
continued on next page
CHAPTER 3. 68
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
asset inc. -0.699 -2.682∗∗∗ -1.503∗∗ -2.355∗∗ -0.085 -0.173 0.846∗ -0.007 1.621∗∗ 0.127 -0.957 -1.133∗ 0.335
asset inc. sq./100 -0.006 -0.012 0.015 -0.028 -0.101∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗ -0.060∗∗ -0.012 -0.010 0.001 0.042∗ 0.021 -0.022
asset inc. x married 0.334 -0.564∗ -0.107 -0.701∗ 0.241 -0.094 -0.020 0.079 0.201 -0.261 0.074 0.074 0.003
asset inc. x hours (male) -0.000 -0.012∗∗ 0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.011∗∗ -0.008∗ 0.003 -0.008 0.006 -0.010∗ -0.004 0.005
asset inc. x hours (female) -0.000 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.010∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.001 -0.006 -0.012∗∗ -0.012∗∗ 0.013∗∗ -0.005
asset inc. x couple -1.658∗ -2.700∗∗∗ -1.671∗∗ -2.602∗∗∗ -0.853 -0.765 -0.173 -0.625 0.385 -0.485 -1.651∗∗ -2.037∗∗∗ 0.094
asset inc. x age (male) 0.052∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ -0.010 0.039∗ 0.008 0.014 -0.040∗ 0.030 0.026 0.081∗∗∗ 0.018
asset inc. x age (female) 0.044∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.046∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.018 0.015 -0.002 0.003 -0.025 -0.003 0.058∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.011
asset inc. x age sq. (male) -0.044∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ 0.025 -0.037∗ -0.004 -0.010 0.043∗ -0.026 -0.001 -0.072∗∗∗ -0.020
asset inc. x age sq. (female) -0.036 -0.040∗ -0.017 -0.057∗∗ -0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.014 0.020 0.022 -0.051∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗ -0.004
asset inc. x civil serv. (male) 1.873 1.203 1.694∗∗ 2.145 -0.086 1.642∗ -1.412 -1.547 -8.879 0.636 1.393 -1.339 -0.587
asset inc. x civil serv. (female) -0.338 -1.229 0.182 -0.277 -1.107 -1.137 -1.405 0.840 1.296∗ 16.362 7.594 -89.751 0.229
asset inc. x self-empl. (male) -0.316∗ -0.122 0.024 0.195 -0.132 -0.301∗∗ -0.345∗ -0.041 0.303∗ -0.138 0.055 -0.212 -0.253
asset inc. x self-empl. (female) 0.207 -0.265 -0.392∗ -0.383∗ -0.082 -0.094 0.078 0.105 -0.299∗ 0.399∗∗ 0.030 -0.385∗ -0.284∗
asset inc. x kids 0-2 . 1.320 -1.810∗ -0.549 1.134 -1.076 1.499∗∗ . -1.235 -0.328 -1.118 -3.846 0.024
asset inc. x kids 3-6 -1.553∗ -0.305 0.485 0.277 -0.848 0.880 0.082 -0.223 0.312 -0.162 2.824∗ 0.732 -0.027
asset inc. x kids 7-16 0.142 0.303 -0.011 -0.358 0.118 -0.480 -0.257 -0.522 -0.782∗∗ -0.627∗ -0.728∗∗∗ -0.226 0.298
asset inc. x kids 17-25 -0.185 0.042 -0.230 0.165 -0.557∗∗ 0.107 -0.747∗∗ -0.348∗ 0.033 -0.184 -0.589∗ -0.226 -0.432∗
asset inc. x adults 0.133 0.260∗∗∗ -0.048 0.098 0.166 0.167 0.170 0.263∗∗ 0.258∗ 0.151 0.269∗ -0.027 -0.102
asset inc. sq./100 x married -0.037∗∗ 0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.007∗ -0.007∗ 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.005 -0.004
asset inc. sq./100 x hours (male) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000
asset inc. sq./100 x hours (female) -0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
asset inc. sq./100 x couple 0.037 -0.029 -0.080∗∗∗ -0.040 -0.064∗∗ -0.039∗ -0.051∗ -0.005 0.012 0.018 0.037 0.016 -0.009
asset inc. sq./100 x age (male) 0.000 -0.001∗ 0.001 0.001 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003∗∗ -0.001 0.001
asset inc. sq./100 x age (female) -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001
asset inc. sq./100 x age sq. (male) -0.000 0.002∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.004∗∗ 0.001 -0.001
asset inc. sq./100 x age sq. (female) 0.000 0.001 -0.003∗ -0.000 -0.003∗ -0.001 -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001
asset inc. sq./100 x civil serv. (male) -0.004 0.002 -0.052∗∗∗ 0.010 0.001 0.009 0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.012∗∗ 0.006 0.004
asset inc. sq./100 x civil serv. (female) -0.008 -0.014 0.019 0.008 0.059 -0.011 0.055∗ -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.011 -0.023 -0.031
asset inc. sq./100 x self-empl. (male) 0.009∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗ -0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.007∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.012∗
asset inc. sq./100 x self-empl. (female) 0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.019∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.015∗∗
asset inc. sq./100 x kids 0-2 0.015 0.051∗ -0.014 0.009 -0.008 -0.051∗∗∗ 0.033 -0.020 -0.021∗∗ 0.043 -0.003 -0.006 -0.014
asset inc. sq./100 x kids 3-6 -0.004 -0.011 -0.005 0.033∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.009 -0.008 -0.003 -0.032∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.014∗ -0.007 -0.013
asset inc. sq./100 x kids 7-16 0.005 0.009∗ 0.010∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.008 0.010∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ -0.006 -0.004 -0.000 -0.008∗∗ 0.002 0.000
asset inc. sq./100 x kids 17-25 0.004 -0.002 0.007 0.007 0.015 0.014 -0.004 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.005 0.006
asset inc. sq./100 x adults -0.006 -0.000 -0.006 -0.004 -0.016∗∗ -0.000 0.001 -0.009∗ -0.010∗ -0.005 0.002 -0.007 -0.006
pensions (male) 0.383 2.184∗∗ 2.394∗∗∗ 2.582∗∗∗ 1.553∗∗∗ 0.548 1.239∗∗ 1.456∗∗ -1.192∗∗ 0.689 0.850∗ 0.978∗∗ 0.712∗
pensions (female) 0.499 1.552∗ 1.448∗∗ 2.428∗∗∗ 1.409∗∗ 0.596 0.955∗∗ 0.435 -0.346 0.129 1.157∗ 1.357∗∗ 0.602
pensions -0.329 -1.369 -0.265 -1.654∗ -0.513 -0.186 0.087 -0.356 1.312∗∗ 0.614 -0.640 -0.304 0.277
pensions sq./100 0.055∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.028 -0.004 -0.017 0.005 -0.045∗ -0.014 0.004 -0.016 0.002 -0.018 -0.005
pensions (male) x married 0.142 0.467∗∗∗ 0.204 0.295 0.227∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.183∗ 0.097 0.206∗∗∗
pensions (male) x hours (male) 0.001 0.009∗ -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.012∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.003 0.008∗∗ -0.004 0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.003
pensions (male) x hours (female) 0.003 0.001 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.008∗∗∗ 0.002 0.005∗ 0.002 -0.004 0.003
pensions (male) x couple 0.263 1.423 1.292∗ 2.767∗∗∗ 0.774 0.529 0.586 0.152 -1.399∗∗ 0.437 1.724∗∗∗ 1.966∗∗∗ 0.072
pensions (male) x age (male) 0.013 -0.066∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗ -0.039∗ -0.014 -0.027∗ -0.026 0.054∗∗∗ -0.020 0.008 -0.029∗ 0.002
pensions (male) x age (female) -0.008 -0.029 -0.010 -0.079∗∗∗ -0.035∗ -0.018 -0.026∗ -0.010 0.020 -0.006 -0.073∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗ -0.011
pensions (male) x age sq. (male) -0.014 0.058∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.020 0.016 0.019 -0.042∗∗∗ 0.019 -0.026∗∗ 0.024∗ -0.004
pensions (male) x age sq. (female) 0.005 0.008 -0.010 0.055∗∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.012 0.019 -0.002 -0.008 -0.003 0.071∗∗∗ 0.024 0.004
pensions (male) x civil serv. (male) . . -2.257∗ -1.955 1.087 -1.571∗ 0.078 -0.022 0.586 2.168∗ 0.021 1.411 -0.028
pensions (male) x civil serv. (female) 0.562∗ 0.748 . 0.173 -0.245 0.852 . -0.044 -0.588 . -2.106 . .
pensions (male) x self-empl. (male) -0.084 -0.251 0.035 0.035 -0.419∗∗∗ 0.098 0.241∗ -0.360∗∗∗ -0.493∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗ 0.300∗ 0.042
pensions (male) x self-empl. (female) -0.286∗ -0.165 0.081 -0.080 0.050 -0.374∗ -0.587∗ 0.257 -0.470∗∗∗ -0.466∗∗∗ -0.276 -0.015 -0.313∗∗∗
pensions (male) x kids 0-2 -1.006 0.672 1.194∗ -1.005 -0.980 1.497∗∗ -1.463∗ . -0.344 0.392 0.428 3.116 0.823
pensions (male) x kids 3-6 1.162∗ 0.264 -0.648∗ -0.410 0.619 -0.767 0.065 0.202 -0.028 -1.174∗ -2.145∗∗∗ -1.495 -0.569
pensions (male) x kids 7-16 -0.268 -0.710∗∗∗ -0.204 0.074 -0.135 0.238 0.012 0.377 0.468 0.230 0.246∗∗ -0.186 -0.275
pensions (male) x kids 17-25 0.167∗ -0.302∗∗∗ 0.099 -0.057 0.078 -0.137 0.683∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.139 0.337 0.181 0.339∗
pensions (male) x adults -0.331∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.146∗ -0.111∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.331∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗ -0.154∗∗ -0.180∗∗ -0.153∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗
pensions (female) x married 0.194 0.415∗∗∗ 0.072 0.296 0.178 0.308∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ -0.126 0.095 0.019
pensions (female) x hours (male) -0.005 0.007 -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.007∗ -0.004∗ 0.009∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗
pensions (female) x hours (female) 0.009∗∗ 0.001 -0.013∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.003 -0.010∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.005∗ 0.002 0.009∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.005 0.002
pensions (female) x couple 1.305 1.074 1.041 0.982 1.142∗ 0.209 1.124∗∗∗ 1.270 -2.129∗∗ 1.348 2.308∗∗∗ 1.729∗∗∗ 0.624
pensions (female) x age (male) -0.019 -0.042 -0.034 -0.052∗ -0.034∗ -0.014 -0.031∗∗∗ -0.041 0.065∗∗ -0.047 -0.032∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.011
pensions (female) x age (female) 0.002 -0.010 -0.009 -0.055∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.019 0.012 0.015 0.015 -0.046∗∗∗ -0.028∗ -0.006
pensions (female) x age sq. (male) 0.001 0.033 0.033∗ 0.052∗ 0.032∗ 0.013 0.013 0.025 -0.054∗∗ 0.032 -0.003 0.036∗∗ 0.002
pensions (female) x age sq. (female) 0.000 -0.003 -0.008 0.040∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.005 0.019 -0.015 -0.000 -0.017 0.057∗∗∗ 0.018 0.005
pensions (female) x civil serv. (male) -1.601 -1.055 -1.871∗∗∗ -2.551 0.181 -1.568∗ 0.267 . 24.014 -2.245 -1.644 2.131 0.107
pensions (female) x civil serv. (female) . 0.602 -0.131 0.428 -0.138 1.228 0.911 0.090 5.837∗∗∗ . . . -0.116
pensions (female) x self-empl. (male) 1.121∗∗∗ 0.048 0.339 0.369 -0.314∗ 0.382∗∗ 0.258∗ -0.366∗∗ -0.502∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.278 0.244
pensions (female) x self-empl. (female) -0.174 -0.222 0.044 0.056 0.082 -0.331∗ -0.454∗ -0.008 -0.548∗∗∗ -0.490∗∗∗ -0.269 0.055 -0.267∗∗
pensions (female) x kids 0-2 -0.074 -1.685 1.159 -0.690 -1.007 -0.246 -3.596 . 4.885 0.692 0.287 2.600 .
pensions (female) x kids 3-6 1.110 0.578 -0.988∗ -0.917 0.164 -0.948 -0.257 -0.438 0.211 . -1.118 -0.651 -0.298
pensions (female) x kids 7-16 -0.277 -0.591∗∗∗ -0.242 0.168 -0.180 0.328 0.195 0.383 0.453 0.473 0.543∗∗∗ 0.106 -0.203
pensions (female) x kids 17-25 0.283∗∗ -0.131 0.112 0.018 0.272∗ 0.199 0.626∗∗ 0.298∗∗ 0.134 -0.009 0.378 0.227 0.498∗∗
pensions (female) x adults -0.380∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ -0.158∗ -0.053 -0.176∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗ -0.147∗∗ -0.164∗∗ -0.074 -0.148∗∗
pensions x married -0.205 -0.517∗∗∗ -0.183 -0.197 -0.251∗∗ -0.182∗ -0.545∗∗∗ -0.602∗∗∗ -0.483∗∗∗ 0.045 0.041 -0.085 -0.154∗
pensions x hours (male) 0.007∗ -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.008∗∗ 0.003 0.004 0.005∗ -0.003 0.010∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
pensions x hours (female) -0.000 0.002 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.004 0.011∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 0.010∗∗ -0.001
pensions x couple -0.250 -1.197 -0.676 -1.751∗ -0.955∗ -0.221 -0.104 -0.041 1.616∗∗ 0.240 -1.007∗ -0.777∗ 0.460
pensions x age (male) -0.009 0.046∗ 0.017 0.064∗∗ 0.020 0.010 -0.008 0.004 -0.049∗∗ -0.004 -0.013 0.024∗ -0.019
pensions x age (female) 0.004 0.021 -0.009 0.038 0.039∗∗ 0.006 0.006 0.001 -0.032∗ -0.017 0.048∗∗∗ 0.010 -0.005
pensions x age sq. (male) 0.020 -0.031 -0.011 -0.051∗∗ -0.013 -0.008 0.022∗ 0.005 0.047∗∗∗ 0.001 0.041∗∗∗ -0.017 0.021∗
pensions x age sq. (female) 0.005 0.001 0.026∗ -0.019 -0.032∗∗ 0.002 -0.005 0.012 0.021 0.020 -0.054∗∗∗ 0.001 0.007
pensions x civil serv. (male) 2.419 1.268 2.122∗∗∗ 2.215 0.066 1.807∗∗ -1.022 -1.404 -0.282 . 1.071 -0.518 -0.023
pensions x civil serv. (female) -0.662 . 1.026 0.034 0.349 -1.108 -1.101 0.392 0.644 16.821 7.945 -96.855 0.181
pensions x self-empl. (male) -0.239 0.053 -0.220 -0.204 0.486∗∗∗ -0.181 -0.326∗∗ 0.255∗ 0.256 -0.438∗∗∗ -0.378∗∗ -0.254 -0.108
pensions x self-empl. (female) 0.001 0.551∗∗ 0.393∗ 0.180 -0.257 0.442∗∗ 0.606∗∗ 0.039 0.460∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.384∗ 0.149 0.543∗∗∗
pensions x kids 0-2 -0.951 3.186 -1.927∗ -0.750 1.520 0.350 0.674 -1.315∗ -0.543 -0.633 -0.223 -2.358 0.180
pensions x kids 3-6 -1.357∗ -0.470 0.134 0.772 -0.515 0.634 -0.098 -0.428 -0.177 . 3.535∗ 0.014 0.485
pensions x kids 7-16 0.512∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.293 -0.144 0.143 -0.407 -0.311∗ -0.435 -0.383 -0.527 -0.584∗∗∗ -0.153 0.264
pensions x kids 17-25 -0.169 0.319∗∗∗ -0.002 0.086 -0.241 0.144 -0.444∗ -0.368∗∗∗ -0.122 -0.038 -0.233 -0.209 -0.389∗
pensions x adults 0.281∗∗∗ 0.108 0.224∗∗∗ 0.158∗ 0.008 0.113 0.207∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.034 0.071 0.120 -0.010 0.019
pensions sq./100 x married 0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.006 -0.004∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.005∗ -0.002 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.002 0.001
pensions sq./100 x hours (male) -0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
pensions sq./100 x hours (female) -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
pensions sq./100 x couple 0.057∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.026 -0.003 -0.012 0.010 -0.035 -0.005 0.004 -0.010 0.009 -0.017 -0.003
pensions sq./100 x age (male) -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗ 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002∗∗ 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
pensions sq./100 x age (female) -0.001∗∗ -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000
pensions sq./100 x age sq. (male) 0.001∗∗ -0.001 -0.001∗∗ -0.001 -0.001∗∗ -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
pensions sq./100 x age sq. (female) 0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001∗ -0.000
pensions sq./100 x civil serv. (male) -0.098∗ -0.023 -0.038 0.075 -0.020 0.004 0.028 0.085 -6.793 0.117 0.033 -0.100∗ -0.002
pensions sq./100 x civil serv. (female) 0.076 -0.033 -0.077 -0.024 0.003 0.007 0.047 -0.009 -0.003 -0.212 -0.199 2.986 -0.013
pensions sq./100 x self-empl. (male) 0.008∗ 0.005∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.005 -0.005∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.008∗∗∗ 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000
pensions sq./100 x self-empl. (female) 0.013∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.013 0.009 -0.004 -0.004 0.008 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.008∗ -0.009∗
pensions sq./100 x kids 0-2 0.101 -0.233∗∗∗ 0.123 0.186 -0.027 -0.187∗∗∗ 0.069 0.042 -0.435 0.024 -0.047 -0.067 -0.050
pensions sq./100 x kids 3-6 0.021 -0.002 0.051 -0.024 -0.007 0.020 0.027 0.080∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.019 -0.175 0.049 -0.008
pensions sq./100 x kids 7-16 -0.038∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.013 -0.009 -0.006 0.003 0.010∗∗ 0.000 -0.007∗∗ 0.008 0.013∗ 0.005 0.001
pensions sq./100 x kids 17-25 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.006∗ -0.004 -0.010 0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 0.005 0.004
pensions sq./100 x adults -0.000 0.002∗ 0.000 -0.001 0.003∗ -0.000 0.003∗ 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.001
Constant 31.159 45.031 -0.829 10.535 -70.615 -45.504 114.966∗∗ 43.675 229.439∗∗∗ 121.003∗ 10.971 148.419∗ -261.887∗∗∗
R2 0.982 0.982 0.985 0.983 0.987 0.986 0.984 0.986 0.982 0.980 0.980 0.972 0.973
Observations 4198 4144 3942 3842 3788 3855 3859 3900 3888 4136 4074 4048 4733
Note: Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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Table 3.6.2: OLS – Estimation of tax-benefit system (1999–2010)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
married 92.356∗ -4.368 -118.132∗∗∗ 1.403 -56.411 32.925 -20.128 81.938∗∗ 57.659 -27.357 -81.721∗ -57.398
hours (male) -3.331∗∗∗ -4.718∗∗∗ -4.885∗∗∗ -3.420∗∗∗ -4.266∗∗∗ -5.624∗∗∗ -4.287∗∗∗ -3.583∗∗∗ -5.456∗∗∗ -4.081∗∗∗ -2.862∗∗∗ -5.623∗∗∗
hours (female) 1.030 1.845∗∗∗ 1.955∗∗∗ 2.108∗∗∗ 2.312∗∗∗ 4.241∗∗∗ 2.345∗∗∗ 1.974∗∗∗ 3.061∗∗∗ 2.207∗∗∗ 2.638∗∗∗ 3.323∗∗∗
couple -303.811∗∗∗ -260.786∗∗∗ -61.707 -80.419 -63.374 -122.185∗∗ -201.529∗∗∗ 65.676 -183.243∗∗∗ -166.001∗∗∗ 47.970 -152.572∗∗
age (male) 18.555∗∗∗ 18.974∗∗∗ 17.668∗∗∗ 10.734∗∗∗ 15.435∗∗∗ 14.625∗∗∗ 16.145∗∗∗ 1.642 12.197∗∗∗ 9.506∗∗∗ 9.028∗∗∗ 16.564∗∗∗
age (female) 12.088∗∗∗ 14.489∗∗∗ 12.806∗∗∗ 8.291∗∗∗ 9.081∗∗∗ 10.460∗∗∗ 14.731∗∗∗ 0.272 11.240∗∗∗ 8.868∗∗∗ 9.069∗∗∗ 11.301∗∗∗
age sq. (male) -19.709∗∗∗ -19.371∗∗∗ -20.097∗∗∗ -10.548∗∗∗ -18.584∗∗∗ -15.658∗∗∗ -16.918∗∗∗ -3.152 -14.014∗∗∗ -8.371∗∗ -10.319∗∗∗ -18.473∗∗∗
age sq. (female) -11.967∗∗∗ -15.129∗∗∗ -14.067∗∗∗ -9.360∗∗∗ -8.849∗∗∗ -11.907∗∗∗ -16.506∗∗∗ -2.085 -12.800∗∗∗ -9.344∗∗∗ -11.759∗∗∗ -11.189∗∗∗
civil serv. (male) -35.560 56.823 98.651 213.892∗∗∗ 125.946∗ 213.184∗ 53.754 81.161 145.260 73.847 -12.498 -331.073∗∗
civil serv. (female) -138.481 72.674 59.753 70.711 27.112 -24.363 76.935 61.111 71.574 -67.198 175.636∗∗ 136.619
self-empl. (male) 49.175 58.007∗ 72.936∗ 254.735∗∗∗ 156.888∗∗∗ 222.254∗∗∗ 165.393∗∗∗ 186.922∗∗∗ 257.199∗∗∗ 114.836∗∗∗ 128.366∗∗∗ 313.524∗∗∗
self-empl. (female) -6.710 23.140 105.759∗∗ 67.003∗ 169.432∗∗∗ 190.634∗∗∗ 6.635 52.219 33.993 45.269 83.833∗ -46.790
kids 0-2 406.128∗∗∗ 356.962∗∗∗ 249.182∗∗∗ 205.184∗∗∗ 319.393∗∗∗ 281.520∗∗∗ 210.508∗∗∗ 248.210∗∗∗ 439.354∗∗∗ 364.299∗∗∗ 323.183∗∗∗ 363.670∗∗∗
kids 3-6 236.786∗∗∗ 171.729∗∗∗ 177.005∗∗∗ 173.666∗∗∗ 238.344∗∗∗ 182.608∗∗∗ 184.465∗∗∗ 260.444∗∗∗ 247.491∗∗∗ 307.006∗∗∗ 186.116∗∗∗ 294.076∗∗∗
kids 7-16 97.977∗∗∗ 146.694∗∗∗ 120.524∗∗∗ 149.797∗∗∗ 129.955∗∗∗ 148.602∗∗∗ 153.886∗∗∗ 159.435∗∗∗ 231.384∗∗∗ 205.343∗∗∗ 166.591∗∗∗ 221.954∗∗∗
kids 17-25 -11.611 62.094 69.089 65.886∗ 73.368∗ 157.475∗∗∗ 91.810∗ 70.859 121.791∗∗ 79.783 178.193∗∗∗ 101.790∗
adults 141.153∗∗∗ 137.425∗∗∗ 153.471∗∗∗ 135.529∗∗∗ 145.781∗∗∗ 135.108∗∗∗ 142.391∗∗∗ 162.271∗∗∗ 196.585∗∗∗ 204.884∗∗∗ 92.273∗∗∗ 148.589∗∗∗
gross inc. -0.262 0.413∗ -0.050 -0.324 -0.568∗∗ 0.263 0.090 0.034 0.122 -0.866∗∗∗ -0.518∗ 0.167
gross inc. sq./100 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002∗ 0.001 0.002∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.004∗∗∗ -0.000 0.006∗∗∗
gross inc. x married 0.271 0.233∗∗ -0.190 -0.208∗ -0.204∗∗ -0.013 0.067 0.121 -0.011 0.107 -0.195∗∗ -0.039
gross inc. x hours (male) -0.004 0.004∗ 0.007∗∗ -0.004∗ -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
gross inc. x hours (female) 0.010∗∗∗ -0.004∗ -0.001 -0.006∗∗∗ -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.006∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ 0.003 0.003 0.002
gross inc. x couple -0.522 0.029 0.390∗ -0.476∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗ 0.172 -0.081 0.040 0.075 -1.033∗∗∗ -0.416∗ -0.161
gross inc. x age (male) 0.003 -0.021∗∗ -0.014∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.002 0.015 0.006 -0.003 0.034∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.011∗
gross inc. x age (female) 0.003 0.002 -0.007 0.013∗ 0.030∗∗∗ -0.011 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.029∗∗∗ 0.013∗ -0.001
gross inc. x age sq. (male) 0.005 0.024∗∗∗ 0.017∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.005 -0.019∗∗ -0.009 0.004 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗
gross inc. x age sq. (female) 0.001 -0.009 0.011 -0.007 -0.024∗∗∗ 0.011∗ -0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.024∗∗∗ -0.007 0.002
gross inc. x civil serv. (male) 6.364 -1.224 -0.953∗ 0.249 0.366 -0.564 -0.301 -0.875 -0.131 -0.053 -0.930 0.486
gross inc. x civil serv. (female) -0.626 0.336 -0.065 0.234 0.177 -0.029 0.030 0.546∗ -0.109 -0.023 -0.262 -0.468
gross inc. x self-empl. (male) -0.171∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.066 0.040 0.012 0.010 0.043 0.022 0.100∗ 0.135∗∗∗ -0.064 0.144∗∗∗
gross inc. x self-empl. (female) -0.157 -0.059 0.125 0.279∗∗∗ -0.145 -0.038 0.221∗∗ 0.165∗∗ -0.140 -0.156∗∗ 0.186∗∗ -0.129
gross inc. x kids 0-2 5.148∗ 0.210 0.722 1.516∗∗∗ -0.711 0.694 0.241 -0.824∗ 0.836∗ 0.958 0.266 0.360
gross inc. x kids 3-6 0.005 -0.153 0.837∗ 0.362 0.449∗ 0.176 0.071 -0.096 0.286 -0.615 0.443∗ 1.000
gross inc. x kids 7-16 0.330∗∗ -0.012 -0.093 -0.110 0.393∗∗∗ -0.005 0.175 0.002 0.020 0.008 0.269∗∗∗ 0.101
gross inc. x kids 17-25 -0.074 -0.176 -0.109 0.076 -0.175 -0.087 0.153 0.147 -0.014 0.312∗∗ -0.173 0.037
gross inc. x adults 0.037 0.008 0.107∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.041 0.064 -0.090∗∗ -0.011 0.059 -0.082∗∗ -0.048 -0.103∗∗
gross inc. sq./100 x married -0.003∗∗ 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.000 0.001∗ 0.000 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
gross inc. sq./100 x hours (male) -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
gross inc. sq./100 x hours (female) -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
gross inc. sq./100 x couple 0.002 0.004∗∗ 0.001 -0.001 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.003∗ -0.002∗ -0.000 0.003∗∗∗ -0.002 0.002
gross inc. sq./100 x age (male) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗
gross inc. sq./100 x age (female) 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗
gross inc. sq./100 x age sq. (male) -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗
gross inc. sq./100 x age sq. (female) -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗
gross inc. sq./100 x civil serv. (male) -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.001∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001
gross inc. sq./100 x civil serv. (female) 0.011∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.000 0.001∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
gross inc. sq./100 x self-empl. (male) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗
gross inc. sq./100 x self-empl. (female) -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.001∗
gross inc. sq./100 x kids 0-2 -0.004 -0.003∗∗ -0.002 0.000 -0.003∗∗ -0.001 0.002 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.002 0.014∗∗∗ 0.001
gross inc. sq./100 x kids 3-6 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.001 -0.003∗∗∗
gross inc. sq./100 x kids 7-16 -0.003∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001∗
gross inc. sq./100 x kids 17-25 -0.002 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.001∗ 0.000 -0.000
gross inc. sq./100 x adults 0.001∗ -0.000 -0.001∗ 0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000
labor inc. 0.965∗∗∗ 0.333 0.753∗∗∗ 1.028∗∗∗ 1.246∗∗∗ 0.460∗ 0.582∗ 0.494∗ 0.481∗ 1.511∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗
labor inc. sq./100 0.002 -0.003∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.006∗∗∗
labor inc. x married -0.292 -0.221∗∗ 0.240∗ 0.226∗∗ 0.217∗∗ 0.013 -0.062 -0.146∗ 0.020 -0.096 0.229∗∗∗ 0.082
labor inc. x hours (male) 0.005 -0.003 -0.006∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
labor inc. x hours (female) -0.011∗∗∗ 0.002 0.001 0.005∗∗ 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.005∗∗ 0.004∗ -0.004∗ -0.004∗ -0.003
labor inc. x couple 0.777∗∗ 0.246 -0.181 0.711∗∗∗ 0.911∗∗∗ 0.115 0.356 0.068 0.122 1.250∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗ 0.380∗
labor inc. x age (male) -0.014 0.011 0.005 -0.036∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.023∗∗ -0.008 -0.004 -0.038∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
labor inc. x age (female) -0.008 -0.012 0.000 -0.022∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.012 -0.000 -0.006 -0.035∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.006
labor inc. x age sq. (male) 0.010 -0.013 -0.005 0.036∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.005 0.030∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
labor inc. x age sq. (female) 0.002 0.020∗∗ -0.004 0.017∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ -0.000 0.015∗ 0.000 0.008 0.031∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.005
labor inc. x civil serv. (male) -6.235 1.316 1.040∗ -0.202 -0.280 0.625 0.398 0.975∗ 0.202 0.139 1.051 -0.239
labor inc. x civil serv. (female) 0.796 -0.277 0.113 -0.188 -0.117 0.113 0.004 -0.491∗ 0.182 0.121 0.273 0.494
labor inc. x self-empl. (male) 0.337∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.051 0.111∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.108∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.023 0.003 0.198∗∗∗ -0.058
labor inc. x self-empl. (female) 0.274∗∗ 0.123 -0.088 -0.228∗∗∗ 0.170∗ 0.094 -0.116 -0.085 0.264∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ -0.134∗ 0.225∗∗∗
labor inc. x kids 0-2 -5.271∗ -0.285 -0.733 -1.511∗∗∗ 0.670 -0.700 -0.232 0.798 -0.913∗∗ -1.008 -0.258 -0.339
labor inc. x kids 3-6 -0.052 0.154 -0.842∗ -0.350 -0.448∗ -0.172 -0.057 0.093 -0.269 0.587 -0.426∗ -1.053
labor inc. x kids 7-16 -0.324∗∗ 0.007 0.110 0.122∗ -0.367∗∗∗ 0.011 -0.161 0.010 -0.032 -0.012 -0.256∗∗∗ -0.114
labor inc. x kids 17-25 0.155 0.228∗ 0.198 -0.023 0.230∗ 0.108 -0.104 -0.108 0.026 -0.244∗ 0.203 0.024
labor inc. x adults -0.098 -0.048 -0.187∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗ -0.096∗∗ 0.045 -0.027 -0.084∗ 0.014 0.026 0.054
labor inc. sq./100 x married 0.003∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.000 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
labor inc. sq./100 x hours (male) 0.000 0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000
labor inc. sq./100 x hours (female) -0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
labor inc. sq./100 x couple -0.003 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.000 -0.003∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ 0.001 -0.000 -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.003∗∗
labor inc. sq./100 x age (male) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
labor inc. sq./100 x age (female) -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
labor inc. sq./100 x age sq. (male) 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗
labor inc. sq./100 x age sq. (female) 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗
labor inc. sq./100 x civil serv. (male) 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003
labor inc. sq./100 x civil serv. (female) -0.013∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
labor inc. sq./100 x self-empl. (male) -0.003∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
labor inc. sq./100 x self-empl. (female) 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗ -0.000∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗
labor inc. sq./100 x kids 0-2 0.005∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.000 0.003∗∗ 0.001 -0.002 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 -0.014∗∗∗ -0.001
labor inc. sq./100 x kids 3-6 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001∗ -0.000 -0.001∗∗ -0.002∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.001 0.004∗∗∗
labor inc. sq./100 x kids 7-16 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 0.001∗∗
labor inc. sq./100 x kids 17-25 0.001 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗ -0.000 0.001∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
labor inc. sq./100 x adults -0.001 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001∗∗ -0.000 -0.001∗∗ -0.000∗ 0.000 0.000
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
asset inc. 1.127∗∗ 0.280 0.774∗∗∗ 1.227∗∗∗ 1.546∗∗∗ 0.309 0.635∗ 0.705∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗ 1.506∗∗∗ 1.367∗∗∗ 0.433∗
asset inc. sq./100 -0.009 -0.007 0.004 0.001 -0.015∗∗∗ -0.001 0.005 0.005∗ 0.004 -0.005∗∗ -0.004 -0.025∗∗∗
asset inc. x married 0.301 -0.126 0.361∗∗ 0.144 0.316∗∗∗ -0.025 0.263∗∗ -0.107 0.171∗ -0.004 0.169∗ -0.225
asset inc. x hours (male) 0.001 -0.003 -0.009∗∗∗ 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.004∗ 0.003
asset inc. x hours (female) -0.010∗∗ 0.005∗ -0.002 0.004∗ -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.003 -0.008∗∗∗
asset inc. x couple -0.262 -0.365 -0.903∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗ -0.374 -0.434 -0.107 -0.190 0.819∗∗∗ 0.495∗ 0.178
asset inc. x age (male) 0.008 0.020∗ 0.021∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.006 0.000 0.008 -0.032∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.008
asset inc. x age (female) 0.002 0.005 0.018∗ -0.013 -0.032∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.008 -0.000 0.002 -0.022∗∗∗ -0.004 0.012
asset inc. x age sq. (male) -0.014 -0.017∗ -0.023∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.005 0.010 0.002 -0.010 0.027∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.014∗
asset inc. x age sq. (female) -0.004 0.006 -0.022∗∗ 0.006 0.027∗∗∗ -0.017∗ -0.005 0.004 0.002 0.018∗∗ -0.004 -0.010
asset inc. x civil serv. (male) -6.342 1.299 1.175∗∗ -0.067 -0.312 0.562 0.456 1.041∗ -0.011 0.164 0.581 -0.610
asset inc. x civil serv. (female) -0.291 -0.864 -0.051 -0.267 -0.389∗ 0.024 -0.026 -0.213 0.024 -0.185 0.231 0.257
asset inc. x self-empl. (male) 0.017 0.104 0.089 -0.090∗ -0.038 -0.116∗ -0.109∗ -0.122∗∗ -0.104∗ -0.150∗∗ -0.001 -0.258∗∗∗
asset inc. x self-empl. (female) -0.029 -0.052 -0.216∗ -0.337∗∗∗ 0.064 -0.096 -0.341∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗ -0.018 0.172∗∗ -0.161∗ 0.060
asset inc. x kids 0-2 -4.443∗ 0.100 -0.441 -1.380∗∗ 1.271∗ -0.345 -0.441 1.187∗∗ -0.613 -1.018 -0.227 -0.550
asset inc. x kids 3-6 0.049 0.125 -0.750 -0.331 -0.498∗ 0.025 0.077 0.225 -0.516 0.763∗ -0.394 -0.679
asset inc. x kids 7-16 -0.072 0.045 0.091 0.063 -0.470∗∗∗ 0.023 -0.188 -0.004 0.010 0.012 -0.313∗∗∗ -0.103
asset inc. x kids 17-25 0.325 0.017 -0.088 -0.111 0.060 0.145 0.002 -0.023 0.127 -0.250∗ 0.280∗ -0.100
asset inc. x adults -0.087 0.019 -0.034 -0.097∗∗ 0.039 -0.048 0.054 0.007 -0.120∗∗ 0.046 -0.047 0.109∗
asset inc. sq./100 x married -0.006∗∗ -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.002
asset inc. sq./100 x hours (male) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
asset inc. sq./100 x hours (female) -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗
asset inc. sq./100 x couple 0.007 -0.006 0.011 0.000 -0.011∗∗∗ 0.003 0.005∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗ -0.002 0.003 -0.018∗∗∗
asset inc. sq./100 x age (male) -0.001∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗
asset inc. sq./100 x age (female) 0.000 0.001∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗∗∗
asset inc. sq./100 x age sq. (male) 0.001∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.001∗∗∗
asset inc. sq./100 x age sq. (female) -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗ -0.000∗
asset inc. sq./100 x civil serv. (male) 0.011 -0.004 -0.013∗ 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.003∗ 0.006 -0.003 -0.003 0.006 -0.001
asset inc. sq./100 x civil serv. (female) -0.041∗ -0.003 -0.006 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.010 0.000
asset inc. sq./100 x self-empl. (male) 0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.000 -0.002∗∗∗ 0.000
asset inc. sq./100 x self-empl. (female) 0.005∗ 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002∗ 0.000 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.001 0.002
asset inc. sq./100 x kids 0-2 -0.010 0.002 0.003 -0.015 0.001 -0.004∗ -0.002 0.006 -0.003∗ 0.013 -0.098∗∗∗ -0.003
asset inc. sq./100 x kids 3-6 -0.000 -0.001 -0.011∗ -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.010∗∗ -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.005∗∗
asset inc. sq./100 x kids 7-16 0.004∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.005∗∗∗
asset inc. sq./100 x kids 17-25 -0.009∗ -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.000 0.002∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.001 0.003
asset inc. sq./100 x adults 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗ -0.001
pensions (male) 0.654∗ 0.048 0.104 0.220 -0.080 1.524∗∗∗ 0.501 0.441 0.251 -0.745∗ 0.491 0.872∗
pensions (female) -0.082 0.064 0.441 0.401 0.129 0.809∗ 0.155 -0.184 0.586 -0.519 0.154 0.321
pensions 1.153∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗ 1.364∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.983∗∗∗ 0.112 0.724∗∗ 0.555∗∗ 0.419∗ 1.252∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗
pensions sq./100 -0.016 0.007 -0.026∗∗ -0.010 -0.013 -0.010 -0.020∗ -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.008
pensions (male) x married 0.285∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.001 0.081 0.054 0.138∗∗ 0.091 0.184∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.082 0.110
pensions (male) x hours (male) -0.002 0.004∗ 0.000 -0.003∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.002∗ 0.001 -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗ -0.000 -0.002 0.001
pensions (male) x hours (female) 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003∗∗ -0.002 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.000 0.001 -0.004∗∗
pensions (male) x couple -0.709∗∗∗ 0.371 -0.221 0.792∗∗ -0.070 0.470 0.338 -0.222 0.401 -0.368 -0.595∗ 0.286
pensions (male) x age (male) -0.003 0.005 0.018∗ 0.001 0.023∗∗ -0.029∗∗ 0.010 -0.005 0.001 0.021∗ -0.006 -0.016
pensions (male) x age (female) 0.011∗ -0.017∗ 0.009 -0.039∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.025∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.000 -0.028∗∗ -0.004 0.004 -0.023∗∗
pensions (male) x age sq. (male) 0.002 -0.002 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.024∗∗∗ 0.017∗ -0.016∗ 0.005 -0.001 -0.009 0.006 0.015
pensions (male) x age sq. (female) -0.009 0.012 -0.006 0.036∗∗∗ 0.003 0.022∗∗∗ 0.004 0.000 0.028∗∗∗ 0.010 0.004 0.020∗∗
pensions (male) x civil serv. (male) 0.909 0.824 0.825 -0.813∗∗ 0.302 -0.044 0.158 -0.012 -0.066 -0.041 -0.052 0.777
pensions (male) x civil serv. (female) -0.649∗ -0.696∗ -0.087 -0.367∗∗∗ -0.228∗ -0.212∗ -0.320∗∗ 0.061 -0.757∗∗∗ -0.214 -0.215 -0.248∗
pensions (male) x self-empl. (male) -0.005 -0.082 0.159∗ 0.071 0.086 0.286∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ -0.048 -0.005 0.307∗∗∗ 0.105
pensions (male) x self-empl. (female) 0.092 -0.148∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.115 -0.038 -0.015 -0.231∗∗ 0.062 -0.043 -0.089 -0.236∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗
pensions (male) x kids 0-2 . . . 0.147 -0.610 0.448 -0.999 -1.124∗ -0.223 0.778 . 0.156
pensions (male) x kids 3-6 -0.319 -0.262 0.670 -0.075 0.183 0.456 0.226 -0.169 0.077 -0.759∗ -0.012 0.377
pensions (male) x kids 7-16 0.048 0.011 -0.251∗∗ -0.100∗ 0.295∗∗∗ -0.173 -0.110 -0.083 -0.046 0.113 0.131∗ -0.239
pensions (male) x kids 17-25 -0.025 -0.100 0.091 -0.006 0.142 0.032 0.291∗∗∗ 0.110 -0.352∗∗∗ -0.045 -0.150 -0.238∗∗
pensions (male) x adults -0.139∗∗ -0.074∗ -0.079∗ 0.013 -0.206∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ 0.011 0.121∗∗∗ 0.040 0.000 0.018
pensions (female) x married 0.168∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.038 0.171∗∗ -0.005 0.111 0.117 0.238∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.084 0.152∗ 0.131
pensions (female) x hours (male) -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.006∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.002 -0.001 -0.004∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.001 0.000
pensions (female) x hours (female) -0.014∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.005 -0.005∗ -0.003 -0.004∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.006∗∗
pensions (female) x couple -0.981∗ 0.171 0.285 0.622∗ 0.306 0.814∗ 0.563 -0.298 0.407 -1.479∗∗∗ -0.771∗ -0.403∗∗
pensions (female) x age (male) 0.032∗ -0.008 0.011 -0.006 0.010 -0.016 0.004 0.012 -0.004 0.047∗∗∗ 0.026∗ 0.010
pensions (female) x age (female) 0.007 0.002 -0.005 -0.024∗∗ 0.003 -0.025∗∗ 0.003 0.002 -0.027∗ 0.002 -0.010 -0.011
pensions (female) x age sq. (male) -0.024∗ 0.007 -0.022 -0.002 -0.019∗∗ 0.005 -0.017 -0.013 -0.006 -0.036∗∗∗ -0.021∗ -0.009
pensions (female) x age sq. (female) -0.004 -0.000 0.004 0.027∗∗∗ 0.002 0.025∗∗∗ -0.002 0.004 0.031∗∗∗ 0.010 0.016∗ 0.016∗
pensions (female) x civil serv. (male) 5.475 -1.216 -0.646 -0.299 0.020 0.159 -0.003 -0.066 -0.091 0.175 -0.223 0.180
pensions (female) x civil serv. (female) . . . . . . . . . . . -0.308
pensions (female) x self-empl. (male) 0.030 0.209∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.168∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.156∗ 0.094 0.318∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗
pensions (female) x self-empl. (female) 0.057 -0.138∗∗ 0.261∗∗ -0.000 -0.192∗∗ -0.100 -0.407∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.198∗∗ -0.106 -0.237∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗
pensions (female) x kids 0-2 4.077 . . 0.594∗ -0.371 . 0.615 . . . . .
pensions (female) x kids 3-6 0.065 -0.038 1.162∗ 0.157 0.131 2.183 0.547 0.124 0.468 0.695 0.022 0.530
pensions (female) x kids 7-16 0.426∗∗ 0.070 -0.110 -0.226∗ 0.304∗∗ -0.009 -0.228 -0.120 -0.108 -0.029 0.094 0.048
pensions (female) x kids 17-25 0.015 -0.043 0.050 -0.110 0.221∗ 0.086 0.408∗∗∗ 0.209∗ -0.102 0.101 0.036 0.011
pensions (female) x adults -0.107∗ -0.063 -0.124∗∗∗ 0.015 -0.229∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ 0.023 0.077∗ 0.067∗ -0.020 0.025
pensions x married -0.351∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.050 0.068 -0.098 -0.053 -0.198∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗ -0.090 -0.045 -0.005
pensions x hours (male) 0.006∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.002 0.003
pensions x hours (female) -0.003 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.001 0.000 0.004∗∗
pensions x couple 1.068∗∗∗ 0.173 0.716∗∗∗ 0.062 0.563∗∗ -0.165 0.486∗ 0.191 0.203 0.823∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗
pensions x age (male) -0.036∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.049∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.032∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.006 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
pensions x age (female) -0.024∗∗ -0.006 -0.032∗∗∗ 0.010 -0.017∗∗ 0.013∗ -0.018∗ 0.006 0.012 -0.007 -0.007 -0.002
pensions x age sq. (male) 0.031∗∗∗ 0.008 0.057∗∗∗ 0.003 0.037∗∗∗ 0.011 0.034∗∗∗ 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.011∗ 0.015∗∗
pensions x age sq. (female) 0.021∗∗ 0.011 0.028∗∗∗ -0.013∗ 0.011 -0.011∗ 0.020∗∗ -0.008 -0.014∗ -0.003 0.001 -0.004
pensions x civil serv. (male) -5.445 1.781 1.122∗∗ -0.062 0.006 -0.165 0.020 0.015 0.065 -0.142 0.237 -0.202
pensions x civil serv. (female) -0.141 -0.023 0.050 0.369∗∗ 0.346∗ 0.195 0.367∗ -0.267 0.950∗∗∗ -0.000 0.251 0.468∗
pensions x self-empl. (male) 0.056 0.112∗ -0.167∗ -0.143∗ -0.113 -0.351∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗ -0.066 -0.300∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗
pensions x self-empl. (female) -0.027 0.187∗∗ -0.252∗ -0.093 0.059 0.041 0.360∗∗∗ 0.005 0.256∗∗∗ 0.116 0.129∗ 0.260∗∗∗
pensions x kids 0-2 -2.410 . -0.188 -1.205∗ 0.287 -0.875 0.351 2.248∗∗ 0.071 -1.354 -0.902∗∗∗ -0.548
pensions x kids 3-6 -0.016 0.000 -0.703 -0.020 -0.491∗ 0.742 0.025 0.365 -0.268 0.991∗∗ -0.434∗ -0.665
pensions x kids 7-16 -0.199 0.041 0.190 0.121∗ -0.368∗∗∗ 0.187 -0.047 0.156∗ 0.084 0.060 0.093 0.016
pensions x kids 17-25 -0.078 0.244∗∗ -0.034 0.132 -0.048 -0.001 -0.251∗∗ -0.027 0.219∗ -0.150 -0.035 0.126
pensions x adults 0.079 0.003 0.012 -0.097∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.073∗ 0.155∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.057 -0.135∗∗∗
pensions sq./100 x married 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.002∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003∗
pensions sq./100 x hours (male) -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
pensions sq./100 x hours (female) 0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
pensions sq./100 x couple -0.013 0.008 -0.022∗ -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.020∗ 0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.002 -0.004
pensions sq./100 x age (male) 0.000 -0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗
pensions sq./100 x age (female) 0.001 -0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
pensions sq./100 x age sq. (male) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗
pensions sq./100 x age sq. (female) -0.001∗∗ -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
pensions sq./100 x civil serv. (male) -0.101 -0.044 -0.045∗ 0.014 -0.015 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.008
pensions sq./100 x civil serv. (female) 0.021 0.026 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 -0.000 0.000 0.006 -0.002 0.006 -0.003 -0.005
pensions sq./100 x self-empl. (male) -0.002∗ -0.002∗ -0.000 -0.002∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001∗ -0.001∗ -0.001 -0.000
pensions sq./100 x self-empl. (female) 0.001 -0.001∗∗ -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.000 0.001 -0.000
pensions sq./100 x kids 0-2 -0.283∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.035 0.046 0.009 0.030 -0.037∗ -0.214∗∗ -0.029∗∗ 0.072 0.036∗∗ 0.034
pensions sq./100 x kids 3-6 0.014 0.007 0.001 -0.021 0.019 -0.106∗ -0.006 -0.024 0.002 -0.021∗∗ 0.013 0.010
pensions sq./100 x kids 7-16 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.004∗ -0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.000 -0.003∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.003
pensions sq./100 x kids 17-25 0.009∗ -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.003 0.007∗ 0.006∗ 0.003
pensions sq./100 x adults -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ -0.000 0.001 0.001∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Constant -45.926 -87.615∗ -10.810 75.996∗ 32.376 57.878 56.331 344.918∗∗∗ 105.695∗∗ 106.270∗ 252.181∗∗∗ 109.323∗
R2 0.975 0.978 0.975 0.984 0.979 0.993 0.994 0.994 0.982 0.989 0.988 0.989
Observations 4545 8686 7767 8223 7932 7760 7519 8127 7507 7073 6589 6184
Note: Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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Chapter 4
Income Inequality, Household
Size and the Welfare State∗
4.1 Introduction
Since reunification in 1990, inequality as well as poverty and richness of the equi-
valent disposable income distribution in Germany have increased considerably (see
OECD, 2008; Bach et al., 2009; Peichl et al., 2010, and figure 4.2.1). From a policy
perspective it is important to understand the driving forces behind this widening
income gap. One cause of this development, among others (e.g., changes in returns
to education, skill-biased technological change, de-unionization or the weakening
bargaining power of unions; also see Lemieux, 2010), could be structural shifts
in household formation due to long-term societal trends. These might be linked
to rising inequality, since a decrease in the number of individuals living together
affects the income distribution because of income sharing within households. Fur-
thermore, changing household structure is accompanied by changes in employ-
ment patterns, which also have an impact on the income distribution. Therefore,
everything else equal, the income distribution is affected by household structure
changes (Burtless, 1999, 2009).
The aim of this chapter is to quantify the effect of such changes on the income
∗This chapter is based on the paper Does Size Matter? The Impact of Changes in Household
Structure on Income Distribution in Germany (joint with Andreas Peichl and Hilmar Schneider,
see Peichl et al., 2012).
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distribution in Germany. The case of Germany is of special interest, as the demo-
graphic development is not only characterized by an ageing population, but also
by a sharp fall in average household size. Despite this very pronounced develop-
ment, there has not been much research that systematically analyzes these effects
on income distribution for Germany.1
Two different methods can be used to assess the impact of changing household
structure: subgroup decomposition and re-weighting. The first is an exact decom-
position of the distributional change by population subgroups (Shorrocks, 1980;
Mookherjee and Shorrocks, 1982; Shorrocks, 1984). This is the common approach
in studies analyzing the effect of demographic change on inequality in the United
Kingdom (Jenkins, 1995) and the United States (Martin, 2006). For Germany
this decomposition technique has been applied to regional differences in income
inequality after reunification (Schwarze, 1996) and to differences in poverty by re-
gion and household type (Bo¨nke and Schro¨der, 2011). Bargain and Callan (2010)
decompose the effects of tax-benefit reforms on income distribution. In addition
to the subgroup decomposition, a re-weighting procedure in the tradition of the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) is applied in order
to obtain counterfactual income distributions while keeping the marginal distribu-
tions of other characteristics fixed (DiNardo et al., 1996; Hyslop and Mare, 2005).
These procedures have already been applied in the OECD (2008) study to assess
the importance of demographic change on income inequality as well as to other
contexts related to wage and wealth inequality (Lemieux, 2006; Bover, 2010).
In this study we contrast the results from both techniques. Due to the possible
existence of non-linearities, and as a sensitivity analysis, we check whether both
approaches lead to similar results. Note that both approaches remain descript-
ive, i.e., based on the results one cannot state that there is a causal relationship
between household structure and income inequality. In addition to quantifying the
impact of changing household structure on inequality, this chapter contributes to
the existing literature by deriving analogous decomposition techniques for changes
in poverty and richness measures. This enables us to conduct a more detailed ana-
1In a recent study on inequality, the OECD (2008) erroneously reports that a share of 88% of
the total (absolute) change in the Gini coefficient of disposable incomes in West Germany from
1985 to 2005 is due to changing household structure. However, the authors have stated that
this is a misprint. The true figure is 12%.
CHAPTER 4. 79
lysis of the tails of the income distribution. Our analysis is based on microdata
from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP).
We find that the growth of the income gap in Germany (East and West, from
1991–2007) is indeed strongly related to such changes. For inequality of incomes
before taxes and transfers we find a fraction of 78%. However, the result for
incomes after taxes and transfers is only 22%. This means that the welfare state has
largely compensated for inequality induced by changes in household structure. The
same holds for the change in poverty, but less for the change in richness measures.
Similar results occur when using a counterfactual re-weighting procedure. The
role of the welfare state is important, since it not only enables the pure existence
of poor households by providing a minimum income, but it also affects the income
situation of specific population groups. For example, the welfare state compensates
low-income households with children but burdens double-earner couples with high
marginal income tax rates.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides an overview of the
demographic trends in Germany, and section 4.3 reviews relevant definitions and
methods. In section 4.4 these methods are applied to German survey data. The
results are presented in section 4.5, and the chapter concludes in section 4.6.
4.2 Demographic Trends in Germany
The demographic development in Germany is not only characterized by an ageing
population, but also by a sharp drop in average household size, which is now –
together with Sweden – lowest among OECD countries (OECD, 2008). Especially
the proportion of one- and two-person households has increased dramatically. The
increase in the number of single households can be primarily explained by a higher
rate of divorce and a lower rate of marriage. The increase in two-person households
is related to two developments: first, the number of childless couples has increased,
and second, the increase in life expectancy has led to a growing number of elderly
two-person households. Figures 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 illustrate the demographic trend
towards smaller households. According to data from the German Micro Census,
the average number of individuals living together in a household decreased from
2.27 to 2.05 between 1991 and 2008. In East Germany this decrease was twice as
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Figure 4.2.1: Household size, inequality, poverty and richness (1991–2007)
large: while the average household size was 2.31 in 1991, it was only 1.91 in 2008.
Although Germany’s population increased by 2.6% between 1991 and 2008 (from
80.2 to 82.3 million), the number of private households increased by 13.6% to 40.1
million. This was predominantly driven by the rising number of households with
two persons at most. The number of one- and two-person households increased
by 33.2% and 25.5% respectively, while the number of households with at least
three persons has been decreasing (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008b).2 To a large
extent, this development can be explained by the drastic and continual decline of
Germany’s birth rate, which decreased by 17.4% between 1991 and 2005 (Stat-
istisches Bundesamt, 2008a). In addition, the trend towards individualization due
to increasing relevance of modern life styles such as “living apart together” (see,
e.g. Asendorpf, 2009) accounted for a large part of this observation.
With regard to causality, the described patterns may result from changes in
mating behavior due to higher levels of education and more frequent labor mar-
ket participation among women. This could lead to modifications in scope and
2Although according to the German Micro Census, the trend towards smaller households might be
somewhat overstated due to statistical artifacts (see Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009, for details),
the direction and magnitude of this trend nevertheless seem to be clear cut. Moreover, our
calculations based on data from the SOEP are not significantly different (see figure 4.2.1).
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Figure 4.2.2: Number of different-sized households (1991–2008)
selectivity of fertility. Hence, it is conceivable that household formation in turn
depends on one’s position in the income distribution, i.e., there is some form of
reverse causality. For instance, educated and employed women may be improv-
ing their income position, which again might coincide with remaining single for a
longer time. In addition, demographic change can have different effects on pre and
post fisc income distributions depending on how implicit equivalence scales are
defined and compensate for different household behavior. Hence, the tax-benefit
system can also provide incentives for a certain behavior, e.g., through a system
of joint taxation which provides incentives for one-earner families.
As a result, it remains a priori unclear in which direction changes of household
structure affect income distribution. The noticeable decline in the number of
births, for example, means that couples nowadays tend to stay childless. This
leaves them with higher equivalent incomes than in a situation with more children.
In addition, this alleviates double-earnership, which makes them even better-off.
Similarly, the increase in the number of single households results in a growing
number of individuals with lower equivalent incomes, since they cannot share fixed
costs of living expenses. This makes them worse-off than if they were cohabiting.
Whether these effects lead to an increase or a decrease in inequality depends on
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the average income position of the respective household types.
4.3 Methodology
In this section we describe methods for the measurement and decomposition of
inequality, poverty and richness. While re-weighting techniques seem to dominate
traditional subgroup decompositions in labor economics literature, this is not true
for the literature on income distribution. We employ both approaches here, since
each has specific advantages. The re-weighting approach allows the calculation
of different measures of distribution, since it is not restricted to a decomposable
specific summary index, as is the case with the decomposition method. However,
it is only possible to compare actually observed and counterfactual values to as-
sess the importance of changes in the composition of the population. In contrast,
using the decomposition approach allows the interpretation of each single compon-
ent beyond simply within and between group inequality. Furthermore, using the
subgroup decomposition approach allows our results to be compared to previous
studies (Jenkins, 1995; Martin, 2006).
4.3.1 Decomposition Techniques
Inequality. There are several measures of inequality (see Atkinson and Bour-
guignon, 2000). In the context of our approach, the class of Generalized En-
tropy (GE) inequality measures (Shorrocks, 1980) is the most suitable one, as
they can be decomposed so total inequality results from the sum of inequality
within and between population subgroups. They are defined for an income distri-
bution Y = (y1, . . . , yn), where yi is the income of individual i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, wi is
i’s population weight and y¯ the population mean.
For the purpose of this chapter we choose I0 =
∑n
i=1
wi∑n
i=1 wi
· ln
(
y¯
yi
)
from the
GE family.3 If one divides the total population into K disjoint and exhaustive
3According to Shorrocks, the features of this measure are best suitable for decomposition analysis,
since total inequality can be exactly decomposed into within- and between-group inequality.
Moreover, the weighting factors sum up to unity (Shorrocks, 1980, p. 625).
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subgroups, denoted by k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, the measure I0 can be written as
I0 =
K∑
k=1
vk · I0k︸ ︷︷ ︸
within
+
K∑
k=1
vk · ln
(
y¯
y¯k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
between
, (4.3.1)
where vk denotes the weighted proportion of individuals belonging to population
subgroup k. Hence, total inequality can be written as a weighted sum of inequality
within and between population subgroups. This allows decomposing the change
in total inequality over time into changes within subgroups and changes resulting
from shifting population ratios, which can be written as
∆I0 = I
t+1
0 − I t0 ≈
K∑
k=1
v¯k ·∆I0k︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
K∑
k=1
I¯0k ·∆vk︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+
K∑
k=1
[
λ¯k − ln (λk)
]
·∆vk︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
+
K∑
k=1
(
θ¯k − v¯k
) ·∆ln (y¯k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
, (4.3.2)
where ∆ is the difference-operator; λk = y¯k/y¯ denotes the ratio of population
subgroup k’s mean income to total population’s mean income and θk = vk · λk,
which is the income ratio of group k. A symbol with a bar denotes the particular
value averaged over time.4 Thus, the total change in inequality can be decom-
posed into four components (Mookherjee and Shorrocks, 1982, p. 897). Summand
A contains the contribution of inequality changes that result solely from changes
within population subgroups (∆I0k) and abstracts from changes in composition by
fixing population ratios to averaged values (v¯k). Accordingly, changes in inequality
within groups with higher proportions would therefore be of greater importance.
Summand B, on the other hand, contains the effect of changes in composition
(∆vk) on inequality within population subgroups. It analogously abstracts from
changes in within-group inequality by fixing it on averaged values (I¯0k). If propor-
4Alternatively, it would be possible to use base or final period weights. However, Mookherjee
and Shorrocks (1982) identify that this choice is unlikely to make a difference to the results. In
addition, this corresponds to the weight that would be assigned by the Shapley value algorithm
(Shorrocks, 1999; Jenkins and Van Kerm, 2005).
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tions of groups with relatively high levels of inequality increase, total inequality will
increase accordingly and vice versa. Summand C describes the effect of changes in
composition (∆vk) on inequality between population subgroups. Again, changes in
population ratios are crucial for the direction of change. Summand C sums up the
contribution to total inequality change that results when proportions of groups
with relatively high (or low) mean incomes increase (or decrease). Summand
D represents the contribution of changes in population subgroup mean incomes
(∆ln (y¯k)). It fixes the difference between group proportions of total income and
population respectively. The higher the income ratio of a group relative to its
share, the greater the effect on total income inequality when the mean income of
that group changes.
To summarize, summand A represents changes in inequality within population
subgroups. Summands B and C both represent the contribution to inequality
change resulting from demographic change, since they are based on shifting pop-
ulation ratios. Summand D represents the effect of changes in the distribution
of population subgroup mean incomes. The relative importance of summands B
and C compared to the total change in inequality ∆I0 is of prior interest for our
analysis.
Poverty and Richness. A well-known and widely used class of poverty meas-
ures which is decomposable by population subgroups was introduced by Foster
et al. (1984). Total poverty Pα is defined as
Pα(y; z) =
q∑
i=1
wi∑n
i=1 wi
·
(gi
z
)α
for yi ≤ z, (4.3.3)
where α ≥ 0 is a parameter of poverty aversion, and gi = z−yi denotes the income
shortfall between individual i’s income yi and a given poverty line z. The number
of poor is denoted by q. They receive an income not exceeding the poverty line z.
In order to assess how much of an observed change in poverty can be attributed to
demographic changes, it is necessary to decompose the change into components ac-
cordingly. If one divides the population into K disjoint and exhaustive population
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subgroups, one can show that (Shorrocks, 1999, p. 13 f.)
∆Pα = P
t+1
α − P tα =
K∑
k=1
v¯k ·∆Pα,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
K∑
k=1
P¯α,k ·∆vk︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
, (4.3.4)
where vk denotes the population share. Subgroup k’s income vector is denoted by
yk, and poverty is measured within each group by Pα,k(yk; z) =
∑qk
i=1(wi/
∑
i∈k wi)·
(gi/z)
α for yi∈k ≤ z, where qk denotes the number of poor individuals within group
k. The change in poverty (∆Pα) can be decomposed into the change in levels
of group poverty (labeled A) and changes in the composition of the population
(demographic change, labeled B). This decomposition of change also corresponds
to the one that results from a Shapley value decomposition (Shorrocks, 1999).
Income richness is a less studied field than income poverty. Peichl et al. (2010)
propose measures that are decomposable by population subgroups and allow for a
consideration of the intensity of richness analogous to the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke
(FGT) poverty measure. The richness index we employ is defined as
Rβ(y; ρ) =
s∑
i=1
wi∑n
i=1wi
·
[
1−
(
ρ
yi
)β]
for yi ≥ ρ, (4.3.5)
where β > 0 is a parameter for the sensitivity to intensive richness. For greater
values of β the richness measure puts more weight on the “very rich”. The richness
line is denoted by ρ, where individuals with an income above this line are defined
as rich. As in the cases of inequality and poverty, it is possible to express richness
as a weighted sum of richness within population subgroups k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, where
richness within each group k is denoted with Rβ,k(yk; ρ) =
∑sk
i=1(wi/
∑
i∈k wi) ·(
1− (ρ/yi)β
)
for yi∈k ≥ ρ, and sk denotes the number of rich within each group.
Analogous to the decomposition of poverty change over time, it is straightforward
to decompose the change in richness between periods t and t+ 1:
∆Rβ = R
t+1
β −Rtβ =
K∑
k=1
v¯k ·∆Rβ,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
K∑
k=1
R¯β,k ·∆vk︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
. (4.3.6)
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The interpretation of this decomposition is the same as for poverty: summand
B is the fraction of the overall change in richness that is related to demographic
change.
4.3.2 Re-weighting Procedure
In order to assess the impact of the changing household structure between 1991 and
2007 by means of re-weighting, we need to compare the counterfactual distribution
of 2007 incomes and 1991 household structure with the observed 2007 income
distribution. In order to do so, we follow the approach suggested by DiNardo et al.
(1996) and extended by Hyslop and Mare (2005) to estimate the counterfactual
density function using a re-weighting technique.
Each household can be described with a vector (y, x, t) consisting of income y,
a vector x of household characteristics, and a date t (1991 or 2007). Each obser-
vation belongs to a joint distribution function F (y, x, t) of income, characteristics
and date. The joint distribution of income and characteristics is the conditional
distribution F (y, x|t). The density of income at a given point in time, ft(y), can
be written as the integral of the density of income, conditional on a set of charac-
teristics and on a date ty, over the distribution of individual characteristics F (x|tx)
at date tx.
ft(y) =
∫
dF (y, x|ty,x = t) =
∫
f(y|x, ty = t)dF (x|tx = t) (4.3.7a)
≡ f(y, ty = t, tx = t). (4.3.7b)
The estimation of counterfactual densities combining different dates is accounted
for in the last line of the notation. Under the assumption that the 2007 distribu-
tion of incomes, F (y|x, ty = 2007), does not depend on the 1991 distribution of
characteristics, F (x|tx = 1991), the hypothetical counterfactual density is:
f(y, ty = 2007, tx = 1991) =
∫
f(y|x, ty = 2007)dF (x|tx = 1991) (4.3.8a)
=
∫
f(y|x, ty = 2007)ψx(x)dF (x|tx = 2007), (4.3.8b)
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where the re-weighting function ψx(x) is defined as
ψx(x) ≡ dF (x|tx = 1991)
dF (x|tx = 2007) . (4.3.9)
The counterfactual density can be estimated by weighted kernel methods. The
difference between the actual 2007 density and the hypothetical re-weighted density
represents the effect of changes in the distribution of household characteristics. To
estimate the impact of the changing household structure, we compare inequality
measures for the counterfactual distribution of 2007 incomes and 1991 household
structure with the observed 2007 income distribution. Re-weighting and subgroup
decomposition will lead to identical results if the relationship between demographic
change and inequality is linear.
4.4 Empirical Foundation
4.4.1 Data
The SOEP is a panel survey of households and individuals that has been con-
ducted annually since 1984. A weighting procedure means respondents’ data are
representative for the German population (see Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005;
Wagner et al., 2007). Issues concerning sampling and weighting methods or the
imputation of information in case of item or unit non-response is well documented
by the SOEP Service Group. We use waves that contain information on annual
income for the longest possible period 1991–2007, in order to include East Ger-
many after reunification. The data set contain information from 17,921 (25,366)
individual observations in 6,665 (11,072) households for 1991 (2007).
4.4.2 Income Concept
We compute the change in measures of distribution (from equations (4.3.2), (4.3.4)
and (4.3.6)) for equivalent pre and post fisc incomes. The progressive German
tax-benefit system induces an inequality-reducing redistribution of incomes and
takes into account household structures through implicit equivalence scales (ES).
CHAPTER 4. 88
Examining pre and post fisc incomes allows us to assess to what extent the German
tax-benefit system compensates for changes in household structure.
SOEP data contain appropriate income variables defined as follows Grabka
(2012): pre fisc income includes labor earnings, asset flows, private retirement
income and private transfers; post fisc income includes pre fisc income, public
transfers and statutory pensions, minus any tax payments. Both concepts of in-
come are deflated in order to compute real incomes. Moreover, we add household
imputed rental values for owner-occupied housing (Yates, 1994; Canberra Group,
2001; Smeeding and Weinberg, 2001; Frick and Grabka, 2003; Eurostat, 2007). For
population weights wi we adopt the weights from the SOEP (Grabka, 2012). In
the following analysis we define the poverty line z to be 60% and the richness line
ρ to be 200% of the median of equivalent pre- and post- government incomes.5
Our main results rely on calculations using the modified OECD equivalence scale,
which assigns a weight of one to the first adult household member, a weight of
0.5 to every additional adult and a weight of 0.3 to every child (OECD, 2005).
In section 4.5.1 we discuss the role of the choice of equivalence scale and present
results for alternative specifications.
4.4.3 Definition of Population Subgroups
The partition of the population into disjoint and exhaustive subgroups is of great
importance for the following analysis.6 According to our research question, house-
hold composition with respect to the number and age of household members is of
relevance. We have already indicated that household formation is also related to
labor market participation. Hence, in order to capture employment effects, our
definition of population subgroups proceeds in two steps. We begin by distinguish-
ing population subgroups according to two criteria. The first is the number of adult
5Alternative definitions of the poverty and richness line do not alter the qualitative findings of
our analysis or the interpretation of our results.
6Note that compared to the population in private households, the population in institutionalized
households is underrepresented in the SOEP (Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005, p. 182 f.). This
may be selective with respect to household composition and poverty risks. Due to increasing
longevity, more and more elderly can be assumed to move into retirement and nursing homes,
i.e., the bias may have increased over time. However, since there is no information available for
this group, we only refer to the population in private households.
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household members (aged 18 or over), and the second is the presence of children
(younger than 18) in the household. We further distinguish these groups according
to the number of employed individuals within the household as a third criterion.
Differences in the results for the two definitions are related to changing patterns in
labor force participation. However, we cannot identify the causal effect, since this
is already partly captured by household structure because household formation
and labor force behavior can be viewed as a joint decision.
We distinguish between singles, couples and households with more than three
adults, with and without children. In total we have six population subgroups ac-
cording to household composition (see table 4.7.1) in the appendix. It appears that
between 1991 and 2007 the population shares of three of these groups increased,
while they decreased for the remaining groups. Single households made up around
16% of the population in 1991, and by 2007 this share increased to 20%. The
largest group in 2007 is represented by individuals living in two-adult-households.
Their share increased from 26% to over 30%. Hence, in 2007 more than half of
the population lived in households with one or two adults without children. In
addition, the share of individuals in single parent households increased from 2.8%
to around 3.7%. Other types of households are on the retreat. One of the greatest
reductions was the proportion of individuals in two-adult households with children
which dropped by nearly seven percentage points to 26%. Note that those groups
with growing population shares are characterized by above average and increasing
levels of income inequality. Moreover, their group mean incomes display much
more variation around the population’s mean, i.e., the population is becoming
more heterogenous both in terms of within- and between-group inequality.
The declining relative number of individuals living in households with several
adults and children partly means that multiple generation-households as a form
of cohabitation is clearly decreasing in Germany: The proportion of individuals
in multiple generation-households decreased from 2.4% to 1.3% between 1991 and
2007. This drop contributes to increasing income inequality because of the dimin-
ishing incidence of redistribution within households between generations. Hence,
to the degree to which this form of cohabitation is reduced, there will be more
inequality.7
7Note that our income concept includes private transfer payments. Hence, we take into ac-
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The definition of subgroups of the second step takes into account the employ-
ment status of household members. Hence, we further split up the beforehand
defined groups based on the number of employed persons in the household. We
now have 16 groups in total. In table 4.7.2 in the appendix we present the group
characteristics with respect to this definition. Population subgroups defined ac-
cording to household structure and employment status are internally less hetero-
genous and there is less variation in mean incomes. This is not surprising, since
additional employed household members increase household earnings. Employed
singles account for around three-quarters of the percentage point increase in the
number of single households, while most of the growth of two-adult households
without children is due to more couples not in employment – presumably many of
retirement age.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Decomposition
In this subsection we present the decomposition results for different measures,
income concepts and regions.8
Pre fisc incomes. For pre fisc incomes overall inequality in reunified Germany
increased by 25% between 1991 and 2007 (see table 4.5.1). Around 19.4 percentage
points (pp) of this increase can be attributed to changes in household structure and
employment status (summands B and C, corresponding to 77.5% of the increase),
count redistribution of income occurring between households but (in most cases) within families.
Which is why our results highlight the effect of less redistribution within households.
8Note that the decomposition results according to equations (4.3.2), (4.3.4) and (4.3.6) are
presented as percentages and percentage points. For example, ∆I0 and the summands A to
D are divided by It0 and multiplied by 100 each. The same holds for the decompositions
of poverty and richness. The differentiation into East and West Germany is appropriate, as
there are still significant income differentials between the two parts of the country. The non-
convergence of income inequality is indirectly explained by much higher rates of unemployment
in East Germany, which causes a high level of inequality in labor income, which is of greater
importance relative to capital income in East Germany (Frick and Goebel, 2008). In addition,
as is clear from figure 4.2.1, the demographic trend is more pronounced in the East.
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16.0 pp to summand A, whereas summand D reduces inequality by 10 pp.9 So
the rise in inequality to be explained by A, B and C together is actually 35%,
whereof A accounts for 45% and B + C for 55%. In the remainder of the chapter
we focus on the first definition but also report the fraction B+C
A+B+C
in table 4.5.1
for completeness. We find that the results differ quantitatively in these cases, but
one cannot draw divergent conclusions.
Table 4.5.1: Inequality decomposition (1991–2007)
Income Region I19910 I
2007
0 ∆I0 A B C D
B+C
∆I0
B+C
A+B+C
Household structure and employment status
pre fisc Germany 0.500 0.625 25.0 16.0 11.8 7.6 -10.2 77.5 54.8
(0.010) (0.011) (3.5) (2.3) (1.2) (1.0) (1.7) (8.2) (4.3)
West 0.480 0.558 16.3 15.9 8.0 5.5 -12.9 83.1 45.9
(0.012) (0.012) (4.0) (2.7) (1.2) (1.1) (1.8) (16.4) (5.4)
East 0.514 0.872 69.6 15.7 28.9 23.9 -0.6 75.9 77.1
(0.022) (0.024) (8.5) (3.7) (3.2) (3.1) (3.7) (5.3) (4.7)
post fisc Germany 0.105 0.144 37.8 28.9 5.4 3.0 0.6 22.2 22.5
(0.002) (0.004) (4.5) (4.0) (0.7) (0.6) (1.4) (2.9) (2.8)
West 0.104 0.149 43.0 35.7 4.7 2.2 0.6 15.9 16.2
(0.003) (0.004) (5.3) (4.6) (0.7) (0.7) (1.5) (2.3) (2.4)
East 0.070 0.097 38.8 44.1 -0.7 7.2 -16.2 16.8 12.8
(0.002) (0.003) (6.0) (4.9) (1.6) (1.9) (2.5) (8.7) (5.5)
Household structure only
pre fisc Germany 0.500 0.625 25.0 9.0 15.0 0.4 0.6 61.4 63.1
(0.010) (0.011) (3.5) (2.9) (1.2) (0.1) (0.5) (7.7) (8.3)
West 0.480 0.558 16.3 3.7 11.5 0.4 0.7 73.1 76.3
(0.012) (0.012) (4.0) (3.4) (1.2) (0.1) (0.6) (19.0) (17.8)
East 0.514 0.872 69.6 35.3 34.0 1.1 -0.8 50.5 49.9
(0.022) (0.024) (8.6) (6.4) (3.3) (0.3) (1.5) (5.6) (5.5)
post fisc Germany 0.105 0.144 37.8 29.4 5.4 1.2 1.7 17.4 18.3
(0.002) (0.004) (4.6) (4.4) (0.6) (0.3) (1.1) (2.1) (2.1)
West 0.104 0.149 43.0 34.8 4.4 1.3 2.5 13.3 14.1
(0.003) (0.004) (5.4) (5.2) (0.6) (0.4) (1.3) (1.8) (1.9)
East 0.070 0.097 38.8 38.1 4.4 3.7 -6.8 21.0 17.5
(0.002) (0.003) (6.0) (6.3) (1.7) (0.7) (2.1) (6.1) (4.4)
Note: Own calculations based on SOEP. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (500 replications). Results
for ∆I0 and
B+C
∆I0
are displayed as percentages. Results for A to D are displayed as percentage points. See
footnote 8. Results are based on the modified OECD equivalence scale.
Although the contribution of summand B is somewhat larger in magnitude,
9Although it is straightforward to interpret the fraction B+C∆I0 as the changing population’s con-
tribution to inequality change (Jenkins, 1995; Martin, 2006), one might argue that the effects
are overstated when single summands have the opposite sign of the total change. This applies
to summand D in our case.
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both summands B and C contribute to this result; population subgroups that are
characterized by smaller household size exhibit greater within-group inequality
than others over time. Thus, the increase in relative size of these groups has
contributed considerably to the overall increase in inequality. Moreover, these
groups have mean incomes quite different from the overall mean, and their growth
contributes to increasing inequality irrespective of increasing heterogeneity within
groups. At the same time, the contribution to inequality growth from summand A,
which comprises changes in within-group inequality, is rather pronounced as well.
This clearly indicates that population subgroups defined by household composition
have become more heterogenous over time. This is especially true for the largest
part of the population, i.e., those people living in one- or two-person households.
In West Germany pre fisc income inequality increased by 16.3% between 1991
and 2007. The share of summands B and C is 83%. The increase in overall pre
fisc inequality in East Germany since reunification in 1991 (around 70%) is much
more pronounced than in the West. Shrinking household size makes up 76% of the
overall change.10
Post fisc incomes. Our results for post fisc income inequality decomposition
show that the effect of changing household structures is less pronounced than for
pre fisc income inequality. Altogether, post fisc income inequality increased by
37.8%, which is larger than the increase for pre fisc income, although the level of
inequality is still much lower. The proportion of summands B and C amounts to
22.2% between 1991 and 2007, which is significantly lower than for pre fisc income.
Examining West Germany alone reveals that the proportion of summands B and
C between 1991 and 2007 (15.9%) is lower than for Germany as a whole. In
East Germany income inequality grew by 38.8%. Summands B and C account for
around 16.8%.
10Note that in 2007 inequality in East Germany is higher for pre fisc incomes compared to the
West, but it is lower for post fisc incomes. The interpretation of this pattern is related to
considerably different levels of unemployment in both parts of the country. In East Germany
the unemployment rate is on average nearly twice as high than in the West. Hence, the
proportion of people whose pre fisc income, i.e., without transfer payments, is close to zero is
much higher there, so the relevance of higher unemployment is clearly considered as a “driving
force”.
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Welfare state effects. Our results imply that the German tax-benefit system
takes into account household structure and compensates for most (but not all)
increases in inequality that can be related to demographic changes. There are
several policies at work. For example, we observe an increase in the number of
single parents. This population group is rather poor, since they typically exhibit
low employment rates, which decreased from an already low level of 34% in 1991
to below 30% in 2007 and, if employed, only work for small number of hours (see
table 4.7.1). Hence, their position in the pre fisc income distribution is much worse
compared to other groups. However, single parents receive important benefits,
targeting children in low-income households, as the implicit equivalence scales in
the tax-benefit system generously compensate for the presence of children (Fuest
et al., 2010) and hence, their relative position is improving. The same holds for
poor households in general, since poorer people tend to have more children than
rich people. Especially among the latter group, fertility is declining the most.
Furthermore, due to the highly progressive income tax system, a large fraction
of the increasing income of double-earner couples is taxed away, which leads to
post fisc inequality increasing less than pre fisc inequality. In particular, the high
marginal tax rates on secondary earners’ income – inherent in the German system
of income taxation – reduces considerably post fisc income compared to market
income of married double-earner couples. This lowers the relative position of this
demographic group in the income distribution. Another example where the tax-
benefit system had a direct impact on household formation is concerned with the
Hartz reforms: These reforms of German labor market policy in 2005 generated
incentives for young unemployed adults to leave their parents’ house earlier in
order to receive certain social benefits (or at least a higher amount).11
Household structure only. In order to obtain an idea of the relative import-
ance of changing household size, we now present results based on the narrower
definition of subgroups, which ignores the employment status of the household
(see lower panel of table 4.5.1). Their characteristics in terms of population share,
11However, these incentives were reduced by legislation in 2006. Gallie and Paugam (2000) and
Klasen and Woolard (2009), among others, deal with this issue in European and developing
countries respectively.
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mean incomes and group-specific measures of income distribution are listed in table
4.7.1 in the appendix.
We find that the relative importance of demographic change turns out to be
somewhat smaller in magnitude. For pre fisc incomes we have a fraction of 61.4%
for summands B and C (West: 73%, East: 50.5%), for post fisc incomes we have
17.4% (West: 13.3%, East: 21%). Hence, without accounting for the employment
status, the explanatory contribution of household structure is reduced by 16.1 (4.8)
pp for pre (post) fisc incomes. These differences are due to the less importance
of summand C, i.e., shifts in population shares play a minor role for increasing
between-group inequality.
Summands A to D are themselves aggregations over population subgroups (see
equation 4.3.2). table 4.5.2 displays the contributions of each single population
subgroup to the components of inequality change for pre and post fisc incomes
respectively. It becomes apparent that for both summands B and C the results
presented in table 4.5.2 are mainly “driven” by certain subgroups. Not surpris-
ingly, it is especially the growth of one- and two-adult households (groups 1 and 3)
which positively contributing to overall inequality change, since these are the only
ones whose proportions among the population are noticeably increasing. Another
group with a smaller, but still positive, contribution are single-parent households
(group 2). All these groups exhibit above-average and increasing levels of inequal-
ity, within as well as between subgroups (see table 4.7.1). Increasing heterogeneity
within the group of single-adult households is due to the fact that nowadays this
group is no longer dominated by elderly people (pensioners, widows/widowers)
with low pension incomes but consists more and more of young- and middle-aged
individuals at different positions in their educational or professional careers. This
is confirmed by the fact that the employment rate of singles increased from below
average in 1991 (43%) to slightly above average in 2007 (49%). Moreover, income
inequality is comparatively high among single-adult households because they are
not able to re-distribute income within the household, while multi-person house-
holds share resources and hence individual household members’ income shocks,
e.g., due to unemployment or retirement, can be cushioned.
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Table 4.5.2: Inequality decomposition (1991–2007): results per group
Income k Adults Children Ak Bk Ck Dk
Bk+Ck
∆I0
pre 1 1 no -9.1 9.8 8.7 -1.0 73.8
(2.2) (1.4) (1.2) (0.4) (11.9)
2 1 yes 2.6 0.9 2.0 1.2 11.8
(0.4) (0.3) (0.6) (0.2) (3.5)
3 2 no 5.1 8.7 10.7 0.1 77.5
(1.9) (1.2) (1.5) (0.1) (13.8)
4 2 yes 7.0 -2.8 -13.7 0.4 -66.1
(0.7) (0.3) (1.5) (0.1) (9.5)
5 ≥3 no 2.0 -1.5 -6.5 0.0 -31.8
(0.4) (0.2) (0.9) (0.1) (5.5)
6 ≥3 yes 1.4 -0.2 -0.8 0.0 -3.7
(0.2) (0.1) (0.7) (0.0) (3.4)
Total – – 9.0 15.0 0.4 0.6 61.4
(2.9) (1.2) (0.1) (0.5) (7.7)
post 1 1 no 3.5 6.5 40.3 -1.1 123.8
(3.3) (1.0) (5.7) (0.5) (20.6)
2 1 yes -1.8 1.0 9.9 0.9 28.9
(0.4) (0.3) (2.8) (0.5) (8.3)
3 2 no 10.7 6.9 51.2 3.9 154.0
(2.5) (1.0) (7.4) (0.7) (27.3)
4 2 yes 10.5 -6.0 -64.9 -2.3 -188.0
(1.4) (0.7) (6.9) (0.3) (26.4)
5 ≥3 no 5.6 -2.6 -30.8 0.3 -88.5
(0.9) (0.4) (4.2) (0.3) (15.1)
6 ≥3 yes 0.9 -0.4 -4.5 -0.0 -12.9
(0.4) (0.3) (3.3) (0.1) (9.5)
Total – – 29.4 5.4 1.2 1.7 17.4
(4.4) (0.6) (0.3) (1.1) (2.1)
Note: Own calculations based on SOEP. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (500
replications). Results for Bk+Ck
∆I0
are displayed as percentages. Results for Ak to Dk are
displayed as percentage points. See footnote 8. Results are based on the modified OECD
equivalence scale.
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Role of the Equivalence Scale. The choice of equivalence scale is not irrelevant
with respect to our research question. Inequality rankings in cross-country compar-
ison are sensitive to different values of the equivalence-scale elasticity (Buhmann
et al., 1988; Hagenaars et al., 1994; Ebert and Moyes, 2003; Bo¨nke and Schro¨der,
2012). Most of the equivalence scales (ES) used in practice (e.g., Jenkins and
Cowell, 1994; Burkhauser et al., 1996) can be written in the general form of
ES = (θ1 + θ2 ·NA + θ3 ·NC)γ, (4.5.1)
where θ1 denotes an extra weight for the (adult) head of the household, θ2 denotes
the weight for (additional) adult household members (NA) and θ3 denotes the
weight of children (NC). For smaller values of the parameter γ the importance of
economies of scale in household consumption increases.12 In order to make certain
that these results are not due to a specific choice of equivalence scale we calculate
the fraction of summands B and C for the inequality decomposition for various
specifications of the general form of the equivalence scale in equation (4.5.1). The
results for both definitions of population subgroups are presented in table 4.5.3.
We find that the choice of does not alter the results significantly. Not surprisingly,
it turns out that the proportion of the demographic effect is somewhat larger in
specifications when large economies of scale are assumed (i.e., for smaller values of
γ). Moreover, we find that even for per-capita incomes, i.e., in the absence of scale
economies, a sizeable fraction of inequality change (60%/77% for pre and 17%/21%
for post fisc income) can be attributed to changing household and employment
structure.
12See, e.g., Cutler and Katz (1992); Banks and Johnson (1994). Note that for θ1 = θ2 = 0.5,
θ3 = 0.3, and γ = 1 we arrive at the modified OECD scale, for θ1 = 0, θ2 = θ3 = 1, and γ = 0.5
at the square-root scale, while using a scale with θ1 = 0, θ2 = θ3 = 1, and γ = 1 is equivalent
to using per-capita incomes, i.e., assuming no economies of scale.
CHAPTER 4. 97
T
a
b
le
4
.5
.3
:
In
eq
u
al
it
y
d
ec
om
p
os
it
io
n
(1
99
1–
20
07
):
d
iff
er
en
t
eq
u
iv
al
en
ce
sc
al
es
θ 1
=
θ 2
=
0.
5
θ 1
=
0;
θ 2
=
1
θ 3
=
0.
3
θ 3
=
0.
5
θ 3
=
1
θ 3
=
0.
3
θ 3
=
0.
5
θ 3
=
1
In
co
m
e
γ
=
0.
5
γ
=
1
γ
=
0.
5
γ
=
1
γ
=
0.
5
γ
=
1
γ
=
0.
5
γ
=
1
γ
=
0.
5
γ
=
1
γ
=
0.
5
γ
=
1
H
ou
se
h
ol
d
st
ru
ct
u
re
an
d
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
st
at
u
s
p
re
fi
sc
79
.1
77
.5
79
.3
78
.1
78
.9
76
.8
78
.5
77
.9
78
.7
78
.6
78
.3
77
.3
(6
.3
)
(5
.8
)
(6
.4
)
(6
.0
)
(6
.3
)
(5
.7
)
(6
.1
)
(5
.6
)
(6
.1
)
(5
.8
)
(6
.1
)
(5
.6
)
p
os
t
fi
sc
23
.3
22
.2
23
.4
22
.9
22
.8
20
.1
21
.7
24
.3
22
.3
26
.5
20
.8
21
.1
(2
.3
)
(2
.5
)
(2
.6
)
(3
.2
)
(2
.0
)
(1
.9
)
(2
.2
)
(2
.9
)
(2
.4
)
(3
.5
)
(2
.0
)
(2
.5
)
H
ou
se
h
ol
d
st
ru
ct
u
re
on
ly
p
re
fi
sc
65
.1
61
.4
65
.4
62
.1
65
.8
63
.0
62
.9
58
.1
63
.1
58
.6
63
.6
59
.7
(8
.7
)
(7
.7
)
(8
.7
)
(7
.8
)
(8
.9
)
(8
.4
)
(8
.1
)
(6
.8
)
(8
.2
)
(6
.9
)
(8
.3
)
(7
.2
)
p
os
t
fi
sc
21
.8
17
.4
21
.8
17
.4
21
.1
13
.4
18
.3
15
.2
18
.7
16
.5
19
.1
17
.1
(2
.5
)
(2
.1
)
(2
.5
)
(2
.3
)
(2
.7
)
(2
.9
)
(2
.1
)
(2
.2
)
(2
.1
)
(2
.5
)
(2
.3
)
(3
.1
)
N
o
te
:
O
w
n
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
S
O
E
P
.
B
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
p
ed
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
(5
0
0
re
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s)
.
N
o
te
th
a
t
fo
r
θ 1
=
θ 2
=
0
.5
,
θ 3
=
0
.3
,
a
n
d
γ
=
1
w
e
a
rr
iv
e
a
t
th
e
m
o
d
ifi
ed
O
E
C
D
sc
a
le
,
fo
r
θ 1
=
0
,
θ 2
=
θ 3
=
1
,
a
n
d
γ
=
0
.5
a
t
th
e
sq
u
a
re
-r
o
o
t
sc
a
le
,
w
h
il
e
u
si
n
g
a
sc
a
le
w
it
h
θ 1
=
0
,
θ 2
=
θ 3
=
1
,
a
n
d
γ
=
1
is
eq
u
iv
a
le
n
t
to
u
si
n
g
p
er
-c
a
p
it
a
in
co
m
es
,
i.
e.
,
a
ss
u
m
in
g
n
o
ec
o
n
o
m
ie
s
o
f
sc
a
le
(s
ee
se
ct
io
n
4
.4
.2
).
CHAPTER 4. 98
Poverty and Richness. The results for the decomposition of poverty and rich-
ness change are presented in table 4.5.4.13 We find that the demographic effect
on poverty change sums to more than half of total change (between 50.3% and
75.1%). The richness measures for post fisc incomes increased quite considerably
between 1991 and 2007 – by more than 76% for β = 1 and by two thirds for
β = 3. The head count ratio for richness (HC) increased by more than 46%. Frick
and Grabka (2010) provide evidence for the increasing relevance of (net) income
from returns on investments, i.e., from capital income and from imputed rent for
owner-occupied housing (see also section 4.4.2). This source of income is especially
concentrated in top income households. Based on the same data and for the same
period of time, they find a dampening effect of imputed rent on inequality, while
capital income clearly contributes to rising inequality. Since both income types
serve as old-age provision in addition to public pensions, it is not surprising that –
in the light of an ageing society in Germany – we find evidence for more concentra-
tion at the top of the income distribution. The fraction of overall richness change
that can be attributed to demographic changes amounts to minuscule values –
between −1% and 2%. Although insignificant, the negative value for the richness
headcount implies that changing population structure marginally dampened the
growth in richness, i.e., those groups with relatively high levels of richness are
becoming smaller, while “poorer” groups with low levels of richness are growing.
Household structure only. In the lower panel of table 4.5.4 we also present
results of the decomposition for poverty and richness based on the distinction
of population subgroups according to household structure only. Although the
resulting values for the fraction of summand B are smaller in magnitude, the
picture is qualitatively the same: the proportion amounts to values between 35.8%
and 37.5% in case of income poverty and between 7.4% and 9% in the case of
richness. That is, changing patterns in household formation contributed much
more to the growth at the bottom than to the upper tail of the income distribution.
13Note that we restrict our analysis to post fisc incomes, which is the measure usually used as a
proxy for well-being in the context of poverty (and richness) analysis.
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Table 4.5.4: Poverty and richness decomposition (1991–2007)
α P 1991α P
2007
α ∆Pα A B B/∆Pα
Household structure and employment status
Poverty HC 0.115 0.141 22.6 5.6 17.0 75.1
(0.003) (0.004) (5.1) (4.7) (2.0) (18.5)
1 0.024 0.033 36.4 15.5 20.9 57.5
(0.001) (0.001) (7.8) (6.8) (2.7) (12.2)
2 0.008 0.012 47.2 23.5 23.8 50.3
(0.000) (0.001) (11.5) (10.1) (3.3) (14.0)
β R1991β R
2007
β ∆Rβ A B B/∆Rβ
Richness 1 0.011 0.019 76.1 74.6 1.4 1.9
(0.001) (0.001) (11.5) (12.0) (1.9) (2.4)
3 0.023 0.039 65.8 65.0 0.7 1.1
(0.001) (0.001) (9.7) (10.1) (1.8) (2.6)
HC 0.056 0.081 46.6 47.0 -0.4 -0.9
(0.002) (0.002) (7.1) (7.4) (1.5) (3.2)
Household structure only
Poverty HC 0.115 0.141 22.6 14.1 8.5 37.5
(0.003) (0.004) (5.1) (4.7) (1.2) (8.8)
1 0.024 0.033 36.4 23.2 13.2 36.3
(0.001) (0.001) (7.8) (6.9) (1.8) (7.7)
2 0.008 0.012 47.2 30.3 16.9 35.8
(0.000) (0.001) (11.5) (10.1) (2.4) (9.4)
β R1991β R
2007
β ∆Rβ A B B/∆Rβ
Richness 1 0.011 0.019 76.1 70.4 5.7 7.4
(0.001) (0.001) (11.6) (11.6) (1.2) (1.9)
3 0.023 0.039 65.8 60.7 5.0 7.7
(0.001) (0.001) (9.7) (9.7) (1.2) (2.0)
HC 0.056 0.081 46.6 42.4 4.2 9.0
(0.002) (0.002) (7.1) (7.1) (1.0) (2.5)
Note: Own calculations based on SOEP. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (500
replications). Results for ∆Pα and B/∆Pα are displayed as percentages. Results for A and
B are displayed as percentage points. See footnote 8. Results are based on the modified
OECD equivalence scale.
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4.5.2 Re-weighting
A different approach to assess the effect of changing household structure on income
distribution over time is to compare the actual change in distributional measures to
the change that would have occurred had household structure remained unchanged
between the base period of our analysis (1991) and the most recent period available
(2007), everything else equal. To do so, one has to assign counterfactual popu-
lation weights to the sample population of 2007 in order to arrive at a marginal
distribution of household structure identical to the one in 1991.
As pointed out in subsection 4.3.2, this is done by re-defining population
weights by multiplying the actual population weights with a re-weighting factor
that is equal to the ratio of the population shares in the base and final period.
Formally, one can write the counterfactual population weights as
w˜2007i = w
2007
i ·
v1991k,i
v2007k,i
= w2007i · ψx(x), (4.5.2)
where w2007i denotes the actual population weight of individual i in 2007 and vk,i
denotes the population share of subgroup k to which individual i belongs. The
re-weighting function ψx(x) reduces to the fraction of population shares in case of
not controlling for further characteristics.14
We apply this type of re-weighting for Germany and report calculations for
different GE inequality measures (I0, I1, and I2) as well as for the Gini coeffi-
cient (IGini) and the measures for poverty and richness introduced in the previous
sections. We compute how large the change in measures of distribution would
have been had the marginal distribution of household structure not have changed
between 1991 and 2007 (∆rew) and compare it to the actual observed change (∆act).
14It would be possible to include additional controls in the re-weighting procedure. However,
when doing so we find rather similar results (available upon request). Therefore, in order to
make the re-weighting procedure and the decomposition approach directly comparable, as well
as in order to compare our results to OECD (2008), we concentrate on simple re-weighting
here. Note that this also corresponds to the first counterfactual in the analysis of Hyslop and
Mare (2005).
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One can easily show that the following holds
∆act −∆rew
∆act
=
Mact,07 −M rew,07
Mact,07 −Mact,91 . (4.5.3)
This term denotes the share of the changing household structure in the total change
of the respective measure M ∈ {I, P,R}. Note that it would equal zero if the re-
weighted counterfactual value in 2007 resembled the actual one, i.e., the changing
household structure would not affect the change at all. In the other extreme
case the term would equal 100% if the household structure were related to the
total change of the measure. The results are displayed in table 4.5.5. For the re-
weighting procedure one can summarize that actual growth rates of the measures
of distribution – without exception – are larger than the counterfactual re-weighted
growth rates for pre fisc as well as for post fisc incomes. In other words, the results
of our re-weighting procedures state that inequality, poverty and richness would
not have increased as much as they actually did had there not been a trend towards
smaller households.
For I0 we find results which are very close to our decomposition results. A
fraction of around 80% (23.7%) of the increase in pre (post) fisc inequality is
related to changes in household size. This is not surprising given the way we
employ the re-weighting, i.e., only accounting for changing household structure
and not adding further control variables when defining the re-weighting function.
Examining other inequality measures reveals that the magnitudes of the relative
importance of household structure differs, but the general pattern of rather high
fractions for market income inequality and much lower values for inequality in
disposable income inequality still holds. For example, around half of the increase
in the Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers are related to changing population
structure. Here one has to take into account that different measures highlight
different parts of the income distribution differently. While the decomposable
measure I0 is more sensitive to changes in the lower tail of the distribution, the Gini
coefficient is known be less sensitive to changes in the extreme tails. Furthermore,
the pre fisc fraction for the GE measures I1 and I2 (48% and 38% respectively) are
somewhat lower, but still rather large. These measures are more sensitive to the
distribution’s upper tail. The relative importance for post fisc inequality varies
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Table 4.5.5: Re-weighting: inequality, poverty and richness (1991–2007)
pre fisc post fisc
Measure ∆act ∆rew ∆
act−∆rew
∆act
∆act ∆rew ∆
act−∆rew
∆act
IGini 18.4 9.2 50.2 16.1 12.5 22.9
(1.4) (1.3) (3.2) (1.7) (1.5) (2.5)
I0 25.0 5.0 80.1 37.8 28.8 23.7
(3.6) (2.9) (9.4) (4.5) (3.9) (2.5)
I1 40.0 20.7 48.2 54.2 43.1 20.5
(5.5) (4.2) (3.9) (10.3) (8.5) (2.8)
I2 107.1 66.7 37.7 187.2 148.7 20.6
(37.3) (26.5) (4.1) (81.3) (65.3) (3.1)
post fisc incomes
Poverty Richness
P0/R0 22.6 10.7 52.9 46.6 40.3 13.6
(5.1) (4.5) (13.1) (7.2) (7.2) (4.6)
P1/R3 36.4 21.1 42.0 65.8 56.8 13.6
(7.7) (7.0) (9.3) (9.7) (9.5) (2.9)
P2/R1 47.2 29.4 37.7 76.1 65.9 13.4
(11.5) (10.2) (10.7) (11.5) (11.4) (2.9)
Note: Own calculations based on SOEP. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
(500 replications). Note that the results for actual (∆act) and re-weighted changes
(∆rew) as well as the term ∆
act−∆rew
∆act
are displayed as percentages, i.e., they were
multiplied by 100. Results are based on the modified OECD equivalence scale.
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much less – between 20.5% and 24%.
The re-weighting results for poverty and richness indices differ somewhat from
the decomposition results with respect to the point estimates. However, the stand-
ard errors are quite large and hence confidence bands overlap. So these differences
are not statistically significant. Moreover, they can be explained by the fact that
the poverty and richness measures we employ are non-linear, since the value func-
tions are concave. In particular, we find that between 38% and 53% of the in-
crease in poverty measures relate to changing population structure. The fraction
decreases for poverty measures which are more sensitive to extreme poverty. The
corresponding result for the richness indices varies around 13–14%.
4.6 Conclusions
The aim of this chapter is to quantify the effect of continually decreasing average
household size on measures of income distribution in Germany. By means of
a re-weighting procedure and decompositions of changes in measures of income
distribution based on SOEP data, we compute to what extent the overall changes
in income distribution result from changes in population structure with respect to
household composition.
Irrespective of the choice of methodology, it appears that Germany’s changing
population structure with respect to household composition during the period
between 1991 and 2007 is associated with increasing values for indices of inequality,
poverty and richness under consideration. Without the demographic trend towards
smaller households, inequality, poverty and richness would have also increased.
However, the levels would be far lower than they actually are. The remaining
increase could be attributed to a declining bargaining power of unions, to changes
in the distribution of human capital as well as to changes in occupational choices
(Bourguignon et al., 2001; Hyslop and Mare, 2005; Lemieux, 2010). Investigating
these factors is left to future research.
We find that the effect of demographic change on income distribution is much
lower for post fisc than for pre fisc incomes. This means that the tax-benefit
system in Germany provides – at least implicitly – some form of compensation for
changing household structure. However, one could also argue that the German
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tax-benefit system itself has an effect on the demographic trend, i.e., the causal
relationship could go in both directions. In this context, it is not implausible to
think of household formation as an endogenous process which is partly shaped
by incentives provided by macro conditions and tax-benefit systems. However,
analyzing this is beyond the scope of this chapter.
4.7 Appendix
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Chapter 5
Multidimensional Aﬄuence:
Income and Wealth∗
5.1 Introduction
The top of the income distribution has recently received increasing attention both
in the literature on economic inequality as well as in public debate (see Atkinson
and Piketty, 2007; Waldenstro¨m, 2009; Atkinson et al., 2011, for overviews). “The
rich” are an important source of both economic growth and economic inequality.
Moreover, they wield considerable economic and political power. Therefore, es-
pecially with regard to the design of public policies (taxation), it is important to
know who the rich in society are and how many and what kind of resources they
command. However, according to Frank (2007), John Kenneth Galbraith’s famous
statement that the rich are the most noticed and the least studied of all classes “has
never been more true than today”. When determining who belongs to the top, the
literature has so far only been concerned with a single dimension (either income or
wealth) and has mainly focused on the shares of top fractiles.1 However, neither a
headcount ratio nor top shares are satisfying measures for (inequality of) economic
∗This chapter is based on the papers Multidimensional Aﬄuence: Theory and Applications to
Germany and the US and Multidimensional Well-Being at the Top: Evidence for Germany
(both joint with Andreas Peichl, see Peichl and Pestel, 2011, 2012).
1See, e.g., Atkinson (2005); Dell (2005); Piketty (2005); Saez (2005); Saez and Veall (2005);
Piketty and Saez (2006); Atkinson and Piketty (2007); Roine and Waldenstro¨m (2008); Roine
et al. (2009); Brzezinski (2010); Roine and Waldenstro¨m (2011).
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well-being at the top because they do not account for changes in the composition
or in the distribution among the top. Moreover, analyzing top income and wealth
shares separately does not reveal insights about their joint distribution. However,
well-being is usually not perceived as an one-dimensional phenomenon and there-
fore the analysis should be extended to more dimensions (Stiglitz et al., 2009). For
this reason, there has been growing interest in multidimensional poverty measure-
ment (see, e.g., Atkinson, 2003b; Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2003; Decancq
and Ooghe, 2010; Alkire and Foster, 2011a; Decancq and Lugo, 2012).
In this chapter, we propose a class of multidimensional aﬄuence measures
which extends the analysis of top inequality to more than one dimension. This
approach allows obtaining a better picture of the (joint) distribution of economic
well-being at the top. First, our measures do not only take into account the
number of individuals’ aﬄuent dimensions, but are also sensitive to changes in
achievements within each dimension. This allows to investigate inequality among
the rich and to explicitly analyze the intensity of aﬄuence. Second, the multidi-
mensional measures allow analyzing the joint distribution of various dimensions
simultaneously. Our approach is related to the work of Alkire and Foster (2011a),
who extend well-known poverty measures (Foster et al., 1984, FGT henceforth) to
a multidimensional setting. We adopt an analogous approach and extend the one-
dimensional aﬄuence measures developed by Peichl et al. (2010). Central to this is
a dual cutoff method that identifies those individuals considered to be multidimen-
sionally aﬄuent. In a first step, an individual is considered as dimension-specific
rich when its achievement in a particular dimension of well-being exceeds the re-
spective cutoff value. In a second step, we define which of the dimension-specific
rich individuals are considered to be aﬄuent in a multidimensional sense. This
is the case if the total number of aﬄuent dimensions is greater than or equal to
a certain threshold (second cutoff). Hence, the joint distribution of dimensions
under consideration is explicitly taken into account and both aﬄuence in marginal
distributions of dimensions as well as the extent of overlap in aﬄuence between
dimension is combined in one single number.
As suggested by Stiglitz et al. (2009), we consider wealth as an additional
dimension besides income in order to capture the breadth of aﬄuence (Cowell,
2011). This is important, since the rich are not a homogenous group, especially in
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terms of income and wealth composition (Atkinson, 2008a; Waldenstro¨m, 2009).
For instance, a differentiation can be made between the high-skilled “working
rich” earning large salaries and the “coupon clippers” with large wealth holdings
and capital income (Kopczuk and Saez, 2004). Wealth is typically more unequally
distributed than income (Jenkins and Ja¨ntti, 2005; Davies et al., 2011) and (though
positively) not perfectly correlated with it (Kennickell, 2009). In fact, marginal
distributions can be shaped very differently (OECD, 2008; Ja¨ntti et al., 2008;
Roine and Waldenstro¨m, 2009). Therefore, analyzing the joint distribution reveals
additional insights about the composition of the top of the distribution and allows
us to quantify the contribution each dimensions to multidimensional aﬄuence.2
We illustrate our approach using comparable microdata in order to analyze
multidimensional aﬄuence across countries (Germany and the US in 2007) and
over time (the US from 1989 to 2007). Comparing these two countries is of special
interest since they represent two distinct welfare state regimes and exhibit different
trends in inequality (Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln et al., 2010; Heathcote et al., 2010). Unfor-
tunately, administrative data comprising information on both income and wealth
is not available. Hence, we must rely on survey data for our empirical illustration.
We extensively discuss issues arising from this and compare our results to findings
from German tax return data.
Our empirical analysis yields the following results. We find that the correlation
between income and wealth is far from perfect in both countries and particularly
weak in Germany. The ranking of the two countries in terms of aﬄuence depends
on the choice of multidimensional measure. When emphasizing large levels of
income and/or wealth of a small group of individuals and hence inequality among
the rich population, the US clearly is richer than Germany as income and wealth
are much more concentrated at the very top. This type of aﬄuence increased in the
US between 1989 and 2007. These findings confirm previous results highlighting
the tremendous increases at the very top (Atkinson et al., 2011). In contrast, when
putting more emphasis on the homogeneity of the rich population, it turns out that
2In principle, it would be possible to combine both income and wealth into an extended income
measure by annualizing the stock of wealth (Smeeding and Thompson, 2011). However, this
implies the assumption that a stock of assets has the same characteristics as income and ignores
particular functioning of wealth, e.g., as a source of power and social status or as means for
consumption smoothing.
CHAPTER 5. 110
aﬄuence is slightly larger in Germany. This type of aﬄuence has remained almost
constant in the US throughout a period of nearly two decades. Furthermore, we
find that in Germany wealth predominantly contributes to intense aﬄuence while
income is more important in the US.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 introduces the concept of
measuring multidimensional aﬄuence before we describe the data in section 5.3.
Our results are presented in section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Measuring Multidimensional Aﬄuence
5.2.1 One-dimensional Aﬄuence
While an extensive literature on the measurement of poverty exists, little research
has been carried out on richness (Medeiros, 2006). Indices of aﬄuence have so
far mostly been restricted to headcount ratios or top income shares (Eisenhauer,
2011). We argue, however, that the measurement of aﬄuence at the top should
be extended – as it has been done for poverty (see, e.g., Foster et al., 1984). A
headcount ratio is only concerned with the number of people above a certain cutoff
and an income change will not affect this index if nobody crosses the threshold.
A top income share analyzes the amount of income for a fixed number of people
without accounting for changes in the number of rich individuals, the composition
of the rich subpopulation nor changes in the distribution of income among the top.
Peichl et al. (2010) propose a class of aﬄuence measures analogously to well-
known measures of poverty (Foster et al., 1984). The general idea is to take into
account the number of aﬄuent people (composition of the rich subpopulation) as
well as the intensity of aﬄuence (distribution among the rich) for individuals above
a certain threshold (“aﬄuence line”). An index of aﬄuence is constructed as the
weighted sum of the individual contributions. The weighting function is supposed
to have some desirable properties, which are derived following the literature on
axioms for poverty indices (especially the focus, continuity, monotonicity and sub-
group decomposability axioms, see Peichl et al., 2010, for details). Thereby, the
transfer axiom of poverty measurement cannot be translated one-to-one to richness
measurement and has to be discussed in more detail. A poverty index satisfies the
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transfer axiom if the index decreases when a rank-preserving progressive transfer
from a poor person to someone who is poorer takes place. This property can be
translated to the richness measurement in two different ways:
• Transfer axiom T1 (concave): an aﬄuence index shall increase when a rank-
preserving progressive transfer between two aﬄuent persons takes place.
• Transfer axiom T2 (convex): an aﬄuence index shall decrease when a rank-
preserving progressive transfer between two aﬄuent persons takes place.
The question behind the definition of these opposite axioms is: shall an index
of aﬄuence increase if a billionaire gives an amount x to a millionaire (T1 ), or
if the millionaire gives the same amount x to the billionaire (T2 ). This cannot
be answered without normative judgement and depends on the research question
(Peichl et al., 2010). A more equal distribution among the rich will lead to a more
homogenous group, which could allow them to better coordinate in pursuing their
interests. If one is interested in this case, the concave approach is more appro-
priate. In contrast, the convex measure reflects inequality among the rich and
the concentration of resources at the very top. This view is also more consistent
with the view of Atkinson (2007a) who considers richness as a source of power. In
addition, there is a serious drawback to the concave approach: it is not compatible
with the weak transfer axiom, i.e., how a progressive transfer from a rich indi-
vidual to another person (rich or non-rich) will change the aﬄuence index (see the
discussion in Peichl et al., 2010). This implies that the choice of the richness line
is much more important than in the convex case. As a consequence, the sensitivity
with respect to choice of the aﬄuence line should be carefully checked (see, e.g.,
the discussion in Medeiros, 2006).
Because of the two possibilities for the transfer axiom, Peichl et al. (2010)
define two classes of aﬄuence indices which either fulfil T1 or T2 as follows. Let yi
be the income of individual i, γ the aﬄuence line (i.e., the threshold above which
someone is defined to be rich) and r = #{i|yi > γ, i = 1, . . . , n} the number of
aﬄuent persons. For T1 the relative incomes yi/γ have to be transformed by a
function that is concave on (1,∞). Peichl et al. (2010) use f(x) = (1− 1
xβ
) · 1x>1
where β > 0 and 1x>1 denotes an indicator function taking on values of one if
CHAPTER 5. 112
x > 1 and zero otherwise:
RChaβ (y,γ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
1−
(
γ
yi
)β)
+
, β > 0. (5.2.1)
The subscript “+” indicates that the expression in brackets must be greater than
or equal to zero. For T2, Peichl et al. (2010) use f(x) = (x− 1)α for x > 1, with
α > 1, to obtain an aﬄuence index that resembles the FGT index of poverty:
RFGT,T2α (y,γ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
yi
γ
− 1
)α
· 1yi>γ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
((
yi − γ
γ
)
+
)α
, α > 1. (5.2.2)
In contrast to poverty, however, the normative (welfare) justification of any meas-
ure are less straightforward in the case of richness. While it is clear that poverty
is a bad thing, this is less so for richness. Clearly, more aﬄuence is bad if the
threshold is set at x% of the distribution since it captures inequality – as the top
income shares or the headcount ratio. However, it might be welfare enhancing if
the threshold is set at a fixed absolute level as in this case more aﬄuence of the
society as a whole is captured.
5.2.2 Multidimensional Aﬄuence
Our approach of measuring multidimensional aﬄuence is based on a dual cutoff
method: In a first step, an individual is considered as dimension-specific aﬄuent
when its achievement in a specific dimension of well-being exceeds the respective
cutoff value. In a second step, we define which individuals (among those who are
aﬄuent with respect to at least one dimension) are considered to be aﬄuent in a
multidimensional sense with the help of a counting methodology (Atkinson, 2003b;
Alkire and Foster, 2011a). An aﬄuent individual is defined to be multidimension-
ally aﬄuent, if the number of its aﬄuence counts across all dimensions is greater
than or equal to a certain threshold (second cutoff). After having identified “the
rich”, their individual achievements are aggregated to single-value measures of
multidimensional aﬄuence.
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Dimension-specific aﬄuence. In this first step, we need to choose which indi-
viduals are aﬄuent in each dimension. The number of individuals in the population
is denoted with n, while d ≥ 2 denotes the number of dimensions of aﬄuence under
consideration. Define the matrix of achievements with Y = [ yij ]n×d, where yij
denotes the achievement of individual i ∈ {1, . . . , n} in dimension j ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
For each dimension j, there is some cutoff value γj (i.e., the dimension-specific
aﬄuence line). Let γ denote a 1 × d vector of dimension-specific cutoffs (chosen
by the researcher or policy-maker). With the help of this vector, it is possible to
identify, whether individual i is aﬄuent with respect to dimension j or not. Next,
define an indicator function θij, which equals 1 if yij > γj and 0 otherwise and with
its help construct a 0 − 1 matrix of dimension-specific aﬄuence Θ0 = [ θij ]n×d,
where each row vector of Θ0, denoted with θi, is equivalent to individual i’s aﬄu-
ence vector. This yields a vector of aﬄuence counts, denoted c = (c1, . . . , cn)
′. Its
elements ci =| θi | are equal to the number of dimensions, in which an individual
i is defined to be aﬄuent.
In the case of cardinal variables in the achievement matrix Y, it is possible to
construct matrices that, in addition, do not only provide the information whether
an individual i is aﬄuent with respect to dimension j or not, but also inform
about the intensity of aﬄuence associated with the dimension under consideration.
Thereby, one can distinguish the concave and the convex case (see above). If we
are interested in the convex case, we look at the following matrix for a given cutoff
γj:
Θα =
[ (
yij − γj
γj
)α
+
]
n×d
for α ≥ 1. (5.2.3)
In the concave case we have
Θβ =
[ (
1−
(
γj
yij
)β)
+
]
n×d
for β > 0. (5.2.4)
Again, the subscript “+” indicates that the entries of matrices Θα and Θβ re-
spectively must be greater than or equal to zero. The parameters α and β are
sensitivity parameters for the intensity of aﬄuence. For larger (smaller) values of
α (β) more weight is put on more intense aﬄuence. Note that Θ0 is simply a
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special case of Θα for α = 0 and of Θβ for β → ∞ respectively. For α = 1 the
function (yij − γj)/γj is just linear in yij.
In addition to the difference with respect to the normative judgement of pro-
gressive transfers between aﬄuent individuals, the distinction between the concave
and convex cases helps to understand what drives inequality at the top of the joint
distribution of dimensions.
Multidimensional measures. In the second step, we have to define which
individuals (among the dimension-specific rich) are aﬄuent in a multidimensional
setting. For this, we use the dual cutoff method of identification. That is, we select
a cutoff value k which defines the number of dimensions in which an individual has
to be rich in order to be multidimensional aﬄuent. Formally, for an (arbitrarily
chosen) number k define the identification method as
φki (yi, γ) =
1 if ci ≥ k,0 if ci < k. (5.2.5)
This yields a 0− 1 vector φk with entries φki equal to one if the number of aﬄuent
dimensions of individual i is not less than k, and is zero otherwise. In other
words, individual i is considered to be multidimensionally aﬄuent, if the number
of dimensions in which its achievement is considered as aﬄuent attains a certain
threshold.3 The choice of the second cutoff is usually less arbitrary than the
choice of the dimension-specific aﬄuence line γj. In practice, the researcher might
want to choose several cutoff values and look at the different results (for instance
k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, i.e., all integers from 1 to the total number of dimensions under
consideration). Hereby, one can think of two extreme cases. First, for k = 1, person
i is multidimensionally aﬄuent when she is considered as aﬄuent in at least one
single dimension (union approach). Second, for k = d, she is only considered
as aﬄuent, if she is aﬄuent in all dimensions (intersection approach). In case
of 1 < k < d we have an intermediate approach (Alkire and Foster, 2011a).
3An individual i can be aﬄuent in one or more dimensions and, at the same time, not be
multidimensionally aﬄuent (when it holds that ci < k), while a multidimensionally aﬄuent
person by definition is always aﬄuent in at least k dimensions. Here, we assume equal weighting
of dimensions. In principle, it is possible to allow for different weights (see appendix).
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Based on this second cutoff, we can define the subset of multidimensionally aﬄuent
individuals among the whole population as Φk = {i : φki (yi, γ) = 1} ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
The number of aﬄuent individuals is denoted with sk =| Φk |.
Since, according to the focus axiom, a measure of aﬄuence must take into ac-
count information on the aﬄuent only, we also replace the elements of the vector of
aﬄuence counts c with zero, when the number of aﬄuence counts of the according
individual i does not attain the threshold k. Formally:
cki =
ci if ci ≥ k,0 if ci < k. (5.2.6)
This yields the vector ck = (ck1, . . . , c
k
n)
′, which contains zeros for those not con-
sidered to be aﬄuent and the number of dimensions, in which the aﬄuent indi-
viduals are considered as aﬄuent. That is, even in case of an individual which
is aﬄuent in several dimensions, its entry in ck nevertheless might be zero if its
number of aﬄuent dimensions is smaller than the threshold k.
In order to obtain matrices that provide information on aﬄuent individuals
only, we replace the row i of Θα and Θβ respectively with vectors of zeros, whenever
it holds that φki (yi, γ) = 0. Formally, define
Θα(k) =
[ (
yij − γj
γj
)α
· φki (yi, γ)
]
n×d
and (5.2.7a)
Θβ(k) =
[ (
1−
(
γj
yij
)β)
· φki (yi, γ)
]
n×d
. (5.2.7b)
Now we are able to define measures of multidimensional aﬄuence based on the
definitions that were introduced in the previous two subsections. In order to derive
a first multivariate measure of aﬄuence, define the headcount ratio (HR) as
HRk =
sk
n
, (5.2.8)
which is simply the proportion of aﬄuent individuals among total population. The
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average aﬄuence share (AASk) reads
AASk =
| ck |
sk · d, (5.2.9)
where | ck | denotes the number of aﬄuence counts among the multidimensionally
aﬄuent population. The average aﬄuence share is hence equal to the relation of
this number to the maximum number of aﬄuence counts that would be observed
when all aﬄuent individuals were aﬄuent among all dimensions and it holds
k/d ≤ AASk ≤ 1. For a given number of dimensions under consideration, the
value of AASk is close to one, when there is a very strong correlation of aﬄuence
across dimensions, i.e., those who are aﬄuent tend to be aﬄuent in all dimensions.
The value becomes smaller if the number of dimensions decreases. It reaches its
minimum value of 1/d, when all aﬄuent individuals are only aﬄuent with respect
to one single dimension.
Now, we can define a first measure of multidimensional aﬄuence by simply
multiplying the headcount ratio and the average aﬄuence share. The dimension
adjusted headcount ratio is defined as
RMHR(k) = HR
k · AASk = | c
k |
n · d , (5.2.10)
which is equal to the proportion of the total number of aﬄuence counts to the
maximum number of aﬄuence counts that one would observe when every single
individual in the population under consideration would be aﬄuent with respect to
every single dimension.4 Contrary to the simple headcount ratio HR, the meas-
ure RMHR satisfies the property of dimensional monotonicity, which requires that
a measure of multidimensional aﬄuence increases (decreases) when a aﬄuent in-
dividual (ci ≥ k) becomes (is no more) aﬄuent in some dimension. That is why
the AAS is incorporated in RMHR. However, the dimension adjusted headcount
ratio does not satisfy the property of monotonicity, i.e., RMHR does not necessarily
increase (decrease) when the achievement yij of a aﬄuent individual i in dimension
4Hence, the nomenclature of a headcount ratio is somewhat misleading. However, in order to
remain consistent with the literature on multidimensional poverty (Alkire and Foster, 2011a)
we stick to this naming. Moreover, the measure RMHR is the multidimensional analogue to the
one-dimensional headcount ratio.
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j increases (decreases).Hence, it only reveals information about the width and not
the depth of aﬄuence.
The following additional measures of multidimensional aﬄuence by contrast do
satisfy the monotonicity property. Again, one can distinguish between a convex
and a concave measure respectively. The dimension adjusted multivariate aﬄuence
measures are defined as
RMl (k) = HR
k · AASk · | Θ
l(k) |
| ck | =
| Θl(k) |
n · d (5.2.11)
for l ∈ {α, β} and hence are equal to the sum of the elements of the matrices
Θα(k) and Θβ(k) divided by the value n · d respectively. The concave measure
RMβ is normalized between zero and one, while the convex measure R
M
α is not.
Although one would prefer to have normalized measures, this is not possible in
the convex case without violating the monotonicity axiom. The choice of RMα over
RMβ emphasizes intense rather than moderate aﬄuence.
Since we are interested in analyzing the role of dimensions (especially income
and wealth) with respect to the measurement of multidimensional aﬄuence, it
seems helpful to formally disentangle the dimensions-specific contributions. There-
fore, we rewrite (5.2.11) as
RMl (k) =
| Θl(k) |
n · d =
∑d
j=1 | θlj(k) |
n · d =
1
d
·
d∑
j=1
| θlj(k) |
n
=
1
d
·
d∑
j=1
Πlj(k) (5.2.12)
for l ∈ {α, β}. Hence, Πjl(k) denotes the contribution of each dimension j mul-
tiplied by the total number of dimensions d. More intuitively, it is equal to the
proportion of individuals that are multidimensionally aﬄuent and aﬄuent with
respect to dimension j at the same time. The simple mean of all these contribu-
tions over the d dimensions yields the overall multidimensional aﬄuence measure
RMl . One can show that the proportional contribution of dimension j to the overall
measure RMl , denoted with pi
l
j(k), can be written as
pilj(k) =
| θlj(k) |
| Θl(k) | . (5.2.13)
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Obviously, it holds that
∑d
j=1 pi
l
j(k) = 1. Hence, it is possible to decompose the
measures proportionally into the contributions of the single dimensions.
5.3 Empirical Application
With respect to measurement of aﬄuence, the representativeness of individuals
with (very) high income and wealth levels in the data at hand clearly is an issue.
Usually, survey data are less representative at the tails of the income distribution
because of small numbers of observations (Burkhauser et al., 2011, 2012). Both
datasets we use address this issue.
5.3.1 Data
Administrative vs. survey data. Kopczuk and Saez (2004) discuss different
reasons for discrepancies in findings between studies based on survey data and
administrative tax return data. These are related to different concepts of income
or wealth and to tax avoidance and evasion. The literature on top incomes typ-
ically makes use of administrative data from tax records. Piketty (2005) argues
that, in contrast to other (survey) data sources, these data are homogeneous over
time, comparable across country and decomposable with respect to income sources.
Furthermore, administrative data do not suffer from non-response, especially re-
garding the top of the distribution.
Since, unfortunately, administrative data are not available to us (in case of the
US) or only for a very restricted period (in case of Germany) we have to rely on sur-
vey data. We argue that both data sources are nevertheless useful for our purposes.
First, both surveys provide harmonized information on income and wealth over
time and allow a restriction to specific income components (see below). Second,
both surveys are explicitly concerned with representativeness of top incomes and
wealth holdings by specific sampling procedures. Finally, as elaborated in Alkire
and Foster (2011b), our methodology requires income and wealth information from
the same data source, which must be linked on the individual (or household) level
in order to be able to assess the joint distribution. Tax return data typically do
not provide both types of information simultaneously. Furthermore, they do not
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contain information on non-taxable income sources (e.g., owner-occupied housing
or private life insurance in Germany). In addition, while survey data are subject to
measurement error, tax data suffer from underreporting due to tax evasion, which
is particularly severe at the top (Kopczuk and Saez, 2004; Paulus, 2011).
SOEP. The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (Wagner et al., 2007; Socio-
Economic Panel, 2010) is a panel survey of households and individuals in Germany
that has been conducted annually since 1984. We use the 2007 wave of the SOEP
with information of 18,773 individuals (aged 17+) in 10,553 households. In or-
der to improve its “statistical power” and the reliability of statements referring to
high incomes (and hence aﬄuence), an additional sample of high income house-
holds was included into the SOEP since wave 2002. This increased the number of
observations within the top 2.5% of the income distribution considerably and hence
reduced potential bias due to poor representativeness of aﬄuent households. Since
these additional observations were oversampled, population weights were adjus-
ted accordingly to make the data representative for the German population (Frick
et al., 2007). The 2002 and 2007 waves of the SOEP contain additional inform-
ation on wealth that was surveyed in supplementary questionnaires (Frick et al.,
2007; Frick and Grabka, 2009). The SOEP income data has been validated against
administrative tax data and was found to perform reasonably well up to the top
1% of the income distribution (Bach et al., 2009). Nevertheless, we perform a
robustness check using German tax microdata.
SCF. The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is a triennial survey of US fam-
ilies with a special focus on wealth holdings. The 2007 wave of the SCF contains
information on 4,422 families with a total of 11,199 members. They were sampled
in two steps: First, a standard geographically based random sample and, second,
a special oversampling of very wealthy families. Similar to the SOEP sampling
weights make the respondents representative for the US population and missing
data are imputed. The SCF provides detailed information on family income, bal-
ance sheets, use of financial services as well as pensions, labor force participation
and demographic characteristics (Bucks et al., 2009).
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5.3.2 Dimensions
Income. When measuring individuals’ well-being, consumption is typically re-
garded as the best proxy for permanent income. Moreover, with regard to the rich
in society, conspicuous consumption might play an important role. Unfortunately,
we do not have information on consumption in our data. Therefore, we use income
as our first dimension as a proxy for actual consumption. Our income measure
contains market income from labor as well as private transfers and pensions from
all household or family members (Bucks et al., 2009; Grabka, 2012). Since we are
interested in the joint distribution of income and wealth, we do not consider income
from assets, such as payments from interest, dividends or capital gains in order
to avoid “double counting”. Income flows from a stock of assets and the stock
itself are highly correlated and the probability of being aﬄuent in both income
and wealth at the same time can be assumed to be quite high when taking cap-
ital income into account. However, a robustness check shows that the qualitative
results do not change when using market income including capital income.
Wealth. As our second dimension, we choose wealth – as recommended by
Stiglitz et al. (2009). Wealth serves as a source of income, utility and power as well
as social status (Frick and Grabka, 2009) and helps to stabilize consumption over
time (Wolff and Zacharias, 2009; Michelangeli et al., 2011). In addition, wealth and
income represent distinct dimensions of satisfaction with life (D’Ambrosio et al.,
2009). Moreover, wealth has been used to measure poverty (Brandolini et al.,
2010; Azpitarte, 2012). While income can be defined as the “increase in a person’s
command over resources during a given time period” one can view wealth as “a
person’s total immediate command over resources” (Cowell, 2008). The require-
ment of immediate command refers to a notion of marketability of an individual’s
wealth stock. This can be seen as appropriate with respect to financial assets and
(to a lesser extent) to housing or business property.5 Our basic measure of indi-
vidual wealth aggregates the following components: owner-occupied housing and
other property (net of mortgage debt), financial assets, business assets, tangible
assets (consumer durables), private pensions net of consumer credits and other
5This definition excludes the present value of future public pension entitlements which are non-
marketable. We discuss this in detail and provide some evidence as a robustness check.
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debt. Information on wealth holdings contained in both datasets differs in terms
of the level of detail but both surveys target these aggregate wealth components.
Moreover, a number of waves of both the SOEP and the SCF surveys serve as the
original sources for the Luxembourg Wealth Study Database (LWS), an ex-post
harmonized cross-national database on household assets and liabilities (Sierminska
et al., 2006). We therefore adopt the LWS practice and harmonize the two data
sources as much as possible.
Cutoffs. Defining the cutoffs which separate the population into aﬄuent and
non-aﬄuent individuals with respect to the dimensions under consideration is cru-
cial for the empirical analysis. Although there are several ways to draw a poverty
line (relative vs. absolute), the underlying principle – a poor person does not meet
a certain level of subsistence, while a non-poor one does – is uncontroversial. With
respect to the upper tail of the distribution this is less clear. The decision how
to define cutoffs is up to the researcher and the sensitivity of results should be
checked for different choices of the aﬄuence line.
One standard approach in the literature is to fix the proportion of the aﬄuent
population (e.g., the top p% of the distribution, see references in footnote 1 and
Cowell, 2011). For example, in research on the “middle class” it is common to
define the middle to comprise the second to fourth income quintiles (Atkinson
and Brandolini, 2011). Consequently, the top (bottom) quintile represents the
rich (poor) part of the society. Another way of defining a cutoff follows standard
practice in poverty research and sets the cutoff at a multiple of the mean or median
value of the respective distribution. For instance, Peichl et al. (2010) choose an
upper threshold of 200% of the median, Barry (2002) suggests 300% of the median
and Atkinson (2008a) proposes different multiples of average income as wealth
cutoffs. Although one can argue in favor of both approaches we follow the first
one here for two reasons: First, we want our results to be comparable to the top
income literature which implicitly sets aﬄuence lines at top quantiles. Second,
a data driven choice of aﬄuence line, i.e., a fraction of the mean or median is
affected by the dispersion of the underlying distribution and hence could also be
interpreted as a measure of inequality. Moreover, with regard to the differences in
the skewness of the distributions it is difficult to find a common multiple for both
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income and wealth which is a meaningful cutoff. Therefore, we set the cutoff at the
80%-quantile of the respective distribution. Of course, this is an arbitrary choice.
However, we check the sensitivity of the results with respect to the cutoff by looking
at the top 10%, top 5% and top 1%. We find that the level of cutoff does not affect
our results qualitatively and is hence not important for our purposes. By definition,
the one-dimensional headcount ratios then equal 20% but the multidimensional
headcount does not necessarily need to take on the same value, since it depends
on the joint distribution of both dimensions. Since both income and wealth usually
exhibit distinct profiles over the life cycle (see Paglin, 1975; Alma˚s and Mogstad,
2012, and figure 5.6.1), we let the cutoffs vary by age of the household head and
distinguish three age groups (head aged ≤29, 30–59 and ≥60) in order to take
into account these life cycle patterns. The specific age groups represent the main
stages of life with completion of education, prime working age and retirement age.
5.3.3 Descriptives
In order to make individuals with different household sizes comparable to each
other we equivalize both income and wealth levels with the common square root
scale. We express income and wealth in 2007 PPP US dollars (US$). In table 5.3.1
we present our results on mean and median income and wealth respectively as well
as the age group-specific cutoffs. Wealth and income are converted to constant
US dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) available from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Furthermore, since we are interested in aﬄuence and hence the
top of the income and wealth distribution, we disregard any adjustments to the
data with respect to extreme upper values (like top-coding or trimming) in the
baseline (we do this as a robustness check, though).
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Table 5.3.1: Descriptives and cutoffs (2007)
Mean Median Cutoff < 30 Cutoff 30–59 Cutoff 60+
United States 2007
Income 44,982 27,252 37,021 63,245 36,358
(434) (358) (1,022) (715) (1,269)
Wealth 355,984 70,750 35,921 280,050 590,399
(4,741) (1,860) (4,878) (7,219) (16,899)
Germany 2007
Income 25,415 21,670 33,784 50,290 17,732
(336) (455) (1,681) (640) (1,281)
Wealth 134,300 43,873 26,942 173,145 259,284
(4,289) (2,193) (3,090) (4,600) (7,228)
Note: Income and wealth in PPP US Dollars. Confidence intervals (95%) based on 500 bootstrap replications. Source:
SCF/SOEP, own calculations.
Mean equivalent market income in the US equals about 45,000 US$ and hence is
nearly twice the level in Germany (24,000 US$), whereas – due to the more skewed
distribution – the US median value (27,000 US$) is only somewhat larger than in
Germany (20,500 US$). The age-specific cutoffs for the youngest group (head aged
below 30) are quite similar and differ more for the older age groups, particularly
for the group of 60 years and above. For the latter, the US value exceeds twice the
German value. Moreover, the age group-specific distributions reveal a typical life-
cycle profile: the 80%-quantiles increase by age from the youngest to the medium
group but decrease again for the oldest (also see figure 5.6.1 in the appendix).
This pattern is more pronounced in Germany, where the cutoff for the group of 60
and older is only half the level of the youngest group. This is due to the fact that
we rely on market incomes. Consumption resources of Germans above retirement
age however heavily depend on old-age benefits from public pensions which are
not included in our income definition. For the US, we find that the youngest and
oldest groups exhibit nearly identical cutoff levels of around 36,000 US$.
Turning to the wealth distributions, we find that overall mean equivalent wealth
in the US is about 356,000 US$ and hence is almost three times as large as in
Germany (127,000 US$). Median wealth is rather low in Germany (42,000 US$)
and less than one third of mean wealth. Although being significantly larger than
the German median wealth level, the US median wealth of around 70,000 US$
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is only about one fifth of the mean. Wealth distributions in both countries are
also characterized by a specific pattern over the life cycle: The cutoffs for the age
groups increase monotonically and the slope is much steeper in the US. While the
youngest group differs only by about 10,000 US$, the cutoff for the oldest group
is more than twice as large in the US compared to Germany.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Shares, Correlations and One-dimensional Aﬄuence
Income and wealth shares. In figure 5.4.1 we present our estimates of income
and wealth shares of the distributions’ top 10%, 5% and 1% fractiles. The upper
graph shows the shares of total income and wealth belonging to top fractiles of each
dimension separately. Although we apply a slightly different concept (equivalence
weighting) our results are in line with previous findings of the top income literature
and further studies reporting top shares (see, e.g., Atkinson et al., 2011, for an
overview). For Germany, we find income shares of 6.2%–32.1% for the top 1%,
5% and 10% of the income distribution. The wealth shares vary between 21%
and 55%. Compared to Germany, top income and wealth shares are significantly
larger in the US. The difference between the countries varies between 13 and 20
percentage points. The top 10% of the US income distribution account for 46.5%
of total income, the top 1% for 18.7%. The concentration of resources in terms
of wealth is even larger. The top decile commands more than 70%. Most of this
share is concentrated in the top 5% of the wealth distribution, almost half of it in
the top percentile. The two other graphs take into account the joint distribution
of income and wealth respectively. The middle graph shows the shares of each
dimension in the top fractiles of the other dimension. This means, the left (right)
hand side of this graph shows the income (wealth) share of the top fractiles in
the wealth (income) distribution. For example, the top decile of the US wealth
distribution receives about 37% of total income, while the top 10% in income
command more than 50% of wealth holdings. In general, the shares are somewhat
smaller compared to the shares found for the marginal distributions, especially for
Germany. Finally, the lower graph presents the shares of the joint top fractiles.
CHAPTER 5. 125
For instance, those who are in the top percentiles of both the income and wealth
distribution in Germany have 1.5% of total income and 5.5% of total wealth.
Interestingly, the income shares of the joint top fractiles are only marginally above
their population shares, which would imply an almost equal distribution. The joint
top decile owns less than one fifth of total German wealth (18.5%). The results
for the US are much larger, between 2.5 and eight times the shares in Germany:
The joint top decile has one third of income and half of the wealth. These findings
indicate that economic resources are much more concentrated in the US than in
Germany. Generally speaking, “the rich” in Germany have either high income or
wealth, while in the US they tend to have both.
Correlations. One motivation for proposing a measure of multidimensional af-
fluence with an application to income and wealth is the fact that looking at the
distribution of one dimension only is not sufficient to capture the distribution of
economic well-being within a given population in general. That is why we take a
closer look at the relationship between the two dimensions under consideration. In
figure 5.4.2 we show results for Pearson’s correlation coefficient as well as for Spear-
man’s rank correlation coefficient. It turns out that individual positions within the
marginal distributions are far from perfectly correlated. This is especially true for
Germany, where we find a value of 0.28 for the total population. The correla-
tion between income and wealth is 0.2. The rank-correlation index even takes on
a slightly negative value (−0.1) and a correlation coefficient of below 0.1, when
restricting the sample to individuals with at least one aﬄuence count. For the
multidimensionally aﬄuent (i.e., aﬄuent in both dimensions) we find a positive
but rather small number of 0.2. This suggests that the rank of an individual within
either the income or the wealth distribution is quite a poor predictor for the rank
within the other marginal distribution. Our findings for the US however suggest a
distinctly stronger relationship between positions in the income and wealth distri-
butions respectively. The rank-correlation for the total population is 0.6, whereas
we find 0.54 for the subpopulation with at least one aﬄuent count and 0.76 for the
very top with income and wealth levels both exceeding the cutoffs. Hence, the re-
lationship between income and wealth positions is far from perfect in in Germany,
but larger in the US.
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One-dimensional aﬄuence. In table 5.4.1 we list several distributional indic-
ators for the dimensions under consideration, focussing on one-dimensional aﬄu-
ence measures as well as the Gini coefficient as a standard measure of inequality.
Consistent with other cross-country analysis, we find larger levels of market income
inequality in the US compared to Germany (Gini: 0.56 vs. 0.42) and higher levels
of wealth inequality: In the US the Gini coefficient is 0.8 and 0.65 in Germany. The
one-dimensional headcount ratios for aﬄuence by definition equal 0.2 since we set
the cutoff levels to the 80%-quantiles. However, we find differences for the other
aﬄuence indicators taking into account inequality among the aﬄuent subpopula-
tion. The convex aﬄuence measures (Rα) for both income and wealth are larger
in US than in Germany. In particular for α = 2, an index emphasizing extreme
aﬄuence, we find huge values of 10.5 and 7.8 for the US compared to 0.4 and 1.6.
Hence, there is much more inequality among the very top of the distributions in
both dimensions. Interestingly, the concave measures (Rβ) turn out to be larger
in Germany, which indicates that high income and wealth are more concentrated
around the cutoff.
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Table 5.4.1: One-dimensional Measures (2007)
RHR Rα=1 Rα=2 Rβ=1 Rβ=3 IGini
United States 2007
Income 0.199 0.110 10.492 0.019 0.030 0.561
(0.000) (0.005) (2.074) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Wealth 0.200 0.156 7.794 0.021 0.030 0.798
(0.000) (0.006) (0.555) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Germany 2007
Income 0.200 0.101 0.397 0.032 0.053 0.416
(0.000) (0.010) (0.120) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Wealth 0.200 0.106 1.598 0.027 0.046 0.651
(0.000) (0.012) (0.541) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010)
Note: Confidence intervals (95%) based on 500 bootstrap replications. Source: SCF/SOEP, own calculations.
5.4.2 Multidimensional Aﬄuence and its Contributions
Germany vs. the US in 2007. In table 5.4.2 we present our results for different
multidimensional aﬄuence measures using different values of the second cutoff
threshold k as well as different values of α and β respectively. Analogous to the
one-dimensional case, the dimension adjusted headcount ratio (RMHR) is equal to
0.2 for k = 1 due to the choice of cutoffs. However, this is not necessarily the case
for k = 2, where we find a larger value for the US (0.11) compared to Germany
(0.08). This means that the relative number of total aﬄuence counts is larger
in the US. Turning to the convex multidimensional aﬄuence measures (RMα ) we
find that for both levels of the second cutoff (k = 1 and k = 2) the levels are
much higher in the US. Whereas the difference for α = 1 is comparably moderate
it turns out to be huge for α = 2, which implies a strong emphasis of the very
top. This implies that aﬄuence in the US is much more concentrated at the
very top of the joint distribution of income and wealth, consisting of only few
households and individuals. However, looking at the concave measures (RMβ ) we
find (slightly) higher levels of multidimensional aﬄuence for Germany, in particular
for k = 1, which results from the weaker (rank) correlation between dimensions.
This indicates that aﬄuence in Germany is more equally distributed among a larger
number of households and individuals not differing too much in their income and
wealth levels, whereas in the US extreme aﬄuence results from a smaller group of
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aﬄuent units where some exhibit extreme levels in both income and wealth.
Table 5.4.2: Multidimensional Measures (2007)
k RMHR R
M
α=1 R
M
α=2 R
M
β=1 R
M
β=3
United States 2007
1 0.199 0.133 9.143 0.020 0.030
(0.000) (0.004) (1.126) (0.000) (0.001)
2 0.111 0.103 8.446 0.012 0.016
(0.002) (0.004) (1.113) (0.000) (0.000)
Germany 2007
1 0.200 0.104 0.997 0.030 0.049
(0.000) (0.008) (0.280) (0.001) (0.001)
2 0.081 0.051 0.457 0.013 0.020
(0.003) (0.006) (0.137) (0.001) (0.001)
Note: Confidence intervals (95%) based on 500 bootstrap replications. Source: SCF/SOEP, own calcu-
lations.
Contributions. As we pointed out before, another advantage of our measures of
multidimensional aﬄuence is that they allow to quantify the contribution of each
dimension to the overall level of aﬄuence. Figure 5.4.3 displays the percentage
contribution of income and wealth respectively. We find that in both countries
the relative importance of both dimensions is quite balanced for all measures.
The only exception is the convex measure for α = 2. For this, the two countries
differ substantially. The contribution of income is reduced to 20–30% in Germany
depending on the second cutoff level k, whereas it amounts to around 60% in
the US. This means that the composition of aﬄuence at the very top differs a
lot between the US and Germany, whereas income and wealth seem to contribute
more or less evenly when extreme aﬄuence is less emphasized.
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United States 1989–2007. We now turn an assessment of the development of
multidimensional aﬄuence over time in the US during the period from 1989 to
2007. We compare our results to an updated time series of top income shares in
the US (Piketty and Saez, 2003, 2007b) provided by Alvaredo et al. (2011). Figure
5.6.2 in the appendix depicts shares of the top 10% to top 0.01% incomes includ-
ing capital gains since this comes closest to our joint consideration of income and
wealth. The share of the very top of the income distribution in the US has been in-
creasing steadily since the mid-1990s with the exception of a short recession period
at the beginning of the 2000s following the burst of the dot-com bubble. In figure
5.6.3 in the appendix we present the development of mean and median income
and wealth for the total population as well as for the three subgroups according
to the age of the household head. Overall, the mean values of both dimensions
under consideration show stronger growth rates than the median values, indicating
growing dispersion in the distribution (see figure 5.6.4 in the appendix). This is
especially true for the oldest age groups, while income and wealth levels for the
youngest group have remained more or less constant throughout the period under
consideration. This might also be due to changes in the demographic composition
with an ageing but on average wealthier society (Alm˚as and Mogstad, 2012).
In the previous section we reported that the US and Germany clearly differ in
the association between rank positions within the income and wealth distributions
for 2007 data. We find that this correlation is much stronger in the US compared
to Germany. Figure 5.4.4 shows the development of the rank correlation between
1989 and 2007. Throughout the whole period, it holds that the correlation has
been stronger than it was in Germany in 2007 we find that there has been a
considerable increase in the US since the beginning of the 1990s. For the whole
population, the Spearman index grew from below 0.5 to a level of around 0.6.
This growth turns out to be even stronger for the subpopulation with at least one
aﬄuence count (increase from 0.35 to 0.55) and also increased somewhat for the
multidimensionally aﬄuent population (increase from 0.65 to 0.75–0.8). Hence, the
high-income individuals more often also exhibit the highest levels of wealth. This
should clearly contribute to an increasing level of aﬄuence in both dimensions.
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Figures 5.4.5a and 5.4.5b depict the development of one-dimensional aﬄuence
for income and wealth respectively. For both we find that aﬄuence measured by
the concave indices (Rβ) remained remarkably unchanged throughout the period
1989–2007 and shows almost no volatility at all. This is contrasted by the convex
measures (Rα) putting more weight on the extreme top of the respective distribu-
tions: For income, the convex measures increased strongly since the beginning of
the 2000s after having remained constant throughout the 1990s (no statistically
significant changes) with the exception of a dip in 1992 due to the contraction of
the US economy. Convex aﬄuence in wealth did not significantly change through-
out the first four waves (1989–1998) despite a clear increasing pattern of point
estimates. The convex measures for α = 2 dropped significantly to lower levels in
2001 and 2004 before increasing again between the 2004 and 2007 waves.
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We present our results for multidimensional aﬄuence in the US between 1989
and 2007 in figures 5.4.6a and 5.4.6b for the two possible levels of second stage
cutoffs. The measures only differ in levels for k = 1 or k = 2 but the trend
patterns over time are very similar: Relying on the concave measures yields that
multidimensional aﬄuence has remained almost constant throughout the period
1989–2007, whereas the convex measures exhibit some volatility. We find a statist-
ically significant drop of convex measures between 1989 and 1992 for both values
of α due to the contraction at that time. For α = 1, multidimensional aﬄuence
afterwards remained constant between 1995 and 2004 and increased between 2004
and 2007. Hence, this measure remained unaffected by the recession in 2000/2001
while we find a significant drop of aﬄuence measured with α = 2, which implies
strongly emphasizing very high achievements in both income and wealth. This
means, the dot-com crisis particularly affected the very top of the distribution
of economic well-being in the US, which is mainly due to its impact on wealth
holdings. Although large confidence intervals (based on bootstrapping) indicate a
fair amount of imprecision in estimated levels of aﬄuence we find a very strong
increase between 2004 and 2007. In fact, we observe a doubling of point estimates.
Hence, in the first half of the 2000s, the top of the joint distribution of income
and wealth not only recovered from its losses at the beginning of the decade but
even increased their economic resources to a historically high level. However, since
the available SCF data do not cover the recent crisis, it can be assumed that the
Great Recession has reversed this trend sharply.6
6The 2009 SCF panel survey reinterviewed participants from the 2007 cross-sectional survey in
order to capture the impact of the crisis on private finances. However, this data is not (yet)
available for public use (see Bricker et al., 2011).
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5.4.3 Extension: Weighting of Dimensions
In both our theoretical consideration as well as in our empirical application of
multidimensional aﬄuence measurement we did not consider the issue of weighting
dimensions and implicitly applied equal weights to both dimensions under consid-
eration. Equal weighting is popular for its simplicity and its easy interpretation.
Furthermore, it is the most appropriate choice if all dimensions are indeed equally
important for economic well-being (Atkinson, 2003b; Alkire and Foster, 2011a).
Decancq and Lugo (2013), however, argue that the weighting scheme determines
the trade-off structure among dimensions and is crucial for choosing the dimen-
sions since not considering several potential dimensions implicitly means assigning
a weight of zero to them. Hence, any choice of weighting scheme clearly has norm-
ative implications (Decancq et al., 2009; Decancq and Ooghe, 2010). However,
although equal weighting is not uncontroversial in the literature on multidimen-
sional well-being there is also no agreement on a specific weighting scheme among
various possible choices (see Decancq and Lugo, 2013, for an overview). Rather
than making a specific alternative choice we present results for a range of possible
combinations of different weights (see appendix).
We distinguish between Germany and the US as well as the cases of a union, an
intermediate and an intersection approach to the dual cutoff method (see Alkire
and Foster, 2011a, pp. 479–480). The union approach represents one extreme
case where an individual is identified as multidimensionally aﬄuent as soon as
the sum of weighted counts is not below the least weight given to one of the
dimensions under consideration. The other extreme approach, the intersection
case, by contrast requires that the sum of weighted counts is equal to the total sum
of weights. In our application using two dimensions and equal weights these cases
were represented by the cutoffs k = 1 (union) and k = 2 (intersection) respectively.
Allowing for different weights (and/or expanding the number of dimensions) allows
intermediate cases, where an individual is aﬄuent when its weighted counts are
below the total sum of weights but are larger than the least weight.
In figure 5.6.5 we plot the values of the multidimensional aﬄuence indices
against the weight of income, while figure 5.6.6 shows the contribution of this
dimension for different weights (see appendix). Overall the results for the multidi-
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mensional aﬄuence indices are not very sensitive to the weighting scheme. There
is only some noise for the intermediate case. Moreover, the relationship between
the relative weight of a dimension and its contribution to overall aﬄuence is almost
described by a linear function with the exception of the convex measure for α = 2.
For the German data, the contribution of income only grows slowly (the curve lies
below the 45-degree line) while it increases rapidly in the US. This confirms our
result that income and wealth contribute differently to multidimensional aﬄuence
when emphasizing the very top of the distributions.
5.4.4 Robustness Checks
Different cutoffs. We calculated the multidimensional aﬄuence indices for dif-
ferent levels of the dimension-specific cutoffs, i.e., higher percentiles of the marginal
distributions of income and wealth. As for our baseline specification, we defined
the cutoffs separately by age of the household head. The results are presented in
figure 5.4.7. The levels of the indices vary by the level of cutoff with smaller values
for higher quantiles. However, the patterns we found for the baseline cutoff (80%-
quantile of the age-specific distributions) are pretty similar. In particular, the
cross-country differences remain almost unchanged, except for the concave meas-
ures. Whereas in our baseline results Germany exhibits (slightly) larger levels for
this set of indices, they are almost the same for both countries or slightly larger
in the US.
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Administrative data for Germany. We check whether utilizing administrat-
ive data from tax records yields approximately similar results to survey data. We
use German tax data (FAST7), which is a 10% stratified random sample from all
German income tax records – about 3 million cases – available for scientific use.
The FAST data provide detailed information on various aspects that are relevant
for income taxation on the micro level (individuals and married couples). We use
data from 2001 since this allows a comparison with the SOEP wave 2002 which
comprise income and wealth information for the previous calender year.8 Unfor-
tunately, these data do not comprise information on wealth holdings and we have
to construct and impute this information as it is not allowed to directly match the
tax data with SOEP data due to German data protection regulations.
Table 5.4.3: Multidimensional Measures: administrative data (Germany, 2001)
k RMHR R
M
α=1 R
M
α=2 R
M
β=1 R
M
β=3
Germany (adminstrative data) 2001
1 0.010 0.018 0.375 0.004 0.007
2 0.001 0.004 0.050 0.001 0.001
Germany (survey data) 2001
1 0.010 0.007 0.041 0.003 0.005
2 0.002 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.001
Note: Source: FAST/SOEP, own calculations.
We define income as the sum of all market income subject to income taxes
less income from capital (dividends) and construct a proxy for wealth holdings
as the level of income from capital divided by an interest rate of around 7%,
which we calculated from the SOEP (average sum of capital gains over the sum
of business assets). Unfortunately, the tax data does not comprise proxies for
property wealth, since especially owner-occupied housing is not subject to income
taxation. Hence, capital income is an incomplete proxy for wealth since owner-
occupied housing does not yield directly measurable income streams (only via
7FAST–Faktisch anonymisierten Daten aus der Lohn- und Einkommensteuerstatistik, see http:
//www.forschungsdatenzentrum.de/bestand/lest/suf/2001/index.asp (in German).
8The FAST data are available for 1998, 2001 and 2004; the SOEP data with wealth information
for 2001 and 2006. Unfortunately, administrative tax data for the US are not available to us.
Although tax record data have several advantages over survey data (esp. reliability of income
information and representativeness) they do not contain direct information on wealth holdings.
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imputed rents for owner-occupiers, see, e.g. Smeeding and Thompson, 2011). This
poses a “serious challenge” for this capitalization of income method (Kopczuk and
Saez, 2004). Hence, we also do not consider property income in the SOEP data
for this comparative exercise. In addition, the (sample) populations of both data
sources are not comparable. While the SOEP is designed to representatively cover
the whole population, the FAST data only comprise tax payers, i.e., a specific
subpopulation. In particular, pensioners are less likely to pay income taxes as
in 2001 in Germany only a small share of public pension income was subject to
taxation. That is why we use only one cutoff for the whole sample at the 99%-
quantile since up to this level the SOEP data compare very well to the tax data
(Bach et al., 2009). Table 5.4.3 presents the results, which are almost identical for
the multidimensional headcount ratio as well as for the concave measures. Only
for the convex indices, which put more weight on the very top, aﬄuence measures
based on tax data are unsurprisingly higher.
Outliers. As we are restricted to rather small samples for our empirical analysis,
an issue arising is the precision of estimated values of multidimensional aﬄuence
indices. This is particularly true for the convex measures, which are more sensit-
ive to extreme values at the top of the income and wealth distributions. As noted
above, we apply the bootstrap method in order to derive empirical standard errors
and find that the more emphasis is put on the very top the more imprecise the
point estimates become. In particular, when analyzing the trend of (multidimen-
sional) aﬄuence over the 1989–2007 period in the US it is not always possible to
detect statistically significant changes in aﬄuence levels over time although point
estimates show clear trends (see figures 5.4.5 and 5.4.6). Hence, there is a sort of
trade-off between precision in estimation and emphasizing very intense aﬄuence
at least in the case of the convex measures. Another way to address this issue
would be top-coding or even trimming the data at a specific threshold (e.g., the
99%-quantile), which is frequently applied in the literature. This is however not
innocuous since it affects the absolute value of aﬄuence measures – especially the
convex ones (Van Kerm, 2007). However, we find that our qualitative results are
not altered in both cases (results are available from the authors upon request).
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Pension wealth. An important motive for building a wealth stock over the life
cycle is precautionary saving, not only in order to smooth consumption over in-
come shocks but in particular also as a form of old-age provision. The importance
of private savings to secure a certain standard of living after retiring depends on
the institutional setting (in particular the public pension system). While in Ger-
many the most important pillar of the pension system relies on a statutory and
compulsory pay-as-you-go pension scheme for dependent employees (and hence for
a majority of the workforce), the system of publicly organized old-age provision in
the US is less important (though not unimportant) for the individual retiree (Wolff,
2011). As a consequence, private old-age provision – in form of housing, stocks,
bonds or pension funds – is of greater importance. Although the present values of
future pension entitlements from a statutory pension scheme are not marketable
(i.e., they cannot be sold or lend against) they nevertheless can be viewed as a
special form of wealth since they represent a substitute for private old-age provi-
sion. Hence, the standard definition of net wealth described above does not take
into account an important component of an individual’s wealth portfolio (Frick
and Heady, 2009). What follows from this line of argument is that it is desirable
to include a measure of “pension wealth” when comparing countries with distinct
pension systems (Frick and Heady, 2009). As an illustration, we use cell means for
public pension entitlements and merge them to the SOEP data.9 Consistent with
previous findings (Rasner et al., 2011), incorporating pension wealth has a strong
equalizing effect, in particular at the very top with a strong decrease in the values
for RMα=2 (see figure 5.4.8).
9We thank Markus M. Grabka (DIW Berlin) for providing us with the information used in Rasner
et al. (2011) for different groups by age, gender, occupational status and region.
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Figure 5.4.8: Multidimensional aﬄuence: public pension wealth (Germany, 2007)
Other dimensions. We restrict our empirical illustration to income and wealth
as dimensions of multidimensional aﬄuence since these can be considered as core
indicators of economic well-being. However, Stiglitz et al. (2009) have identified
various key dimensions that should in principle be taken into account, when provid-
ing a more differentiated picture of a society’s economic well-being. These dimen-
sions comprise, among others, material living standards and health. Moreover, it
is argued that quality of life depends on people’s objective conditions and capabil-
ities as well as on their subjective evaluations (see Sen, 1985; Anand and van Hees,
2006). In Peichl and Pestel (2012) we explicitly seize on these recommendations
and apply the multidimensional approach to three dimensions reflecting different
domains of life. Using SOEP data we include health as a proxy for non-material
quality of life as well as self-reported satisfaction with life as dimensions besides
income as traditional indicator for material well-being. We find that one third of
the German population is well-off in at least one dimension but only one 1% in
all three dimensions simultaneously. While the distribution of income has become
more concentrated at the top, the concentration of the multidimensional well-being
has decreased over time. Moreover, health as well as life satisfaction are important
drivers of multidimensional richness which has important policy implications.
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5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we propose measures for multidimensional aﬄuence. We argue
that the analysis of economic well-being, especially at the top of its distribution,
should not only consider income as a single dimension, but in addition take into
account further dimensions in order to provide a differentiated picture of economic
well-being. We distinguish convex and concave measures of aﬄuence, where the
first put more emphasis on inequality at the very top of the joint distribution.
Using microdata from the SOEP and the SCF, we apply this framework to
Germany and the United States (in 2007) and perform a cross-country analysis as
well as an analysis of multidimensional aﬄuence over time in the US (1989–2007).
Conclusions derived from our results depend on the choice of multidimensional
measure of aﬄuence. It turns out, that according to the concave measures the
German population is overall slightly more aﬄuent than the US population and
multidimensional aﬄuence has remained constant during a period of nearly two
decades. However, when referring to the convex measurement of multidimensional
aﬄuence, the US clearly outperforms Germany and there is volatility in aﬄuence
in the US between 1989 and 2007. In particular, based on a measure putting most
emphasis on extreme aﬄuence, we find that the very top of the joint distribution
of income and wealth was responsible for most of volatility in inequality at the top.
This is not only true during times of recession but also for a more recent period,
when the US experienced a strong surge in multidimensional aﬄuence.
Moreover, our approach allows to quantify the relative importance of single
dimensions contributing to multidimensional aﬄuence. We find that, in general,
both income and wealth are equally important. Only when emphasizing extreme
aﬄuence there is a clear difference between the two countries: While in Germany
wealth predominantly contributes to intense aﬄuence in a multidimensional set-
ting, income is more important in the US. Note again that our empirical application
is based on survey data. Future research could employ administrative data in order
to analyze several dimensions with different weights.
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5.6 Appendix
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Figure 5.6.1: Income and wealth densities by age (2007)
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Figure 5.6.2: Top income shares incl. capital gains (US, 1989–2007)
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Figure 5.6.3: Income and wealth by age (US, 1989–2007)
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Figure 5.6.4: Income and wealth inequality (US, 1989–2007)
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Weighting of dimensions. In section 5.2.2 we described the measurement of
multidimensional aﬄuence in the case of equal weighting of dimensions. Here, we
describe the more general case with different weights wj for dimensions j, where
it holds that the weights sum up to the number of dimensions under consideration
(
∑d
j=1wj = d). So far we have assumed wj = 1 ∀ j. The identification of the
dimension-specific aﬄuent then becomes
θwij(yij; γ) =
wj if yij > γj,0 otherwise (5.6.1)
and the sum of individual i’s aﬄuent dimensions’ weights cwi =
∑d
j=1 θ
w
ij is needed
for the identification of multidimensional richness depending on the second-stage
cutoff k ∈ [minj(wj), d]:
φk,wi (yi, γ) =
1 if cwi ≥ k,0 if cwi < k. (5.6.2)
Hence, the weighted matrices now read
Θα,w(k) =
[
wj ·
(
yij − γj
γj
)α
· φk,wi (yi, γ)
]
n×d
(5.6.3)
and
Θβ,w(k) =
[
wj ·
(
1−
(
γj
yij
)β)
· φk,wi (yi, γ)
]
n×d
(5.6.4)
respectively. The calculation of the multidimensional aﬄuence measures and its
contributions now works in the same as in the equal weighting case before.
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Figure 5.6.5: Multidimensional aﬄuence: different weights (2007)
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Figure 5.6.6: Aﬄuence contributions per dimension: different weights (2007)
Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
Growing economic inequality has recently received increasing attention. The gap
between rich and poor is potentially harmful for public welfare when it exceeds a
certain threshold. That is why many policy makers are concerned with increasing
levels of inequality. Economists should, therefore, provide an objective basis for
decision making with regard to redistributive policies. Conducting analysis of
economic inequality requires a decision on the exact research subject. This is
concerned with the underlying concept of economic resources as well as the extent
to which the household context is involved. The studies presented in this thesis
differ with respect to both dimensions. In the following, I will briefly summarize
the main results and discuss implications for future research and policy making.
Chapter 2 analyzes the remuneration of members of parliament (MPs) in Ger-
many. MPs earn significantly more than an average executive. However, politi-
cians’ earnings are not excessive compared to top level executives. Hence, answer-
ing the question whether the pay of MPs is appropriate is not straightforward and,
in turn, depends on the appropriateness of the underlying control group.
With respect to equity considerations, politicians’ remuneration is a good show-
case for policy makers themselves. It should be recognized that the assessment of
earnings differentials requires thorough scrutiny of whether high pay can be jus-
tified or not. This is especially important at the top, where excessive incomes
attract lots of publicity. Individual cases, that are perceived as unfair, can poten-
tially cement the public’s attitude towards the fairness of pay in general. However,
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decision makers should bear in mind that above average earnings are a necessary,
but not a sufficient condition for inefficient rent-seeking behavior or inequitable
discrimination on labor markets. In addition, politicians’ remuneration has im-
portant implications for the selection of individuals into politics and, hence, af-
fects the quality of policy making. Future research should, therefore, deepen our
understanding of the incentive systems politicians face in order to improve policy
output.
Chapter 3 studies the role of marital sorting on inequality while taking into
account labor supply behavior. The observed pattern of sorting in earnings has
a fairly weak impact on inequality. However, after correcting for labor supply
choices, sorting in productivity has a much stronger effect. This is mainly due to
positive correlation in earnings potential and increases in female employment that
are more concentrated in the upper part of the distribution.
From a policy maker’s perspective, this result implies a trade-off between policy
measures promoting female labor force participation and redistributive policies.
Achieving the objective of higher female employment apparently comes at the
price of higher inequality. The policy implications are ambiguous. One could ar-
gue that government intervention is not justified here, since this specific reason for
increasing inequality is the result of couples’ choices. However, the growing share
of dual earner couples implies a declining importance of intra family redistribu-
tion, which could potentially be substituted by government redistribution. Policy
advice on how to deal with this equity-efficiency trade-off can only be based on
a theoretical framework of optimal taxation of couples. This should explicitly
consider the role of market and non-market production of household goods and
services affecting the distribution both within and across couple households as well
as the selection into cohabitation and marriage.
Chapter 4 examines the role of changing household structure, especially de-
creasing household size, for the distribution of income. Changes in household
formation are associated with income inequality, since economies of scales in house-
hold consumption are more and more lost. This effect is stronger for gross incomes
than for disposable incomes. This means that the German tax and transfer system
implicitly provides a compensation for changing household composition.
Chapters 3 and 4 are concerned with social changes, which have altered soci-
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eties in many industrialized countries over the past decades. In many ways, the
distribution of economic resources did not remain unaffected by these trends. In
democracies, a society’s way of life is beyond the sphere of direct political influ-
ence. At the same time, tax-benefit policies are typically viewed as mechanisms for
redistributive or allocative purposes. However, there are a number of incentives
inherent in these policies affecting individual and household choices (sometimes
unintentionally) with respect to living arrangements. Therefore, the study of be-
havioral responses to policies remains at the top of future research agendas. The
optimal design of tax-benefit policies needs to take into account potential indirect
effects. Moreover, we should broaden our knowledge of the driving forces behind
long term trends shaping the composition of societies.
Finally, chapter 5 looks at the joint distribution of income and wealth at the
top. In general, both dimensions are equally important for multidimensional af-
fluence. When emphasizing the very top, wealth predominantly contributes to
intense aﬄuence in Germany, while income is more important in the US.
The view that economic well-being is not one-dimensional is now widespread.
Therefore, governments should take into account additional key dimensions when
assessing society’s welfare. However, when it comes to practical implementation of
multidimensional evaluation (of the distribution) of well-being, there is no general
consensus, neither on the choice nor on the weighting of dimensions. We use
core indicators of economic well-being, since they are important determinants of
economic inequality, which is the focus of this thesis. In other contexts, additional
dimensions are also of great importance and it is up to the researcher to select
dimensions in light of the respective research question. However, it would be
beneficial for the coherence of multidimensional analyses of economic well-being if
researchers agreed on a core set of dimensions and indicators.
In this dissertation, I address several building blocks in the literature on eco-
nomic inequality that are not fully integrated. Formulating a comprehensive model
of the distribution of economic resources is beyond the scope of this thesis. How-
ever, making progress on the development of such a theoretical framework, com-
prising models of earnings and income from all sources as well as models of house-
hold formation processes, is an enormous challenge for future research (Jenkins
and Micklewright, 2007a). As long as such a framework does not exist, one should
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instead combine single pieces of the puzzle to get closer to the overall picture of
economic inequality. This thesis contributes some of the pieces that were not yet
fully explored.
One important part of the puzzle, which deserves further study, is the interplay
between social and demographic changes on the one hand and the distribution of
economic resources on the other hand. Secular trends of changing living arrange-
ments are related to serious demographic transitions many Western societies will
face in coming years. These changes will fundamentally reshape the workforce and
society more generally. This is particularly true for Germany. As discussed before,
economic inequality will not remain unaffected by these foreseeable changes, but
our knowledge of this nexus is still limited and we do not exactly know which role
policies (should) play. Hence, future research should further address this issue.
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